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ABSTRACT 
 
 
THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE FRACTIONED NATURE 
OF THE CONTEMPORARY UKRAINIAN SOCIETY 
 
 
Gürsu, Tuna 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Associate Prof. Dr. Hakan Kırımlı 
September 2012 
 
 
The existence of a regionally divergent Ukrainian society is manifested not 
only in sharp regional voting differences, but also in differences in political culture, 
incompatible interpretations of history, conflicting choices of language and 
opposing preferences on country’s foreign policy orientation in different regions of 
Ukraine. The fact that divisions mainly correspond to historical regions led to the 
inference that these regional differences could largely be a matter of different 
historical experiences, that is different historical legacies, since these regions 
belonged to different countries during different historical periods. Accordingly, this 
thesis intends to analyze the historical roots of the extensive and persistent regional 
differences observed within the contemporary Ukrainian society, and lays the claim 
that this diversity is a reflection of their ancestors’ experiences in several diverse 
political dominations simultaneously, experiencing a life in very different 
environments provided by different sovereigns, and being exposed to different and 
sometimes even conflicting policies. Comparing the developments in different 
historical regions, this thesis aims at giving a comprehensive picture as to how the 
different experiences of Ukrainian people resulted in different self-identifications 
starting its analysis from the Kievan Rus’ and reaching up until the modern 
Ukraine. The historical analysis of different historical periods performed in this 
thesis demonstrates and confirms the fundamental role played by centuries long 
diverging historical experiences of Ukrainian generations and their historical legacy 
on the evolution of contemporary regional distinctions. 
 
 
Key Words: Ukrainian society, Ukrainian identity, historical experiences, 
historical legacy, regional diversities, historical regions, western Ukraine, eastern 
Ukraine, Ukrainian nationalism, Russification 
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ÖZET 
 
 
GÜNÜMÜZ UKRAYNA TOPLUMUNUN  
BÖLÜNMÜŞ YAPISININ TARİHSEL KÖKENLERİ 
 
 
Gürsu, Tuna 
Master tezi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Doçent Dr. Hakan Kırımlı 
Eylül 2012 
 
 
Ukrayna’nın farklı bölgelerinin belirgin bölgesel oy farklılıkları, politik kültür 
farklılıkları, birbiriyle uyumsuz tarih yorumlamaları, çelişen dil tercihleri, ve 
ülkenin dış politika yönelimi hakkında birbirine ters öncelikleri olması bölgesel 
farklılıkları olan bir Ukrayna toplumunun varlığını gözler önüne sermiştir. 
Bölünmüşlüklerin ağırlıklı olarak tarihi bölgelerle kesiştiği gerçeği, bu bölgeler 
farklı tarihsel dönemlerde farklı ülkelere ait olduklarından, bu durumun daha çok 
farklı tarihsel deneyimlerle, yani farklı tarihi miraslarla alakalı olduğu çıkarımına 
yol açmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, bu tez günümüz Ukrayna toplumunda gözlemlenen 
yaygın ve kalıcı bölgesel farklılıkların tarihsel kökenlerini incelemeyi 
amaçlamaktadır. Bu farklılıkların Ukrainlerin atalarının aynı anda farklı farklı siyasi 
egemenlikler altındaki deneyimlerinin, farklı ve hatta bazen çelişen politikalara 
maruz kalmış olmalarının bir yansıması olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Bu tez, Kiev 
Rusyası’ndan başlayıp modern Ukrayna’ya kadar uzanan bir analiz ile farklı tarihsel 
bölgelerdeki gelişmeleri karşılaştırarak Ukrainlerin farklı tarihsel deneyimlerinin 
nasıl farklı öz kimliklendirmelere sebep olduğunu gösteren kapsamlı bir resim 
sunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu tezde gerçekleştirilen farklı dönemlerin tarihsel 
analizi günümüz Ukrayna’sındaki bölgesel farklılıkların gelişiminde Ukrain 
nesillerinin yüzyıllar süren birbirinden farklı tarihsel deneyimlerinin ve bıraktıkları 
tarihi mirasın asli rolünü ortaya koymaktadır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ukrayna toplumu, Ukrain kimliği, tarihsel deneyim, 
tarihi miras, bölgesel farklılıklar, tarihi bölgeler, batı Ukrayna, doğu Ukrayna, 
Ukrain milliyetçiliği, Ruslaştırma 
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION 
 
 
In this thesis all Ukrainian and Russian names, terminology and words have 
been transliterated to English in line with the rules of the Library of Congress. 
However, terms and words from several other languages such as Turkish, Polish, 
German and Belorussian had to be used. Transliteration from these languages have 
been omitted, instead they were used as they occurred in the referred bibliography. 
If a name of a person or of a place has a frequently used equivalent in 
English, then English form is preferred above transliteration such as Moscow, 
Dnieper, Galicia, Khrushchev, Gorbachev, Yanukovych, Yushchenko and so on. In 
a similar sense, the use of Kiev instead of Kyiv is preferred in this study. Although 
Kiev is the Russian transliteration of the city’s name, it is not the reason for the 
author’s choice to use it instead of Kyiv, but the reason is that Kiev is the well 
established form in English. 
When it comes to the preference of Russian vs Ukrainian names of the 
districts, the criteria is, what people inhabiting these lands today call their cities. In 
other words, the names of Eastern and Southeastern districts of Ukraine have been 
transliterated not from their Ukrainian names but from their Russian names such as 
Kharkov, Lugansk, Donbass, Krivoy Rog and so on. Many of the names of the 
historical places or peoples are not used in today’s languages. Those names are 
either well established in English such as Galicia, Volhynia, Ruthenians and so their 
vii 
 
English forms are used or the preference of language for transliteration in terms of 
its relevance for respective histories of Russia and Ukraine such as using Zaporiz’ka 
Sich of Ukrainian transliteration instead of Zaporozhskaia Sech’ of Russian 
transliteration and Bohdan Khmel’nytskyi instead of Bogdan Khmel’nitskii. 
Ukrainian and Russian transliteration tables of Library of Congress include 
characters that do not exist in the  nglish Alphabet but in  atin. Among those 
characters only   and   have been used. Characters such as  ,   and   are not used for 
the convenience and instead conventional i and e are utilized since their phonetical 
similarity.  
In this thesis, whenever a quotation is used, the author does not change 
transliteration of the quoted sentence(s) in an effort to refrain from infringement to 
the authenticity of the related citation. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Every passing year the spirit of unity in Ukraine seems to be more far a 
dream since the developments show that Ukrainian people are further breaking 
ranks with each other. The developments of summer 2012 in Ukraine were crucial 
enough to jolt the country.  A new law on state language policy adopted by 
Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament) on 3th of July with the pushing of the party 
of power which represents pro-Russian southern and eastern areas, entered into 
force on 10
th
 of August with the signature of President Viktor Yanukovych.
1
 Within 
a week or two predominantly Russian-speaking southern and eastern Ukrainian 
oblasts (provinces) Odessa, Sevastopol, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, Kharkov, Mykolaiv, 
Kherson, Lugansk, and Dnepropetrovsk adopted the law, making Russian a regional 
language in their regions.
2
  “According to the law’s stipulation, 13 out of Ukraine’s 
27 regions will be eligible to officially recognize the Russian language”.3 On the 
other hand, western oblasts of historical Galicia,  ’viv, Ivano-Frankivs’k, and 
                                                             
1“ anguage  aw Comes Into Force In Ukraine,” Kyiv Post, 10 August 2012. 
2 “Russian Spreads  ike Wildfires In Dry Ukrainian Forest,” Kyiv Post, 23 August 2012. 
3“Ukrainian regions Move to Officially Recognize Russian,” RIA Novosti, 15 August 2012, available 
at http://en.ria.ru/society/20120815/175227937.html 
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Ternopil’ began protesting this law, refusing the recognition of the law and asking 
its cancellation.
4
   
Since Russian is now going to be used more broadly in administrative 
affairs, in education and business in southern and eastern Ukrainian regions, the 
already considerable differences between the regions of Ukraine may increase as 
this law may further stimulate the cultural, linguistic, and political divide in the 
country.
5
 The ex-President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko’s and jailed ex-Prime 
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko’s words on this law are worrisome. While Yushchenko 
argues that “this means not even Russification, because the 13 regions of which we 
are talking about are already Russified. … But we are talking about … de-
Ukrainization, as there are no more legal grounds to introduce the Ukrainian 
language … there,”6 the leader of Ukrainian opposition and reportedly nationalist 
and pro-West Tymoshenko further claimed that by this law “Yanukovych declared 
war on independent Ukraine.”7  
This latest development is one of the many demonstrating the divided nature 
of the Ukrainian society. Since independence, Ukrainian society proved itself to be 
                                                             
4 “Ivano-Frankivsk City Council refuses to recognize language law,” Kyiv Post, 23 August 2012. 
“Ternopil Regional Council Declared Language Law as Invalid in Region, Asks Constitutional Court 
to Cancel It,” Kyiv Post, 17 August 2012. “ viv City Council to Challenge  anguage  aw in 
Constitutional Court,” Kyiv Post, 28 August 2012. 
5
 According to the survey done by Kiev-based Ukrainian research organization named “Rating,” 
while 80 percent of the respondents in Western Ukraine believe that this law will destroy Ukrainian 
language, and 70 percent of them think the law further splits Ukrainians, 70 percent of the 
respondents from Donbass disagree and support the law. [Sociological Group “Rating,” Movne 
Pytannia: Za i proty, Press Release (July 2012): 25.] 
6“Yushchenko:  anguage  aw Will Trigger Ukraine’s de-Ukrainization,” Kyiv Post, 15 August 
2012. 
7 “Yanukovych Declared War On Whole Nation,” Kyiv Post, 5 August 2012. From October 2011 till 
now Tymoshenko is being held in prison in Kharkov since the Ukrainian Courts found her guilty of 
exceeding her power in signing a gas deal with Russia in 2009, sentencing her for 7 years-term. 
(“Guilty!,” Kyiv Post, 14 October 2011.) Western governments and pro-Tymoshenko camp in 
Ukraine perceive her situation as an unfair and politically motivated imprisonment. (European 
Commission, Stefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood, 
Statement on the Situation in Ukraine, Case of Yulia Tymoshenko, European Parliament Plenary 
Session, Strasbourg, 22 May 2012 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? 
reference=SPEECH/12/373&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en) 
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in trouble in developing a common unifying identity. The analysis of the results of 
the elections, referendums, surveys and public opinion polls held since 1991 all 
revealed incompatible values and attitudes inherent in Ukrainians of different 
regions. The geographical voting patterns that came to surface with the 1994 
Presidential elections proved habitual with each election to come. While the western 
Ukraine was supporting those politicians (Leonid Kravchuk, later-time Leonid 
Kuchma, Yushchenko, and Tymoshenko) who reportedly represented nationalist, 
pro-independence and pro-western orientation, eastern and southern Ukraine 
supported those allegedly representing pro-Russian and pro-communist one (early-
time Kuchma, Petro Symonenko, and Yanukovych).
8
 As for the extreme ends, 
Ukrainians living in the oblasts of historical Galicia casted 94% of their votes for 
Kravchuk in 1994, 91% for Kuchma in 1999, 95% for Yushchenko in 2004, and 
88% for Tymonshenko in 2010, while overwhelming majority in Crimea and 
Donbass voted for Kuchma in 1994 (93%), Symonenko in 1999 (52 %), and 
Yanukovich in 2004 (88%) and in 2010 (89%).
9
 
Survey and opinion polls are also indicative of the situation in Ukraine. A 
2008 survey demonstrated that while 87.7 percent of western Ukrainians declared 
that if the referendum on independence was to be held again they would go for 
independence, the support fell increasingly moving towards the east of the country 
                                                             
8 In 1994, 45.2 percent of Ukrainians voted for Kravchuk, and 52.3 for Kuchma. In 1999, 56.25 
percent voted for Kuchma, while 37.80 percent for Symonenko. In 2004, 51.99 percent of 
Ukrainians casted their votes to Yushchenko, and 44.20 percent to Yanukovich. In 2010, 45.47 
percent of Ukrainians supported Tymoshenko, whereas 48.95 percent supported Yanukovich, 
making him the first Ukrainian president ever to be elected with less than half of the votes casted. 
Tsentral’na Vyborcha Komisiia Ukraїny (Central Voting Commission of Ukraine) available at 
http://www.cvk.gov.ua/sekretariat/ 
9Tsentral’na Vyborcha Komisiia Ukraїny available at http://www.cvk.gov.ua/sekretariat/ 
Tymoshenko garnered only 10 percent of the votes casted in the Crimea and Donbass, and 
Yanukovych garnered only 7 percent of those in Galician oblasts. In 2004 elections, Yanukovych 
garnered only 3 percent of the votes from Galicia, and Yushchenko received 8 percent from the 
Crimea and Donbass. In 1999, while a mere 5 percent of the votes from Galician oblasts were casted 
to Symonenko, Kuchma received 40 percent of Crimean and Donbass votes, a comparatively high 
figure but still less than votes given to Symenenko in these regions.  
4 
 
since 55.7 percent of central Ukrainians, and only 39.1 and 38.6 of southern and 
eastern Ukrainians thought to re-vote for independence.
10
 On the other hand, 65 
percent of southern and eastern Ukrainians expressed their regret for the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union, whereas 82 percent of their western counterparts were pleased 
with the collapse of the Soviet state.
11
 Regional differences come to surface also in 
terms of foreign policy choices. 65.5 percent of western Ukrainians prefer 
prioritization of relations with the European Union; however, 56.85 percent of 
southern and eastern Ukrainians prefer closer relations with Russia. As it is the case 
in many issues, central Ukraine represents a middle ground since 40.7% support 
close relations with the EU and 36.6 percent with Russia.
12
 
Language preference and mother-tongue identification is another crucial 
indicator of regional differences. While Ukrainian language is the mother-tongue of 
89.9 percent of western Ukrainians, it is so for 59.6 percent of central Ukrainians 
29.1 of whom define both Ukrainian and Russian as their mother-tongue. On the 
other hand, Russian language dominates as the mother-tongue of southern and 
eastern Ukrainians (48 and 44.4 percent respectively), and only 14.5 of them 
specify Ukrainian as such.
13
 Furthermore, while 89 percent of western Ukrainians 
                                                             
10Razumkov Center, Iakby referendum shchodo proholoshennia derzhavnoї nezalezhnosti Ukraїny 
vidbuvavsia c’ohodni, to iak by Vy na n’omu proholosuvaly? (rehional’nyĭ rozpodil), Sociological 
poll held on 21 August 2008 available at  http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=326 
11Sociological Group “Rating,” “Back in USSR?”: dumky ukraїntsiv i rosiian, Press Release 
(December 2010): 7. 
12 Razumkov Center, Iakyĭ napriam zovnishn’oї politykky maie buty priorytetnym dlia Ukraїny? 
(rehional’nyĭ rozpodil), Sociological poll held on 31 Jenuary-5 February 2008. Available 
at http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=119 
13 Razumkov Center, Iaka mova ie dlia Vas ridnoiu?(rehional’ny  rozpodil, dynamika 2006-2008), 
Sociological poll held on 7-19 October 2008. Available at http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/ 
poll.php?poll_id=436 
5 
 
use Ukrainian fluently; this figure drops to 70.6 in center and merely to 36 in 
southern and eastern Ukraine.
14
 
Another point of differentiation in the Ukrainian society is their 
incompatible interpretations of history. Contradictory regional understandings of 
the WWII period surfaces in the celebrations of the Victory Day.
15
 While in 
celebrations in Galician oblasts attention is usually given to the role of the OUN-
UPA and the Soviet victory is presented as mainly an alien invasion, eastern 
Ukrainian celebrations usually have an atmosphere similar to that in Moscow. Kiev 
representes a compromise, as while the celebrations are in Ukrainian, they are 
similar to those in eastern Ukrainian cities. In the same vein, as a 2009 Kiev 
International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) Survey demonstrated, while respondents 
from historical Galicia had positive perceptions of OUN-UPA, those from historical 
Volhynia, Bukovina, and Transcarpathia also possessed positive perceptions, still 
much less than the Galicians. On the other hand, eastern Ukrainians tended to have 
negative views of OUN-UPA.
16
 This issue remains a controversy in today’s 
Ukraine. Only several years had passed since the dispute between the reportedly 
nationalist Yushchenko, whose electoral base was western Ukraine, and the 
allegedly pro-Russian Yanukovych, whose electoral base was eastern Ukraine, over 
rehabilitation of OUN-UPA insurgents and conferring of the status of “Hero of 
Ukraine” title to Stepan Bandera amd Roman Shukhevych.17 
                                                             
14 Razumkov Center, Iak by Vy otsinyly svi  riven’ znannia ukraїns’koї movy? (rehional’ny  
rozpodil), Sociological poll held on 20 April – 12 May 2006. Available at 
http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=778 
15 9 May is celebrated as the day Nazi Germany was defeated by the Soviet Union. 
16 Ivan Katchanovski, “Terrorists or National Heroes? Politics of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine,” 
(paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Canadian Political Science Association,  Montreal,  
June 1-3, 2010), 15. The survey was done by KIIS in the request of Katchoanovski to be published in 
his study. 
17  The status of “Hero of Ukraine” conferred to OUN-UPA by Yushchenko was annulled by the 
Yanukovych administration. (“Analysis: Ukrainian leader struggles to handle Bandera legacy,” Kyiv 
6 
 
In terms of cultural identification, although overwhelming majority of 
western Ukrainians identify with the Ukrainian culture (79.9%), less than half of 
southern and eastern Ukrainians do so (45.5%), since the remaining of them identify 
either with the Soviet or with the Russian culture, and think of having no major 
differences with ethnic Russians living in Ukraine (60%).
18
 Furthermore, southern 
and eastern Ukrainians think to possess more than twice percent similar 
characteristics, customs and traditions with Russians rather than with western 
Ukrainians.
19
 
As the above mentioned suggest, contemporary Ukraine is a country of 
extensive and persistent regional differences which are manifested not only in sharp 
regional voting differences, but also in differences in political culture, incompatible 
interpretations of history, conflicting choices of language and opposing preferences 
on country’s foreign policy orientation in different regions of Ukraine. Three years 
of personal experience in Ukraine during 1998-2000 and trips to Kiev,  ’viv, and 
several Crimean cities as a resident of eastern Ukrainian city of Kharkov led the 
author of this thesis to run into the notable differences between the people of these 
cities. While these childhood experiences in Ukraine meant the beginning of an 
interest in the reasons of such dissimilarities, a further scholarly interest has 
developed over the course of academic studies performed in later years.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
Post, 13 April 2010. “Donetsk court deprives Shukevych of Ukrainian Hero title,” Kyiv Post, 21 
April 2010. “Update: Stapan Bandera is no longer a Hero of Ukraine,” Kyiv Post, 21 April 2010.) 
18 Razumkov Center, Do iakoї kul’turnoї tradytsiї Vy sebe vidnosyte? (dynamika 2006-2007) 
(rehional’nyĭ, vikovyĭ rozpodily ta rozpodil za natsional’nistiu), Sociological poll held on 31 May – 
18 June 2007. Available at http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=693; Razumkov 
Center, Nackil’ky blyz’ki abo rizni kul’tury tradytsiї abo pohliady nastupnykh hrup? (rehional’nyĭ 
rozpodil), Sociological poll held on 20-27 December 2005. Available at 
http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=745 
19Razumkov Center, Nasikil’ky zhyteli riznykh rehioniv Ukraїny ta deiakykh susidnikh kraїn blyz’ki 
Vam za kharakterom, zvychaiamy, tradytsiiamy? (dynamika 2006-2007) (rehional’ny  rozpodil), 
Sociological poll held on 31 May – 18 June 2007. Available at 
http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=720 
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That the Ukrainian society is innately divided in almost every aspect 
triggered our curiosity about the underlying reason which shaped the Ukrainian 
people in a way that culminated in today’s regionally divergent Ukrainian society. 
The fact that divisions mainly corresponded to historical regions made us to reason 
that these regional differences could largely be a matter of different historical 
experiences, that is different historical legacies. 
The author of this thesis thinks that history provides by narrative the roots of 
a present situation. That being the case, we chose historical analysis as our method 
and from a comparative perspective we decided to examine the historical legacy of 
different historical regions of Ukraine on the development of separate identities in 
contemporary Ukraine.  
At this point, there arises the need to clarify the concept of historical legacy. 
Historical legacy is a combination of historical experiences and memories handed 
down by past generations to their descendants. It incorporates the effect of historical 
environment on these people, such as the events witnessed, the ways they were 
treated, the political, religious, and economic systems and institutions, and the 
policies implemented in the countries they lived in. As such, historical legacy 
involves the factors of religion and language, as these two factors have been 
evolved and transferred to future generations as an indispensible part of historical 
legacies. The transmission of shared past experiences and memories from one 
generation to the next through family, social environment, education and religious 
institutions help these past experiences and memories become the formative events 
that constitute the historical legacy of that group of people. Thus, sharing a common 
historical legacy helps people develop similar values, norms, and political cultures. 
Even if they can either be distorted or reinterpreted differently by different 
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sovereigns mainly with political reasons, historical legacies reach our day and shape 
societies. Max Weber’s thinking stands with our attribution of great importance to 
historical legacy. Quoting from Max Weber,  
The community of political destiny, i.e., above all, of common struggle 
of life and death, has given rise to groups with joint memories which 
often have had a deeper impact than the ties of merely cultural, 
linguistic, or ethnic community. It is this “community of memories” 
which, as we shall see, constitutes the ultimately decisive element of 
“national consciousness”.20 
 
In line with such thinking, the role of historical legacies is chosen as this 
study’s focal point. 
The effect of historical factors on regional political differentiations is studied 
by different scholars. Daniel Judah Elazar
21
 (1966) and John Shelton Reed
22
 studied 
the United States, Derek Urwin
23
 worked on the United Kingdom; Douglass C. 
North
24
 focused on the North-Latin American case, Seymour Martin Lipset
25
 and 
Lipset et al.
26
 studied the United States-Canadian case, Robert Putnam
27
 worked on 
the Italian case, Grzegorz Gorzelak
28
 and Tomasz Zarycki and Andrzej Nowak
29
 
                                                             
20 Max Webber, Economy and Society, Vol.2 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of 
California Press, 1978), 903. 
21 Daniel Judah Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the State (New York: Crowell, 1966) 
22 John Shelton Reed, The Enduring South: Subcultural Persistence in Mass Society. (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1986) 
23 Derek Urwin, “Territorial Structures and Political Developments in the United Kingdom.” in The 
Politics of Territorial Identity: Studies in European Regionalism, ed. Stein Rokkan and Derek Urwin 
(London: Sage, 1982). 
24 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
25 Seymour Martin Lipset, Revolution and Counterrevolution: Change and Persistence in Social 
Structures (New York: Anchor Books, 1970); Seymour Martin Lipset, Continental Divide: The 
Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada. (New York: Routledge, 1990). 
26 Seymour Martin Lipset et al., The Paradox of American and Canadian Unionism: Why Americans 
Like Unions More than Canadians Do, but Join Much Less (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). 
27 Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993). 
28 Grzegorz Gorzelak, Regional and Local Potential for Transformation in Poland (Warsaw: 
Euroreg, 1998). 
29 Tomasz Zarycki and Andrzej Nowak, “Hidden Dimensions: The Stability and Structure of 
Regional Political Cleavages in Poland,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 33, 3 (2000): 
331-354. 
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studied the Polish case, Juan  inz’s,30 Derek Urwin’s,31 and Robert 
Rohrschneider’s32 case was Germany, Medrano Juan Diez’s33 case was Spain, Ivan 
Katchanovski focused on the Crimean Tatar and the Gagauz,
34
 and Moldovan and 
Ukrainian cases,
35
 Vujačić36 studied the Russian and Serbian cases, Steven D. 
Roper and Florin Fesnic
37
 examined the Romanian and Ukrainian cases, and 
Andreas Kappeler’s38 focus was on the Ukrainian case. 
The general literature about Ukrainian regional diversity mostly tends to 
divide the country into two parts along the Dnieper River as West and East 
Ukraine.
39
 Some prefer to divide Ukraine as Western Ukraine, Central Ukraine, and 
Southeast Ukraine;
40
 while some others divide it as West, East, Central, and South 
Ukraine.
41
 Within this last quadripartite division, Dominique Arel further divides 
                                                             
30 Juan  inz, “Cleavage and Consensus in West German Politics: The  arly Fifties,” in Party 
Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein 
Rokkan. (New York: Free Press, 1967). 
31 Derek Urwin, “Germany: From Geographical  xpression to Regional Accommodation,” in The 
Politics of Territorial Identity: Studies in European Regionalism, ed. Stein Rokkan and Derek 
Urwin. (London: Sage, 1982). 
32 Robert Rohrschneider, “Cultural Transmission versus Perceptions of the  conomy,” Comparative 
Politics 29, 1 (1996): 78-104. 
33 Medrano Juan Diez, Divided Nations: Class, Politics, and Nationalism in the Basque Country and 
Catalonia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995). 
34 Ivan Katchanovski, “Small Nations but Great Differences: Political Orientations and Cultures of 
the Crimean Tatars and the Gagauz,” Europe-Asia Studies 57, 6 (2005): 877-894. 
35 Ivan Katchanovski, Cleft Countries: Regional Political Divisions and Cultures in Post-Soviet 
Ukraine and Moldova (Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2006); Ivan Katchanovski, “Regional Political 
Divisions in Ukraine in 1991-2006,” Nationalities Papers 34,5 (2006): 507-532. 
36 Veljko Vujačić, “Historical  egacies, Nationalist Mobilization, and Political Outcomes in Russia 
and Serbia: A Weberian View,” Theory and Society 25, 6 (1996): 763-801. 
37 Steven D. Roper and Florin Fesnic, “Historical  egacies and Their Impact on Post-Communist 
Voting Behavior,” Europe-Asia Studies 55, 1 (2003): 119-131. 
38 Andreas Kappeler, “The Politics of History in Contemporary Ukraine: Russia, Poland, Austria, 
and  urope,” in Ukraine on its way to Europe: Interim Results of the Orange Revolution, ed. Juliane 
Besters-Dilger. (Peter Lang: Frankfurt am Main; Oxford, 2009). 
39 Examples to such a dualistic approach are, Mykola Ryabchuk, “Two Ukraines?,” East European 
Reporter 5, 4 (1992): 18-22; Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith 
(Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997);  
40 Sharon L. Wolchik and Volodymyr Zviglyanich eds., Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity 
(Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 5.  
41 Dominique Arel, “Ukraine: The Temptation of the Nationalizing State,” in Political Culture and 
Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu (Armonk: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1995), 183. 
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the Central region as central-west (Right Bank) and central-east (Left Bank).
42
 
There are also those who argue about the non-existence of a clear divide but claim 
that Ukrainian society is far more fractured to divide into such clear groupings.
43
 
Although we prefer to refrain from accepting a specific way of division of 
Ukraine, we still can note that Dominique Arel’s and Orest Subtelny’s 
classifications fit to our mind the most. Similar to Arel’s quadripartite division, 
Subtelny prefers a division as Northwest and Southeast Ukraine with each having 
their own subdivisions.
44
 Northwest Ukraine is composed of Central and Western 
Ukrainian regions, while Southeast Ukraine is divided into East and South 
subregions. Our reason to opt for such a division as shown in the map below is that, 
firstly, while Northwestern Ukraine incorporates the lands which were formerly 
under the lengthy rule of its western neighbors, Southeastern Ukraine incorporates 
lands which had an experience of the rule of the Crimean Khanate, Ottoman and 
Russian Empires. Such a classification is also preferable because, a dichotomic 
division as East-West or Northwest-Southeast may lead to oversimplification, since, 
although differences within these regions are often tended to be overlooked, they 
actually do matter.  As such, Subtelny’s division of the main regions into two 
subregions is perceptive, since it reminds that despite having a great deal of 
similarities, the historical experiences of these subregions differ to some extent 
which requires separate examination. It should be remembered that Galicia, which 
is within the Western subregion had been under the rule of Austria and Poland until 
                                                             
42 Ibid. 
43 Yaroslav Hrytsak, Strasti za nationalizmom: Istorichni esei (Kiev: Kritika, 2004); Catherine 
Wanner, Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine (Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998). 
44 Orest Subtelny, “Russocentrism, Regionalism, and the Political Culture of Ukraine” in Political 
Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu 
(Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 189-207. 
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the Second World War, while Kiev region which is in the Central Ukraine used to 
be a part of the Russian Empire since the second half of the 17
th
 century. Similarly, 
Donetsk of East Ukraine and the Crimea have diverse historical experiences. 
Moreover, Kherson of South Ukraine and Aqmescit of Crimea also differ 
substantially. In fact, it would be more coherent to consider the Crimea as distinct 
from the South Ukraine.  
Reiterating our reservation in choosing a specific classification since we 
think that there are considerable internal differences within each of these regional 
divisions stated above,
45
 we do not deny that each proposition has validity in itself.  
 
Non-administrative regional division of Ukraine used by KIIS in 
election polls. The Western region (orange) comprises the eight regions 
of the west - Volynska, Rivnenska, Lvivska, Ivano-Frankivska, 
Ternopilska, Khmelnytska, Zakarpatska, and Chernivetska regions; the 
Central region (yellow) is made up by Zhytomyrska, Vinnytska, 
Kirovohradska, Cherkaska, Poltavska, Sumska, Chernihivska, Kyivska 
regions and the city of Kyiv; the Southern region (light blue) consists of 
Dnipropetrovska, Odeska, Mykolayivska, Khersonska, Zaporizka 
                                                             
45 For example, although in each of the classifications Galicia, Volhynia, and Transcarpathia remain 
within the same category, Western Ukraine, each of these historical regions’ past experiences differ 
from each other and as such despite being accepted as regions constituting western Ukraine the 
developments and experiences of these regions were examined separately throughout this thesis. 
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regions and Crimea; the Eastern region (dark blue) includes Kharkivska, 
Donetska and Luhanska regions
46
 
 
A Ukrainian nation and a Ukrainian homeland exclusive to them and 
corresponding to contemporary Ukraine’s territories did not exist historically. We 
shall remember that “an identity that might define the population of what is now 
Ukrainian territory as a single entity in opposition to a ‘non-Ukrainian’ other” did 
not “exist at the time”.47 The territories which comprise today’s Ukraine throughout 
centuries lived under a variety of political rule. The ancestors of today’s Ukrainians 
lived without a nation state for centuries. The lands which constitute the territory of 
contemporary Ukraine and the peoples who lived in these lands did “come under 
the influence of various organized states” all through history.48  
Ukraine as we know today is a Soviet creation. While the south and east 
Ukraine were “never Ukrainian or Russian before the late 18th century,” Sloboda 
Ukraine (the area around Kharkov) was never solely Ukrainian but was a mixed 
Russian-Ukrainian territory from the very beginning.
49
 The lack of any lasting 
independent statehood, that could help define the essence of an all encompassing 
consciousness and identity for Ukrainians, spilled over into our century.  
These diverse legacies form Ukraine into a country which “contains a vast 
array of regions with different histories, cultural outlooks, and levels of national 
                                                             
46Kiev International Institute of Sociology, Political Orientation of Ukrainian Population: Two 
Months Before the Elections, Press release based on the results of the survey conducted by KIIS 
January 18 – 28, 2006 (February 9, 2006). 
47 Serhii Plokhy, The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and 
Belarus (Cambridge,U.K; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 46. 
48 Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, “The Traditional Scheme of ‘Russian’ History and the Problem of a 
Rational Organization of  astern Slavs,” reprinted in From Kievan Rus’ to Modern Ukraine: 
Formation of the Ukrainian Nation (Cambridge, Mass.: Ukrainian Studies Fund, Harvard University, 
1984), 361. 
49 Anatol Lieven, Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute 
of Peace Press, 1999), 26-27. 
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consciousness.” 50 The diversity in the national consciousness of today’s people of 
Ukraine is a reflection of their ancestors’ experiences in several diverse political 
dominations simultaneously, experiencing a life in “very different milieus” and 
“reacting to very different stimuli.”51 As such, composed of people with varied 
cultural baggages handed down by their ancestors, today’s Ukraine can be described 
as “a country with enormous cultural and psychological diversity, with few 
collective experiences and little ‘usable history’ that could serve as a matrix for the 
future.”52 Instead, contemporary Ukraine’s history was shaped in the hands of 
foreign rulers who have written and rewritten it along the lines of their own political 
interests. Thus, be it Russian, Polish, Soviet, Ukrainian, or Western historiography, 
all of them present a different perspective on the history of Ukraine. 
Quite a many scholar prefer skipping the pre-imperial period when studying 
the legacy of past experiences for the current fragmented Ukrainian identity.
53
 As a 
result, presentation of the legacy of pre-18
th
 century developments were seen crucial 
by the author of this thesis who argues that to apprehend the fragmented nature of 
contemporary Ukrainian society, the examination of the past few centuries will not 
be adequate. Since every past century took shape in the light of the former one, 
ignoring the legacy of the pre-18th century historical period would lead to an 
information gap when studying the role of past experiences over the development of 
present-day identities and political cultures of the Ukrainians. In such a view, we 
went as back as the times of the Kievan Rus’ in our search for the crucial breaking 
                                                             
50 Taras Kuzio, Ukrainian Security Policy (Westport: Praeger, 1995), 9, 13. 
51 Ilya Prizel, “Nation-Building and Foreign Policy,” in Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity, 
eds. Sharon L. Wolchik and Volodymyr Zviglyanich (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 12. 
52 Ibid., 13. 
53 To name some of those who see no necessity to examine the role of ancient periods whose work is 
concentrated on historical divisions in contemporary Ukraine, Katchanovski, Cleft Countries, 
especially 39, 41. Lieven, Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry, especially 6.  
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points that led to the differentiation of experiences of the Ukrainian people in 
adjacent but still separated geographies. Although we accept that the legacy of the 
pre-Polish-Lithuanian period is minor as compared to later eras, ignoring the legacy 
of pre-Partition Commonwealth on the separate development of Ukrainians would 
have rendered our analysis of the historical roots of the present situation 
incomplete.  
Ukrainian regional diversity is a fact accepted by almost all studying 
Ukraine. This phenomenon raises the curiosity of scholars interested in intra-state 
political cleavages in general and in the Ukrainian politics in particular. This thesis 
aims at giving a comprehensive picture as to how the different experiences of 
Ukrainian people resulted in different self-identifications starting from the 
dissolution of the Kievan Rus’, the motherland in which ancestors of all Ukrainians 
were once bound by the same experiences, thus the inception of today’s Ukraine. 
By historicising the past historical eras, and comparing the developments in 
different historical regions of Ukraine this study offers an historical analysis of the 
events and policies of different sovereigns, which regions of Ukraine were subject 
to, and examines how and why these shaped the Ukrainian society in a way that 
culminated in the historical outcome of today’s regionally divergent Ukrainian 
state. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LEGACY OF ANCIENT TIMES:  
FROM KIEVAN RUS’ TO THE PARTITIONS OF POLAND 
 
 
2.1 Kievan Rus’ 
 
The differing historical legacies of the people of Ukraine began shaping as 
early as the first known  ast Slavic state, i.e. the Kievan Rus’, which came into 
being during the late 9
th
 century.
54
 In search for a foundation myth, all three East 
Slavic peoples – Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians – claim that their historical 
ancestry extends to the Kievan Rus’.  
In the traditional Russian historiography, the theories of “translatio from 
Kiev to Moscow,” that is the “displacement of political centers”55 and “shift in 
population,”56 attempt to explain Russia’s being successor to Kievan Rus’. Russian 
                                                             
54 Though the lands encompassing the Kievan Rus’ can only be estimated approximately, “at its 
peak, circa the mid-twelfth century, Kievan Rus extended from the Carpathian mountains and the 
Black Sea in the south-west to the White Sea in the north-east,”  incorporating the lands occupied by 
the East Slavic tribes. [Mikhail A. Molchanov, Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-
Ukrainian Relations (USA: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 60.] 
55 For details about Karamzin’s theory of the displacement of political centers see, Nikolay 
Mikhailovich Karamzin, Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskago: V dvenadtsati tomakh (History of the 
Russian State) (Moscow: Olma-Press, 2004). 
56For Mikhail D. Pogodin’s depopulation theory see, the 7th volume of his Issledovaniia, 
zamechaniia i lektsii o russkoi istorii (Moscow: v tipografii L. Stepanovoi, 1856), 425-8; or for a 
brief account see Zenon  . Kohut, “Origins of the Unity Paradigm: Ukraine and the Construction of 
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historians of the traditionalist school view the Mongol invasions of Kievan realm in 
mid-thirteenth century as the reason of the fragmentation of the “single Russian 
people” into three.57 Accordingly, future developments led Ukraine to emerge as 
“Polonized and Catholicized ‘Western Russian’ lands” which were “historically 
destined for reunion with Great Russia.”58 Polish mainstream historians seem to 
follow “shift in populations” theory of Russians, arguing that the barren lands in the 
east were settled by those peasants from Polish and Lithuanian lands.
59
 Many a 
Western scholar also adopted the Russian standpoint, while the Soviet 
historiography came to perceive Kievan Rus’ as the “common cradle” of all  ast 
Slavs, and the Russians as the “elder brother” who were to protect their “little 
brothers” from foreign control and meant to “reunite” the “brotherly peoples”.60  
On the other hand, Ukrainian nationalist perception, highly shaped by 
Mykhailo S. Hrushevskyi,
61
  is that “the real successor to Kievan Rus was Galicia 
and Volhynia, and that Muscovy belongs to an entirely different civilizational 
orbit.”62 Hrushevskyi asserts that “the Kievan State, its law and culture, were the 
creation of one nationality, the Ukrainian-Rus’, while the Vladimir-Moscow State 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Russian National History(1620-1860),” Eighteenth-Century Studies 35, 1 (2001): 73, and Edward D. 
Wynot, Jr., “The Impact of Mykhailo Hrushevsky on the History of Russia, Poland, and the  astern 
Slavs,” The History Teacher 20, 3 (1987):350.  
57 Prizel, “Nation-Building and Foreign Policy,” 15. 
58Kohut, “Origins of the Unity Paradigm ,” 74.  This view was formulated by one of themost 
influential historians of the nineteenth century Russia, Sergei M. Solovev, in his 29-volumed Istoriia 
Rossii s drevneishikh vremen published between 1851-1879. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no-
ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1959-66). 
59Paul Robert Magocsi, A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1996), 17. 
60 Ibid., 21-24. 
61 Hrushevskyi is a leading figure in the Ukrainian history, who in 1904 wrote a seminal article 
entitled “The Traditional Scheme of ‘Russian’ History and the Problem of a Rational Organization 
of  astern Slavs,” and then the ten-volumed Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy (History of Ukraine-Rus’, 1898-
1937). Apart from being a prominent historian, he was to head the short-lived Ukrainian state of the 
revolutionary period of 1917-1918. 
62 Prizel, “Nation-Building and Foreign Policy,” 15-16. See Mykhailo S. Hrushevskyi, “The 
Traditional Scheme of ‘Russian’ History”. 
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was the creation of another nationality, the Great Russian.”63 Furthermore, 
according to the traditional Ukrainian historical approach, Kiev’s population did not 
entirely flee after the Mongol invasions in 1240s, but shifted towards Galicia and 
Volhynia, that is slightly westward, until returning as the Cossacks in the 
seventeenth century.
64
 Hence, it was not Vladimir-Suzdal (succeeded by Muscovy) 
but was the ‘state’ of Galicia-Volhynia which was the true inheritor to Kievan 
Rus’.65 Thus, as an antidote to the “translatio from Kiev to Moscow” theory, “from 
Kiev to Kiev” was introduced, with which Kievan Rus’ is seen as “an exclusively 
proto-Ukrainian state.”66 This way, Ukrainian historiography leaded by 
Hrushevskyi, challenged the Russian conception of the history of Eastern Slavs.
67
  
The examination of the culture and religion in the Kievan Rus’ is directly 
related to the impact of Byzantium. As coming to existence of the Kievan Rus’ 
corresponds to Byzantium’s Golden Age (843-1025), Byzantium was a source of 
critical inspiration for the Kievan Rus’.  The commercial interactions not only 
brought economic prosperity but also enabled the introduction of Christianity and 
Byzantine culture into the Kievan lands.”68 In 988 Christianity was made the 
                                                             
63 Hrushevskyi, “The Traditional Sheme of ‘Russian’ History”, 356-357. (Hrushevskyi, “The 
Traditional Sheme of ‘Russian’ History”, 357.) 
64 Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, 24. 
65 Serhy Yekelchyk, Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation (Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 23. See for examples considering Galicia-Volhynia as a state rather than a principality; 
Yaroslav Isaievych, Halytsko-Volynska derzhava (Lviv: Instytut ukrainoznavstva im. 
I. Krypiakevycha NANU, 1999), and O. S. Kucheruk, ed., Halytsko-Volynska derzhava XII-XIV st. 
(Lviv: Svit, 2002). 
66 Arel, “Ukraine: The Temptation of the Nationalizing State,” 178. 
67 Ukrainian interpretation of history can be labeled as an “exclusivist and victimized conception of 
Ukrainian history.” (Arel, The Temptation of the Nationalizing State, 177.) This is not restricted to 
the historians but serves as a foundation for Ukrainian nationalists’ thinking. For instance, for many 
Ukrainian nationalists, while “Ukraine belongs to  urope … Moscow is … an usurper of that 
heritage and belonging to Asia” [Kristian Gerner, “Ukraine between  ast and West in History,” in 
Ukraine and Integration in the East: Economic, Military and Military-Industrial Relations, ed. Lena 
Jonson (Stockholm: The Swedish Institute of International Affairs), 22.], and let alone being a elder 
brother, Russia’s role in Ukraine is one of political subjugation, imperial domination, economic 
exploitation, denationalization, and Russification. (Arel, “Ukraine: The Temptation of the 
Nationalizing State,” 158, 167.) 
68 Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, 62.  
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official religion of the Kievan Rus’ by Vladimir the Great. In time, Kiev turned into 
a “Constantinople on the Dnipro.”69 Still, paganism remained widespread among 
many Eastern Slavs. At any rate, the late 980s were to be of great importance not 
only for the creation of a common identity for the Kievan Rus’, but also from now 
on being “Rus’” began to mean belonging to the Orthodox Christian faith.70  
1054 was a very critical year for two reasons: the Great Schism and the 
death of Iaroslav the Wise. It was in 1054 that the European Christianity was split 
into two as the Catholic Church (Roman or Latin) with its seat in Rome in the west, 
and Orthodox Church (Byzantine Greek) with its seat in Constantinople in the east. 
As a “cultural foster child of Byzantium,”71 highly influenced by it in arts, religion, 
literature, and architecture, Kievan Rus’ and its successors were to remain within 
the authority of the Byzantine version of Christianity, the Orthodox Church. On the 
other hand, in 1054 the death of Iaroslav the Wise ignited a conflict among his 
descendants over the issue of succession. Iaroslav decided to allocate Kievan lands 
into five patrimonies among his sons.
72
 With his death, each son developed their 
own dynasty in their own patrimonies. The different paths to be followed by each 
principality would have implications for the differentiation of these regions and 
their inhabitants from one another in the course of time.  
In the Conference of  iubech of 1097, the Rus’ princes, accepted that they 
and their offspring will rule in their own patrimony and will not interfere with each 
others’ domains.73  With, the death of Mstyslav I, the only prince who could hold 
                                                             
69 Plokhy, The Origins of the Slavic Nations, 13. 
70 Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, 72-73. 
71 Yekelchyk, Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation, 21. 
72 Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, Second Edition (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto 
Press, 1994), 36.  
73 Ibid., 79. With some disruption this concert continued until the death of the grand prince Mstyslav 
I in 1132. 
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Kievan Rus’ together, internal strife reemerged and thus of the era of disintegration 
of the Kievan Rus’ started. This period was marked with the decline of Kiev as the 
political center of the Kievan Rus’ as power gradually defuses to new centers that 
are, Galicia-Volhynia (now western Ukraine), Novgorod (in the north in today’s 
Russia), and Vladimir-Suzdal’(in the north-east, in present-day European Russia) 
and this transformation brought about further differentiation.
74
 Kievan Rus’ “was 
transformed into a loose dynastic confederation,”75 and later on in 1136 Novgorod 
became independent of the Kievan Rus’, while Galicia-Volhynia and Vladimir-
Suzdal’ (later Muscovy) struggled to unite the Kievan realm under their rule, in 
which they failed. However, they both began to call themselves to be the political 
heir to the Kievan Rus’.76  
 
 
2.2 Pax Mongolica 
 
The real transformation of Kievan Rus’ was to occur with the Mongol 
invasions in 1240s that “destroyed the fragile remnants of Kyivan Rus and 
precipitated the trend towards separate development among the eastern Slavs,”77 
thus political divergences began solidifying with the Mongol invasions. Henceforth, 
the Rus’ lands were subordinated to the Mongol state Golden Horde (also known as 
                                                             
74 According to the Primary Chronicle, the Rus’  and was located “within the boundaries of the 
Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Pereiaslav triangle” while “other lands were viewed merely as possessions, not 
as part of the Rus’  and per se.”, It was after the Mongol invasions of Kiev region the Rus’  and 
“took on new political and geographic dimensions, including Galicia and Volhynia as integral parts.” 
(“Since the Galician-Volhynian princes took possession of parts of the traditional Rus’  and without 
relinquishing control over Galicia and Volhynia” the concept was extended to their entire realm. 
(Plokhy, The Origins of the Slavic Nations, 38-39, 59-60) 
75 Bohdan Nahaylo, The Ukrainian Resurgence (London: Hurst & Company, 1999), 2. 
76 Yekelchyk, Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation, 23.  
77 Nahaylo, The Ukrainian Resurgence, 2. 
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the Kipchak Khanate or the Ulus of Jochi), and “the princes of Rus’ recognized 
Batu and his successors as their overlords.”78As of then, Kievan Rus’ was divided 
into separate principalities and as long as they recognized the authority of the 
Mongols and paid their annual tribute, the princes were left to rule their patrimonies 
as before.
79
 Furthermore, as the Mongols did not give much effort to spread their 
own religion in the Rus’ lands,80 the Pax Mongolica provided the Rus’ with an 
atmosphere for the improvement of the status of Orthodoxy to the extent that in the 
late 13
th
 century Orthodoxy could reach to the countryside.
81
 Thus, the Orthodox 
Church was the foremost beneficiary of the Mongol rule. However, still, the 
adoption of Islam by the Golden Horde in 1313 caused discomfort among the 
Rus’.82 Despite increasing political divergence, there is little wonder that the 
Mongol “other” promoted a sense of Rus’ unity which seemed to disappear during 
the inter-dynastic warfare years in the eve of the Mongol invasions.
83
  
While with the Christianization of the Rus’ land, the use of Church Slavonic 
in liturgical practices “helped unify the linguistic practices” of the Rus’ people,84 
Magocsi hypotheses that during the era of political disintegration and Mongol rule 
did the “Slavic linguistic unity among the inhabitants of Kievan Rus’ began to 
break down, … and that out of this differentiation Ukrainian, Belarusan, and 
Russian began to take shape in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.”85 Thus we 
may guess that ethnic and linguistic differentiations among the Eastern Slavs began 
to develop following the Mongol invasions and became more visible with the 
                                                             
78 Janet Martin, Medieval Russia 980-1584 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995),147. 
79 Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, 105. 
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incorporation of the Western Rus’ lands into the Grand Duchy of  ithuania and the 
Polish Kingdom.
86
 
 
 
2.3 Galicia-Volhynia 
 
After lengthy vassalage to the Golden Horde, Vladimir-Suzdal’ evolved into 
Muscovy in the 15
th
 century, while the Novgorod Republic retained its existence 
until Muscovy absorbed it in 1478. The major principality that remained 
functioning on the Ukrainian territory following the Mongol invasions was the 
principality (later the Kingdom) of Galicia-Volhynia (1238-1349). Meanwhile, 
other Southern-Rus’ lands were under the direct control of the Golden Horde.  
During 10
th
 century the lands of Galicia-Volhynia were undergone several  
invasions. These invasions by its neighbors are the reasons behind the historical 
debate of whose historic lands these were, as every invasion provided Poles, 
Hungarians or Habsburgs with pretext for future invasions and claim upon these 
lands.
87
 During the first half of the 1240s Prince Danylo of Galicia
88
 was approved 
as the ruler of Galicia-Volhynia by the Mongol overlords and he frequently relied 
on Mongol existence to deter neighboring powers Poland, Lithuania, and Hungary 
from meddling in Galicia-Volhynia.  
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Hungarians until 1918. [ udvik Nemec, “The Ruthenian Uniate Church in Its Historical 
Perspective,” Church History 37,1 (1968): 369.] 
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In 1240s however, Danylo who wanted to get rid of the Mongol suzerainty 
was in search for an alliance with Poland, Lithuania, and Hungary against the 
Mongols. As such, in hope for possible mounting of a crusade against the Mongols 
he stated his readiness to acknowledge the Pope as the head of the church.
89
 This 
fruitless attempt led to suspicions on the part of the Orthodox Church hierarchy and 
Galician boyars that he had a Roman Catholic orientation.
90
 The suspicions about 
Danylo’s religious orientation persuaded Constantinople to look for a new place of 
residence for the Metropolitan of Kiev and all Rus’. As a result, the new 
metropolitan Cyril moved to the next alternative that is Vladimir-Suzdal’. This 
resettlement initiated the transformation of the center of the Rus’ church, as Cyril’s 
successors first moved to Vladimir-na-Kliazma, the capital of Vladimir-Suzdal, in 
1300 and then permanently to Moscow in 1326.
91
 Thus the year 1299 indicates the 
“final demise of Kiev as the center of the Rus’ realm,” whereas the 1326 movement 
of the Kievan Metropolitan See to Moscow supports the claim of the Orthodox 
Church hierarchy in Moscow to the Kievan heritage.
92
 Thereafter, the two power 
centers were contesting for primacy by both laying their claim to Kievan 
ecclesiastical heritage.
93
 
An important territory inhabited by the Rus’ because of “a steady influx of 
fugitives from the Kievan lands” as a result of the Mongol attacks was the north-
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eastern Carpathia.
94
 The Galicia-Volhynian period is also critical for the future 
developments in Transcarpathia as it was during the reign of Danylo’s son  ev 
(1269-1301) that Transcarpathian Rus’ was obtained from Hungary.95 Although 
with the destruction of the principality of Galicia-Volhynia the Rus’ inhabitants of 
the area became subjects of the Hungarians,
96
 this laid “the foundation for future 
Ukrainian claims to the Western slopes of the Carpathians.”97 
With its geographic proximity, Galicia-Volhynia was the very Rus’ land 
which was open to the interferences from its neighbors and susceptible to their 
Catholic faith. The situation supervened with annexations by these Catholic  powers 
signaled the upcoming evolutions in these lands. In 1340s, when Galicia-Volhynia 
was in turmoil following the death of its very last ruler, and when the Golden Horde 
had relaxed its grip on the western territories,
98
 Polish Kingdom was being ruled by 
one of its greatest rulers Casimir the Great and The Grand Duchy of Lithuania was 
experiencing a rapid growth. Consequently, while Lithuania took control of 
Volhynia in 1344, Poland annexed Galicia in 1349.  
These developments in Galicia-Volhynia meant the beginning of a new 
phase in the Ukrainian history, as with the disappearance of Galicia-Volhynia the 
last “political entity on the territory of Ukraine to embody the heritage of Kievan 
Rus’ ceased to exist,”99 and hereafter most Ukrainian lands  gradually came under 
the control of Lithuania within  half a century.  While the Tatar rule over the 
Western Rus’ lands was being gradually replaced by that of Poland and  ithuania, 
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one more century was to pass before  astern Rus’ lands were to be freed from the 
Tatar suzerainty. This was a crucial factor in “accentuating the differences in the 
historical development” between the ancestors of present-day Russians, Ukrainians, 
and Belarusians.
100
  
 
 
2.4 Desht-i Kipchak 
 
While the northern and western territories of contemporary Ukraine where 
changing hand from the Kingdom of Galicia-Volhynia to the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland, the southern and eastern lands were 
experiencing different developments. It should be remembered that in this period 
Ukrainian-Rus’ people did not populate these lands, but these lands from Dniester 
to the Don, which were directly ruled by the Golden Horde (and after the 1420s by 
one of the successor states of the Golden Horde, that is the Crimean Khanate), were 
called as the Desht-i Kipchak (the Kipchak Steppes). These lands were not a part of 
the historic Ukraine, were not inhabited by Slavs, neither by the Russians nor by the 
Ukrainians, but were inhabited by the Tatars and nomadic Nogays both descendants 
of the Kipchak Turks.
101
   
By the late 1400s these lands were empty of sedentary Rus’ population and 
those settled southward were retreating northward as a result of the Tatar raids.
102
 
The only Ukrainian elements we can talk about in the Kipchak plain during the 
sixteenth century were the Zaporozhian Cossacks in the upper northern parts of the 
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plain and the “Rus’ (Ukrainian) and Moskoflu (Russian)”103 captives sold as slaves 
by the Tatars.
104
 Thus, it should be kept in mind that even if these were lands with a 
scattered population, they were by no means no-man’s land, or barren lands of the 
Ukrainians. It was only after the time the Russia Empire acquired these lands that 
the Ukrainians arrived in the Kipchak Steppes. The Russian expansion southward 
was a slow process that “did not begin in earnest until the last decade of the 
fifteenth century.”105 
When the Golden Horde’s hegemony in the Kipchak Steppes began 
deteriorating in the mid-14
th
 century, Lithuania, Poland and Muscovy saw this as an 
opportunity to expand their territory southward.
106
 Following the assassination of 
Berdibek Khan (in 1359), the Golden Horde was busy with its internal turmoil, 
which turned into a protracted internecine war. Profiting from the situation, 
 ithuania systematically annexed first the core Rus’ lands and then reached further 
south In the meantime, Poland annexed Chelm and Belz. On the other hand, the 
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southward expansion of Muscovy was to begin only in the end of the sixteenth 
century. 
However, by the 1480s Crimean Khanate, which accepted the suzerainty of 
the Ottoman Empire by 1475, was to become an important power to hinder the 
Lithuanian, Polish, and Muscovite colonization of the Black Sea steppe. In late 15
th
 
century, there were a number of Crimean Tatar incursions into the lands acquired by 
Poland and Lithuania, such as Podolia, Volhynia, Malopolska, Rus’ Czerwona, or 
 ithuanian Belarus’.107 Crimean Tatars were also attacking the lands acquired by 
the Muscovy in the early sixteenth century, such as Briansk, Starodub, Novgorod-
Severskii, Ryl’sk, Putivl’, and Karachev, in order to “discourage Muscovite military 
colonization of the forest-steppe and steppe.”108 
By the mid-sixteenth century, being in alliance with the Crimean Tatars, 
Ottoman presence in Eastern European scene was to become emphatic. At the same 
time as central Hungary was outrightly annexed to the Empire following the Battle 
of Mohacs in 1526, a part of it became an Ottoman vassal state called as the 
Principality of Erdel (Transylvania). On the other side, the Principalities of 
Moldavia and Wallachia had already became vassals of the Porte.
109
 As such, 
Ottomans were to influence the future developments in the region, as the Ukraine 
was to remain in between the competition of the Commonwealth, Muscovy, and the 
Crimean-Ottoman alliance. 
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2.5 Under the Rule of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania 
 
As mentioned above,  ithuania gradually annexed the Rus’ lands during the 
second half of the 14
th
 century. It can be said that the Lithuanian forces were 
welcomed by the Ruthenian
110
 population, and it was the Golden Horde that fought 
against the Lithuanians, not them.
111
 Ruthenians should have had preferred the 
overlordship of the Lithuanians to that of the Crimean Tatars. As a matter of fact, 
during the Lithuanian rule the Ruthenians could identify with the political system 
they lived in and most probably they did not feel to be ruled by a foreign rule, 
because Lithuanian rulers were not forcing their culture, religion and language to 
their Ruthenian population; on the contrary, it was the Lithuanians who adopted the 
Ruthenian cultural elements.
112
 The new state which the Ruthenians were now 
living in became a kind of a Lithuanian-Rus’ state using the official name of the 
Grand Duchy of  ithuania, Rus’, and Samogitia.113  
The Ruthenians of the Grand Duchy were not feeling alien in this new 
environment as alongside the Lithuanians they were seen as the ruling group of the 
Duchy,
114
 and the Ruthenian elite were let to function even in the highest 
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governmental posts.
115
 Actually, the very fact that the Ruthenians did not feel alien 
to their new overlords, an environment which we propose to be non-assimilatory, 
was the reason why this period “significantly retarded the development of a separate 
identity”116 as the Ruthenian elite did not feel the need to develop a separate one.  
Unfortunately, the situation in the Polish ruled Rus’ lands was not that 
favorable, and eventually the promising conditions in the Grand Duchy were to fade 
out by 1385, when  ithuania and Poland entered into a “personal dynastic union”117 
with the Union of Krewo. As of then, Lithuania, which became a Catholic state as a 
condition of the Union, did not provide its Orthodox-Ruthenian subjects with a 
favorable environment. After the Union of Krewo and with the support of the state, 
the Polish rival “not only removed the  ithuanian elites from the Rus’ sphere of 
influence but also made inroads into the ranks of the Rus’ elites themselves.”118 
Eventually, as the Polish and Lithuanian elites drew more and more closer, 
the gap between the Lithuanians and Ruthenians grew. In the process Lithuanian 
upper classes became Polonized. In time, Roman Catholics began to be given 
preferential treatment at the expense of the Orthodox-Ruthenian people of the 
Grand Duchy.
119
 The Rus’ principalities which were “dismantled and replaced by 
smaller territorial entities” were given to the rule of Roman Catholic boyars.120 
Orthodox princes and nobles lost their previously favorable positions. As of then, 
Orthodox people were no more considered as citizens with full rights as long as 
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they did not convert to Catholicism.
121
 As such, the 16
th
 century in the Grand Duchy 
of Lithuania was marked with the emigration of numerous Orthodox-Ruthenian 
people
122
 who regarded  ithuania as “an oppressive Roman Catholic environment” 
to the Orthodox Muscovy.
123
 Those who did not leave the lands of Lithuania were 
organizing several uprisings against the Lithuanian authorities.
124
  
The period also saw the incremental division of the Rus’ church, which was 
a vital factor for the development of distinctions in the future Ukrainian society. 
After the disappearance of the Kievan state, the only unified Rus’ institution that 
remained was the Metropolitanate of Rus’, which helped to uphold the common 
liturgical practices and language. However, its fragmentation began with the 
establishment of the Metropolitanate of Halych
125
 following the departure of the 
Metropolitan of Kiev and All Rus’ to Northeastern Rus’ in 1299. This was followed 
with the establishment by the Lithuanians of their own metropolitanate ca. 1317 so 
as to detach their Orthodox subjects from the metropolitans of all Rus’ and  ittle 
Rus’,126 thereby contributing to  ithuanian state’s “legitimacy and the consolidation 
of their authority in Orthodox territories.”127  
Henceforward, there appeared a number of metropolitans with the titles as 
the Metropolitan of Kiev and  ithuania, of  ittle Rus’ and  ithuania, of Halych, of 
Kiev and All Rus’, of Kiev and Great Rus’, and so on. These many titles reflected 
the state of chaos in the Orthodox-Ruthenian world. Furthermore, after the Union of 
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Florence (1439)
128
 and then the election of Metropolitan Iona as the head of the 
Muscovite church without the assent of Constantinople in 1448, as a reaction to the 
Florence decisions, the split of the once unified Rus’ metropolitanate became 
permanent. As of then, there were two metropolitanates claiming their jurisdiction 
over all the lands of the former Rus’ metropolitanate, one in Moscow, one in 
Kiev.
129
 The two Rus’ became increasingly separate with the rising “competition 
between Vilnius and Moscow for the “gathering” of the Rus’ lands”.130  
While the Lithuanian state was ignoring the deteriorating status of its 
Orthodox-Ruthenian subjects, Muscovy emerged as a protector of Orthodoxy.
131
 In 
search for a justification for their expansion westward to the ancient Kievan lands 
there, Muscovites were relying on their claims of being the protector of Orthodoxy 
and the inheritor to the Kievan Rus’ and thus the gatherer of all ancient Rus’. 
However, these did not mean that they genuinely felt the Orthodox-Ruthenian 
people of those lands were their brethren neither during the Lithuanian, nor during 
the Polish and Polish-Lithuanian periods of the following centuries up until the 
17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries.
132
 The case was the same for the Ruthenians of the 
Commonwealth who named themselves Rus’ and Rusyn. Although they recognized 
their commonalities with the Muscovites, for the Ruthenians, their eastern 
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neighbors were “alien” and were referred to as “Muscovites”.133 That is, the 
“allegiance to different states reinforced by cultural, linguistic, and social 
differences tended to underline the distinctions between the two peoples.”134 
We can claim that dating back to the 15
th
 century, alienation began to take shape 
between the Muscovite and Polish- ithuanian Rus’, especially following the Union 
of Florence in 1439.
135
 
The rising power of the late 16
th
 century Eastern Europe was the Grand 
Duchy of Muscovy,
136
 which, during the second half of the century, expanded at the 
disadvantage of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (annexing Chernigov, Starodub, 
Novgorod-Severskii, and Smolensk).  Lithuania was not only struggling with the 
invasions of Muscovy, but also with the Crimean Tatar incursions, major ones 
accruing in 1549 and 1552.
137
 Lithuania which was desperately in need of help, 
turned to Poland. In 1569, the Poles unilaterally annexed the Grand Duchy’s 
southern regions Podlachia and Ruthenian lands (Volhynia, Bratslav, and Kiev).
138
 
This forced the Lithuanian side to come to terms with the Poles, and the Union of 
Lublin which meant the emergence of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 
(Rzeczpospolita) was concluded in 1569.  
Prior to evaluating the developments during the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth, for understanding the changing environment of the 
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Commonwealth’s Ruthenians better, we should focus on the developments in the 
lands inhabited by the Ruthenians in the Polish Kingdom before the Union of 1569. 
 
 
2.6 Under the Rule of the Polish Kingdom 
 
Before the Union of Lublin, and thus incorporation of Volhynia, Bratslav 
and Kiev, the other Rus’ inhabited lands Galicia, Belz, and Podolia were already 
part of the Polish Kingdom. Contrary to the relatively favorable environment 
experienced by the Ruthenians of the Grand Duchy, the Ruthenian inhabitants of 
the Polish Kingdom were faced with a more intolerant and imposing culture. The 
Polish-ruled lands inhabited by the Ruthenians were administered with the Polish 
legal system and used Polish as the official language.
139
 
16
th
 century Poland was marked with Polish cultural achievements.
140
 These 
achievements deluded the Orthodox-Ruthenian nobility. While some of the Rus’ 
nobility converted to Roman Catholicism and opted for Polish culture,
141
 others 
who retained their religion but adopted Polish customs and language, gave way to 
the development of the concept “gente Ruthenus, natione Polonus” (a Pole of Rus’ 
religion).
142
 In the late 16
th
 century, Polish magnates and gentry expanded into the 
Rus’ lands and became the new landlords. With the decline in the Polish economy 
in the early 17
th
 century, the Ruthenian population was to face the intensification of 
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social and religious intolerance. Owing to their Orthodox-Ruthenian identity, “Rus’ 
were differentiated from the rest of the society.”143 
In such a Roman Catholic environment, and being abandoned by their elite, 
the faith of the Orthodox-Ruthenian people was tied with the stance of the Orthodox 
Church. Unfortunately, they were left with no resolute Orthodox Church 
hierarchy.
144
 Furthermore, to facilitate the spread of Roman Catholicism in the Rus’ 
lands (contemporary western Ukraine) Roman Catholic archbishopric of Halych 
and  ’viv was established in 1375.145 Deprived of the support of its elites and 
Church hierarchy, the future of the Orthodox Church was “left to its own devices” 
and the Orthodox-Ruthenian identity in Ukraine was left to the hands of the 
ordinary masses.
146
  
Beginning with the late 15
th
 century, Orthodox Christianity in Polish 
controlled lands could keep alive in monasteries which encouraged ‘national 
consciousness.’  Possibly a more vital role was played by the Brotherhood 
(Bratstva) organizations, which were established by Orthodox-Ruthenian townsmen 
(mainly merchants and craftsmen)
147
 mostly in western Ukrainian cities during the 
first half of the 15
th
 century, with the aim of preserving Orthodox-Ruthenian 
identity and supporting the Orthodox church.
148
 
 
 
                                                             
143 Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, 150. 
144 Sysyn, “Ukrainian-Polish Relations in the Seventieth Century,” 76. As of mid-15th century, the 
Rus’ territories controlled by Poland and  ithuania had no Orthodox-Rus’ metropolitan in residence, 
and this “lack of effective authority led to an almost total breakdown of ecclesiastical order.” 
(Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, 154.) 
145 Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, 153. 
146 Ivan  . Rudnytsky, “ A Study of Cossack History,” Slavic Review 31, 4 (1972):  872. 
147 Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, 97. 
148 One of the most prominent Brotherhood was in the center of Galicia (renamed as the Polish 
palatinate of Red Rus’ since 1387), the  ’viv’s Stauropegial Brotherhood. (Magocsi, A History of 
Ukraine, 137.) 
34 
 
2.7 The Developments during the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 
 
The period the contemporary Ukrainian lands were ruled by the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth was of great importance in the evolution of the political 
culture of future people of Ukraine. After the Union of Lublin in 1569, all the 
Ukrainian lands previously controlled by Lithuania came under the control of the 
Polish side of the Commonwealth.
149
 Whereas the Ruthenians were the adherents of 
the majority religion in the grand Duchy of Lithuania, their religion became the 
faith of a minority with the Union of Lublin. While considering the Grand Duchy of 
 ithuania as a “foreign” rule could be misleading, such a labeling would better fit to 
the Polish rule, with its imposing religion, language, and culture, having an 
assimilatory effect on the Rus’ population. 
 “ acking both external and internal stimuli,” Orthodox-Ruthenians were 
left into the hands of the Polish dominant culture and were exposed to its 
assimilation efforts,
150
 which was further facilitated with the absence of Muscovite 
interest in the position of the Orthodox-Ruthenian people in the Commonwealth
151
 
This assimilation process was felt more strongly in the densely populated western 
Ukrainian regions of the Commonwealth, as compared to the regions in the Dnieper 
River basin with a geographic remoteness to the Polish center and proximity to the 
Muscovites. As Poland took control of Galicia and then other parts of Ukraine, in 
due course, cultural and linguistic Polonization spread in the cities. For most 
Orthodox-Ruthenian, cities became a “foreign” territory, inhabited by the Poles or 
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Polonized people.
152
 As privilege and wealth were progressively associated with 
Catholicity and Polishness, many “status conscious” elites preferred abandoning 
their culture and religion, while those who could or would not identify with 
Catholicity and Polishness felt increasingly resentful.
153
 In 1423, the Union of 
Horodlo amended the Union of Krewo and gave Catholicized Lithuanian and 
Ruthenian nobility equal status with their Polish counterparts.
154
 As such, by the 
15
th
 century, an important number of leading Orthodox-Ruthenian families opted 
for Roman Catholicism, Polish culture and language.
155
 As nobility was mostly lost 
to the Polish-Catholicism, Ruthenian culture, language, and religion became 
associated with the lower classes. Although few, there were also Ruthenian nobles 
who fought assimilation, establishing printing presses and Orthodox schools.
156
 
Apart from those efforts of the few elites, the Brotherhoods (Bratstva) served as 
important mediums for maintaining Orthodoxy-Rus’ identity.157 
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2.7.1 The Union of Brest and the Uniate Church 
 
Following the arrival of the Jesuits to Poland in 1560s, the previously 
tolerable religious environment of the Commonwealth was disturbed.
158
 Subsequent 
to the Protestants, the next target of the Jesuits was “schismatics,” that is the 
Orthodox. Pursuant to the Union of Florence of 1439, Jesuits promoted the idea of a 
local Church union to solve the “Orthodox problem” of Poland.159  
Still, the first initiative for a union came from the Orthodox side.
160
 The June 
1595 statement of several orthodox bishops of their intention for the union with 
certain prerequisites, most important of which was the inviolability of the traditional 
liturgies and rites, was followed by the Pope Clement VIII’s acceptance of the 
Ruthenians and their Church into the Roman Catholic Church in December 1595.
161
 
As a result, in October 1596, a pro-union synod was held in Brest which culminated 
in the declaration of the Union of Brest, with which while the head of the Rus’ 
Church became the Pope, the church practices were left unchanged, leading to the 
emergence of a Church suiting neither to the Roman Catholic nor to the Orthodox 
fashion.
162
 This new Church was named the Uniate Church (later to become Greek 
Catholic and then Ukrainian Catholic Church).  
As such, while from the Roman Catholic perspective, Uniates emerged as 
“half-Catholics” who could become “true Catholics” only after accepting the Latin 
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Rite, from the Greek Orthodox perspective they became traitors who apostatized 
their religion.
163
 The emergence of the Uniate Church caused a big commotion 
among the Ruthenians of the Commonwealth as Polish king approved the Union of 
Brest, and thus outlawed the Orthodox Church. Orthodox Church properties had 
been confiscated and the Orthodox bishops were pressured into joining the 
Uniate.
164
 The Orthodox cause of the Commonwealth’s Ruthenians was taken over 
by the brotherhoods and non-Polonized magnates, as the Ruthenian Orthodox ruling 
class and nobility was gradually converting to the Uniate side if not becoming 
Roman Catholics.
165
 
Following these developments, Ruthenians who retained Orthodoxy came 
increasingly to look at to Moscow for protection.
166
 However, Muscovy was 
preoccupied with domestic problems during the Time of Troubles. Still, the Union 
of Brest was received by the Muscovites as a serious blow to the Muscovite ‘Third 
Rome’ idea and as an effort to separate the “ ittle” and “White” Rus’ from the 
“Great” Rus’ by laying the stones for the Polonization of them.167  
The 16
th
 century religious developments in the Commonwealth were crucial 
as the period saw the conversion of quite a few Orthodox Ruthenians to Roman 
Catholicism and/or Greek Catholicism. At those times as religion was the main 
cursor of one’s self-identification, being Greek Orthodox meant being Rus’. As 
such “Rus’ faith” was the synonym for the “Greek faith.” In the 17 th century 
Commonwealth, Rus’ faith was part of an entire culture, which included the 
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historical traditions, ethnic characteristics and linguistic patterns” of the 
Ruthenians.
168
 Because of such interrelatedness, a Ruthenian’s desertion from 
Orthodoxy could easily bring about his alienation from the Ruthenian culture and 
absorption into the mainstream Polish-Catholic culture. However, the Uniate 
Church did not facilitate the Catholicization and Polonization of the Greek Catholic 
Ruthenians. Centuries later, the Uniate Church was to emerge as a bastion of 
Ukrainian national movement in western Ukraine that would cause great trouble in 
the future eastern Poland.
169
  
Still, the Union of Brest “divided Ukrainians into Orthodox and Greek 
Catholics, thereby laying the foundation for the many sharp distinctions that 
eventually developed between  ast and West Ukrainians.”170 Indeed, the Orthodox - 
Greek Catholic split persists even today, and distinguishes western Ukrainians 
culturally from those in south and east Ukraine. The Uniate Church played “a 
critical role in shaping the culture and identity of Galicia and Volhynia, and giving 
these regions an identity wholly separate from that of Orthodox Russia”171 and the 
remaining Russian-ruled Ukrainian lands which remained Orthodox.  
Not all Orthodox-Ruthenian population of the Commonwealth supported the 
Union. While the Bishops of  ’viv and Peremyshl’ (present day Polish city 
Przemyśl) refused the Union, quite a few number of priests, monastics, Orthodox 
magnates and Brotherhoods also did not support it.
172
 The Orthodox magnates and 
the Brotherhoods worked hard for the restoration of the Orthodox Church in the 
Commonwealth and their efforts culminated in 1607 the reinstate the Orthodox 
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Church.
173
 Subsequent to this, after lengthy struggles with the authorities, by 1632 
the Orthodox Church gained official recognition.
174
 Still, the Greek Catholicism 
was indelibly being established in the Rus’ lands and the scarred Orthodoxy had to 
wait for its curative. This was to be the Cossacks.  
 
 
2.7.2 The Zaporozhian Cossacks, Khmelnytskyi, and the Cossack State 
 
Today the term Ukraine is typically employed to the state in which the 
Ukrainian people live. However, during the middle ages Ukraina meant 
“borderland,” it was used to refer to the lands constituting the eastern border areas 
of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth.
175
 The southeastern parts of the 
Commonwealth, generally called as the Dzikie Pole (Wild Fields) (that is the 
Kipchak Steppes), were comprised of an open steppe making the region vulnerable 
to attacks by the Crimean Tatars. To the south of these lands lay the lands of the 
Crimean Khanate. The Crimean Tatar slave-raiding groups mostly aimed at the 
provinces of Kiev and Bratslav, and during late 16
th
 and early 17
th
 centuries they 
took a much devastating form.
176
 Thus, the region was sparsely populated and was 
kind of a buffer zone between the Commonwealth, Muscovy, and the Crimean-
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Ottoman lands. The Cossacks emerged in the middle of this triangle as “a product 
of the Ukraina in the original sense of the word.”177 
While Cossacks’ early ethnic composition is disputable, it can be said that it 
had a mixed ethnic composition. The Cossacks of 14
th
 and early 15
th
 centuries were 
most likely nomadic Tatars. However, the Cossacks of Ukraine were slavicised 
during the mid-fifteenth century.
178
 This probably happened especially with the 
emigration of Ruthenians from Galicia, Volhynia, and western Podolia to eastward 
beyond the reach of Polish landlords, in an effort to escape the Polish manorial 
system and in search for a land where they can live free from the burdens of the 
process of the Polish colonization of their lands.
179
 Although there were Russians, 
Belarusians, Poles, Moldavian, and Tatars among the Cossacks, the majority were 
Ruthenians, i.e., Ukrainians.
180
 Of Turkic-Tatar origin the word Kazak originally 
denoted a “freebooter,”181 meant a straggler, renegade182 and unruly. Cossacks were 
freebooters, adventurers, and free-lance warriors who by early sixteenth century 
began grouping into “small bands of armed men and engaged in trade and 
banditry.”183 They enjoyed a practical independence under nominal Polish rule in 
the steppes, and in time they became skilled warriors attracting the attention of the 
Commonwealth authorities.
184
 Hence, the Cossacks began serving the Polish and 
Lithuanian frontier officials as mercenaries.
185
 As they strived to escape Polish 
overlordship, about 1550 the Cossacks established their Sich (Cossack fortified 
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center) on the lower Dnieper area, which became to be known as the Zaporiz’ka 
Sich.
186
  
With the Union of Lublin of 1569, Cossacks accepted their subjugation to 
the Polish king as long as their traditional liberties were to remain untouched. The 
Cossacks began fighting against Muscovites and the Crimean-Ottomans along with 
the Commonwealth forces. Yet, the presence and rapid increase of Cossacks began 
to disturb the authorities. As such, in 1572 they decided to reduce the number of 
Cossacks by introducing a registration system. Hereinafter, the period saw series of 
uprisings by the discontented Zaporozhian Cossacks. These uprisings unified the 
Cossacks more strongly and they developed a strong sense of commonality. 
Cossacks began to call themselves as their fatherland Ukraine’s defenders, and the 
state-like entity they were to control in the upcoming years was named the 
Zaporozhian Host, the freedom and autonomy of which was to be defended not only 
against the Crimean Tatars but also against Polish-Catholicization.
187
 Along these 
lines were the Cossacks to “provide the initiative for a strong national 
movement.”188 In future, Ukrainian nationalists were to praise the role of their 
Cossack forefathers, seeing the state they found as the precursor of a Ukrainian 
nation state. 
Raiding deep into both the Polish-Lithuanian and the Ottoman lands, the 
Cossacks soon emerged as a power in its own right.
189
 During the first two decades 
of the 17th century, Cossacks revived Ukrainian-Rus’ culture. Kiev which during 
the 16
th
 century became simply a purely inhabited frontier fortress emerged as the 
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center of this revival by becoming the political and military seat of the Hetman,
190
 
and by reemerging as the religious and cultural center.
191
While one of the factors in 
the Union of Brest’s greater progress in what are today the Belarusian lands rather 
than in the Ukrainian lands is the presence of Prince Ostroz’kyi and the two 
Orthodox bishops who resisted the Union, the second important factor was the 
Zaporozhian Cossacks.
192
 While at the early stages the Polish-Lithuanian authorities 
made use of the existence of these unruly Cossacks in between the lands of the 
Commonwealth and the Khanate, for they were instrumental in hindering the 
intrusions of the Crimean Tatars, with the Union of Brest the Cossacks emerged as 
a threat for the Commonwealth as they seized upon the role of protection of 
Orthodoxy.
193
 During 1600-1620s, Uniates held the Metropolitan’s office and all 
the Eastern-rite eparchies (except  ’viv) in the Ruthenian lands of the 
Commonwealth. However, the Uniate metropolitans were precluded by the 
Cossacks from taking up their seats in Kiev. Cossacks even further arranged the 
secret appointment of an Orthodox Metropolitan for Kiev and bishops for five 
Orthodox sees.
194
  
In 1632, as the Poles wanted to convince the Cossacks to participate a 
campaign against Muscovy, Polish Diet arranged the compromise of 1632 which 
was also known as the Pacification of the Greek Faith with which Eastern-rite 
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eparchies of the Kievan Metropolitanate were divided among the Uniate and the 
Orthodox Churches.
195
 Still, although the Cossack pressure helped to legalize of the 
Orthodox Church in the Commonwealth, frictions did not halt and each time the 
outside danger was over the Poles embarked upon their anti-Cossack policies and 
Cossack rebellions proceeded.
196
 In any case, the existence of the Cossacks helped 
preserve and further develop the Orthodox-Ruthenian identity creating a shelter 
within an imposing Polish-Catholic environment. 
In such an environment Hetman Bohdan Khmel’nytskyi emerged as the man 
who would change the destiny not only of the Cossacks but also of the Ukrainian 
people yet to come. Hetman Khmel’nytskyi, who ruled the Cossack territories as if 
an independent state, wished to free the Cossack lands from the Polish suzerainty 
and “save and protect” his people “from forcible Polish Catholic assimilation,”197 
and as such initiated a rebellion in 1648. The rebellion turned out to be a huge threat 
for the Commonwealth because Khmel’nytskyi managed to combine “peasant anger 
at expanding serfdom, burghers’ antagonism to Jewish competitors, Orthodox 
abomination of Catholic oppression, and much of the Ukrainian population's 
resistance to the misrule of the magnates.”198  
In early 1648, in need of help he accepted the suzerainty of the Crimean 
Khan after which the Zaporozhian-Tatar army defeated the Poles. Following this 
victory, the registered Cossacks deserted to the Khmel’nyskyi forces.199 The second 
Polish defeat in the Battle of Korsun brought about the revolt of the ordinary 
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people, turning the revolt into a popular uprising.
200
 As “all the avenging Furies” 
were let loose, peasants were taking vengeance from the Polish-Catholic rule by 
killing any Polish landlord, Jewish estate manager, Roman Catholic and Uniate 
priest they came across.
201
 Following these two victories the entire Dnieper region 
was left to the Cossacks.
202
 With the 1649 Zboriv Treaty, Polish military and 
administrative personnel, Catholics, Uniates, and Jews left the Ukrainian inhabited 
palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav, and Chernigov to be replaced by the Cossacks and 
Ruthenian Orthodox nobles.
203
 Zboriv also brought about the recognition of the 
“autonomous Cossack state.”204 Furthermore, the Cossacks stipulated the 
reintroduction of Orthodoxy into the Commonwealth.
205
 Although much of the 
favorable conditions of the Zboriv Peace were lost with the Treaty of Bila Tserkva 
signed after the defeat of the Cossacks at Berestechko in Volhynia in 1651, ending 
up with a considerable contraction of Cossack territories,
206
 the Cossacks regained 
their favorable position with the 1653 Zhvanets Treaty by which the boundaries of 
the autonomous Cossack state were confirmed.
207
 
During this period those unregistered Cossacks and Ruthenian peasants who 
were discontented by the actions of Khmel’nytski, the return of, albeit of Orthodox 
Ruthenian extraction, landlords’ rule,208 thus disillusioned by their disability to free 
themselves from servitude
209
 and disturbed by the Hetman’s alliance with the 
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Crimean Tatars were moving to the eastern lands controlled by the Muscovites.
210
 
In today’s Kharkov and around the Ukrainian-Russian border area, that is the lands 
which mostly constitute today’s eastern Ukraine the Cossacks were allowed to form 
tax-exempt settlements (slobody), and these lands controlled by Muscovy but 
inhabited mainly by the Cossacks began to be called as Sloboda Ukraine.
211
 Starting 
from 1648 when Khmel’nytskyi had to turn to Muscovy for military assistance, the 
Cossacks were entering into the orbit of Muscovy step by step.
212
 Got stuck 
between the aggressive policies of the Commonwealth, the Ottoman Empire, and 
the Tsardom, and taking into account the fact that he could not rely on the Crimean 
Tatars for long
213
 by early 1650s Khmel’nytskyi became convinced that the only 
way for the survival of the Cossacks was by entering under the protection of the 
Tsar. At least the Muscovites shared with them the Orthodox religion and the Rus’ 
past.
214
 Although Khmel’nytskyi relied upon religious commonality between the 
two people in his addresses to the Tsar when calling his help, Muscovites drew a 
clear religious divide.
215
  
Prompted by Khmel’nytskyi’s threats that unless the Tsar does not accept 
his people he would ally with the Turks and the Crimean Tatars,
216
 Muscovites 
dropped their previous stance of 1634 when they assured the Poles that the Tsar’s 
title “all Rus’” had nothing to do with the Polish- ithuanian “ ittle Rus’.” As such, 
after twenty years of ignorance, Muscovites started to justify their intervention in 
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Commonwealth affairs with the pretext of protection of their coreligionists.
217
After 
some months of negotiations, in March 1654 the Agreement of Pereiaslav (The 
March Articles, Bereznevistatti) was signed between the Hetman Khmelnytski and 
the Tsardom, whereby the Tsar accepted the Cossacks “under his high hand” and 
the Cossacks swore their allegiance to the Tsar.
218
  
Pereiaslav has been attributed a crucial role especially by traditional Russian 
historiography, and seen as the agreement by which Ukraine was united with 
Russia. However, actually this agreement was not to be permanent since the 
developments of the time were to see a number of changing alliances whereby the 
Cossacks were to fight against the Tsar they were to be loyal according to 
Pereiaslav. Still, in the end of the day, the territories east of Dnieper were to enter 
under the control of a Muscovite-Russian state, and further acquisitions were to 
follow that by the beginning of the 19
th
 century all the territories except western 
Ukrainian lands (Galicia, Transcarpathia, and Bukovina) would be incorporated into 
the Russian Empire. 
The Agreement of Pereiaslav was followed by Tsardom’s attack on the 
Commonwealth for further acquisitions. In these early periods of Pereiaslavl, 
Khmel’nytskyi became more and more disturbed by the attitude of the Tsardom and 
the truce with the Poles in 1656. Although still the contemporary historians can 
hardly agree whether the Agreement of Pereiaslav “constituted a protectorate, 
suzerainty, military alliance, personal union, real union or complete 
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subordination,”219 what is obvious that whatever the essence of the Agreement was, 
Hetman Khmel’nytskyi did not hesitate from pursuing an independent foreign 
policy,
220
 and neither during his rule nor after did the Cossacks remain loyal to the 
Russians but changed side for numerous times between the conflicting parties who 
were fighting for the domination of the area. 
With the death of Khmel’nytskyi in 1657 and without a finalized agreement 
to ensure Ukraine’s security, Ukraine entered into the Period of Ruin during which 
where the future of Ukraine lay was far more than ambiguous.
221
 There were 
Swedes who were promising the establishment of an independent Cossack state 
incorporating Galicia, Volhynia, and eastern Ukrainian lands.
222
 There were also the 
Poles, to whom, in 1659 the Hetman proposed the transformation of the 
Commonwealth into a federation of Poland, Lithuania, and the Grand Duchy of 
Rus’.223 This plan, came to be known as the Union of Hadiach, was the last attempt 
“for solving the thorny Ukrainian problem within the framework of the 
Commonwealth.”224 This Union was never realized because those Cossacks who 
favored Muscovy had the upper hand.
225
 Learning about the Union of Hadiach, 
Muscovy attempted to invade Ukraine, however defeated by the joint Crimean 
Tatar-Cossack armies in the Battle of Konotop as a result of which a stalemate 
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emerged.
226
 According to the stalemate and because of their suspicion that “the 
khan wished to subdue Ukraine for his own”,227 The Poles and the Russians decided 
to reach a compromise whereby the Cossack lands were divided into a Polish sphere 
of influence on the Right Bank and a Muscovite sphere of influence on the Left 
Bank Ukraine. This division was formalized with the Treaty of Andrusovo of 
1667.
228
  
As of then there was one hetman in the Polish-controlled Right Bank, and 
another in the Muscovite-controlled Left Bank.
229
 The attempt in 1668 of Hetman 
Petro Doroshenko of Right Bank, who approached the Crimean Khan and asked 
help, thereby entered under Ottoman suzerainty and tried to unite the two sides by 
invading the Left Bank with the backing of the Porte,
230
 ended up with the Ottoman 
control of large parts of Right Bank by annexations of Podolia, Bratslav, and 
southern palatinates by the Treaty of Buchach of 1672. The Ottoman annexations 
led to the influx of Ruthenian peasants to the Left Bank and Sloboda Ukrainian 
lands.
231
 In the meantime, Muscovites and Ottoman-Crimean Tatars recognized 
each others’ sovereignty in their domains with the Peace of Bahçesaray of 1681. 
However, the war between the Ottomans and the Poles still continued.
232
 Because 
the Commonwealth was in great trouble with the Ottomans, they wanted to reach an 
accord with the Muscovites. Hence, the Eternal Peace of 1686 was established 
between the Commonwealth and the Tsardom. With this, it became evident that the 
division of Ukraine roughly along the Dnieper River was here to stay for a long 
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time. Commonwealth was renouncing any claim to Left Bank, Kiev, Smolensk, 
Starodub, and Zoporozhian Cossack lands, while Right Bank and Eastern Galicia 
were to remain under the Polish control. Southern Kiev, Podolia, and Bratslav were 
to remain Ottoman lands until the end of the 17th century.
233
  
Prior to 1648, almost all Ukrainian-inhabited lands were ruled by a single 
political system, that is the Commonwealth. The events ensuing the 1648 
Khmel’nytskyi Uprising brought the Polish retreat,234 and meant that all Ukrainians 
would not live under a single political entity “again for almost 300 years.”235 Still, 
the Khmel’nytskyi Uprising and the thus emerged Cossack state helped to the 
development of a “vision of Rus’ as a nation endowed with a particular territory and 
protected by its own political and military institutions.”236 Thus, the period became 
a “milestone in the formation of the modern Ukrainian identity.”237 However, the 
course of events developed contrary to the hopes of the Cossacks. The Agreement 
of Pereiaslav never brought the wished position, but conversely it became the first 
step of Tsardom’s absorption of the Cossack Ukraine. Although the Hetmanate 
(officially the Army of Zaporozhia) on the Muscovite-controlled Left Bank was 
autonomous, year by year the Muscovites established stricter control on the Cossack 
lands.  
As for the position of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, in the Polish-ruled 
Galicia, Polissia and Right Bank Orthodox Church was under the strong Polish-
Catholic influence, and thus the Uniate Church became more and more entrenched 
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in these regions.
238
 Actually, it should be noted that the Cossack influence was not 
considerable for the Ruthenians of Galicia as the Cossack movement could reach 
there only for a brief period during the Cossack occupation in 1649. Thus the region 
remained within the Polish cultural orbit.
239
 However, in the Hetmanate, as 
following the 1648 revolution Roman Catholic and Uniate clergy and Polish and 
Polonized nobles had to flee to the Polish ruled territories as they were replaced by 
the Orthodox clergy and fledgling Cossack nobility and their properties were 
confiscated by the Orthodox Church.
240
 Hence, although the Orthodox Church was 
one of the foremost beneficiaries of the establishment of the Cossack rule, in time 
increasing Muscovite control brought its jurisdiction under the autocephalous 
Russian Orthodox Church from the ecumenical patriarchate in Constantinople in 
1686. The jurisdiction of the patriarchy of Moscow meant the loss of the Ukrainian 
Orthodoxy’s independence.241 
The period of rule of Hetman Ivan Mazepa (1687-1709) was crucial for it 
saw important developments that shaped the future of Ukraine. Since the death of 
Khmelnytskyi the Cossacks of the Zaporiz’ka Sich were against the hetmans and 
starshyna and their policies.
242
 Although the Hetmans looked for different alliances 
to attain their goals, the Cossacks vigorously favored Muscovy. However, during 
Mezapa’s rule the Zaporozhian position towards Muscovy began to change as a 
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result of the successful Muscovite campaigns over the Crimean Tatars. As the 
existence of the Crimean Khanate was the raison d’être for Muscovy’s toleration of 
the Cossacks, they knew that in the absence of the Tatar threat Muscovy would not 
need them.
243
  
However, Mazepa’s decisions during the Great Northern War between 
Muscovy and Sweden were to shape the destiny of the Ukraine. As requested by 
Peter the Great, Mazepa’s forces occupied Kiev and Volhynia from Poland, 
unilaterally appending  ’viv to these occupations. Thence, the Mazepa controlled 
Hetmanete territories roughly corresponded to Khmelnytskyi period territories. 
When Peter, allied with the Poles, wanted the return of the occupied territories 
Mazepa procrastinated on fulfilling Peter’s orders as he wished to establish an 
independent state in these lands and looked for an alliance with Sweden to attain 
this goal.
244
 Mazepa defected to Swedes, and the Zaporozhians followed him.
245
 
This “defection” was catastrophic for Ukraine, because albeit Mazepa’s 
expectations, his decision resulted in the attack of Muscovite forces, capture of 
Hetmanate’s capital, destruction of the Zaporiz’ka Sich, Mazepa’s removal from his 
post and replacement by Ivan Skoropadskyi who acted as a puppet of the Tsar, and 
gradual reduction of Cossack autonomy resulting in total incorporation of the 
Cossack controlled Ukrainian lands into the Tsardom.
246
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After the decisive defeat of the Swedish-Cossack forces at Poltava, Mazepa 
followed the Swedish King and took refuge in Ottoman territory.
247
 The Cossack 
struggle for independence continued from exile under the Ottoman protection until 
1734. Following Mazepa’s death in 1709, in search for the establishment of an 
independent state, the new Hetman Orlyk, who was under Ottoman suzerainty, 
invaded Right Bank in 1711, however to be suppressed by the Polish forces.
248
 
After all the struggle given, by 1711 while the Commonwealth ruled most of 
Right Bank, Galicia, Volhynia, Podolia and Belz, most of Left Bank, the 
Hetmanate, and Sloboda Ukraine were controlled by the Tsardom of Muscovy. As it 
was since the Middle Ages uninterruptedly a part of Hungary, Transcarpathia 
remained a part of the Austrian-ruled Hungarian Kingdom.
249
 Bukovina was a part 
of the Ottoman vassal state of Moldovia, Zaporozhia was under the protection of the 
Ottomans until their return to the Muscovite rule by 1734, and the Ottomans ruled 
southern territories either directly or through the control of the Crimean Khanate. 
However soon things were to change since while Tsardom was evolving into 
an Empire, Commmonwealth was having hard times and the Partitions of Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth was just around the corner. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE PARTITIONS OF POLAND AND THE AGE OF EMPIRES 
 
 
3.1 The Developments until the 1
st
 Partition of Poland 
 
This period saw the events that paved the way for the disappearance of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from the political map of Europe for 123 years to 
come. Hence, the Polish rule of Ukrainian inhabited lands was to cease until the 
restoration of the Second Polish Republic in 1918. Thus, the developments of these 
years were preparatory for the division of the Ukrainian lands between the two 
major powers of their period, the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian Empires.  
 
 
3.1.1 The Rise of the Russian Empire 
 
The transformation of Tsardom of Muscovy into the Russian Empire by 
Peter the Great in 1721 was followed by the initiation of the policy of 
centralization, which meant that gradually, most Ukrainian inhabited territories 
were to be fully integrated into the Russian Empire. The first Ukrainian-inhabited 
territory to lose its status was the Sloboda Ukraine. Although never a Ukrainian 
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land, Sloboda Ukraine became inhabited by runaway Ukrainian peasants and the 
Cossacks who were offered by the Tsardom to form tax-exempt settlements there 
during the 17
th
 century. The local autonomy which was granted to the area was first 
disturbed in 1732, and its autonomous status was totally dispensed with following 
Catherine the Great’s decision to Russify the southern lands. Hence, Sloboda 
Ukraine was fully integrated to the Russian Empire by being incorporated into the 
imperial province of New Russia.
250
  
In the meantime, Russians were approaching to the Black Sea as a result of 
their victories against the Ottomans. With the Treaty of Küçuk Kaynarca of 1774, 
Ottomans lost their sovereignty over the Crimean Khanate,
251
 and by 1783 Russia 
absorbed the Khanate. As a response to the annexation of Crimea, Turks declared a 
new war to the Russians, in which they lost.
252
 As a result of this war, the southern 
lands became totally open for the Russian imperial colonization. Thence, Ukrainian-
Russian settlement of the Black Sea hinterland boomed by 1780s.
253
 
As for the Zaporozhians, in 1734 they decided to return to the Russian 
suzerainty for they were offered to resettle to their former lands and establish the 
“New Sech” for their support of Russians against the Ottomans.254 However, as the 
lasting Russian success over the Ottomans and the signing of the Treaty of Küçük 
Kaynarca in 1774 meant that now the Crimean Tatars were subdued, Zaparozhian 
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Cossacks became less than necessary for the Russians.
255
 They were once more 
considered as a potential source of rebellion and an obstacle before the colonization 
of the Black Sea hinterlands.
256
 Hence, in 1775 the Zaporozhian Sich was destroyed 
for the second time and the lands of Zaparozhia were incorporated into the imperial 
province of New Russia.
257
 
The last to be integrated into the Russian Empire was the Hetmanate. The 
office of Hetman was abolished in 1765 for once and for all. Its lands were divided 
among the Russian imperial provinces of Kiev, Novgorod-Severskii, and 
Chernigov, its administration was replaced by Russian imperial bureaucracy, 
Cossack army was merged into the Russian imperial army, and its autonomous 
status was abolished altogether by 1785.
258
  
With the absorption of the Cossack lands by the Russian Empire the 
Cossacks and the Ruthenian peasant masses were to be exposed to an ever 
increasing process of Russification, and by time the Cossack starshyna and their 
descendants were to be assimilated into the Russian nobility. By the same token, the 
Polish-ruled Ruthenian lands were under heavy Polish-Catholic influence for 
centuries, and by the time of the Partitions of Poland and introduction of the 
Habsburg rule over these territories, the Ruthenian nobility was mainly Polonized. 
However, the developments of the 19th century were to help them to rediscover 
their Ruthenian identity. 
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3.1.2 The Right Bank and West Ukraine and the Partitions of Poland 
 
It took several more years after the suppression of the Cossack invasion 
attempt in 1711 for the Poles to reestablish their control over the Right Bank. The 
Polish comeback meant the return of the Polish magnates, Roman Catholic and 
Uniate Churches.
259
 With the era of Sarmatianism in the Commonwealth, there 
emerged an environment where there was extreme intolerance towards everything 
not associated with Polish-Catholicism and all Orthodox eparchies were 
eliminated.
260
 In these circumstances, a great amount of the Orthodox-Ruthenians of 
the Commonwealth sought escape in the Muscovite controlled Left Bank.
261
 
The intolerance shown to the Orthodox religion, Ruthenian culture, and the 
Cossack way of life and the increasing burden of the economic conditions evoked 
revolts by the Cossacks and Orthodox peasants. Bands of armed peasants were 
targeting the Commonwealth officials, Roman Catholic and Uniate clergy, Polish or 
Polonized nobility, and Jewish arendars (leaseholders) living in Right Bank 
territories.
262
 These revolts came to be known as the Haidamak Revolts.
263
 The most 
infamous was the Koliivshchyna Revolt of 1768. During the Revolt which began in 
southern Kiev palatinate and spread to Podolia, Volhynia, and Bratslav, thousands 
of Poles, Jews, and Roman Catholics or Uniates were brutally massacred, most 
notorious of these massacres had taken place in Uman.
264
 Koliivshchyna, its 
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suppression,
265
 and the Uman massacre became the symbols of hatred between the 
Poles and Ukrainians. 
In great trouble both inside and outside, early in 1768 the Polish sejm 
(parliament) accepted the signature of a treaty by which the sejm conceded to the 
Russian Empire all but formal sovereignty in Poland turning it into a protectorate of 
the Russian Empire. On the other hand, a number of confederacies were formed 
(with headquarters at Bar) in defense of the Catholic Church, the Sejm, and the 
independence of the Commonwealth against the Russian influence. Authorized to 
suppress the Bar confederates, Polish-Russian troops began attacking the 
confederates. The expansion of the events into Ottoman lands by the attack on Balta 
of the Cossacks in the Russian service, who followed the fleeing confederates into 
this Ottoman-Tatar border town and massacred Ottoman subjects, drew the 
Ottomans into the conflict, whereby the Ottomans first demanded the withdrawal of 
the Russian forces from Poland and then declared war on the Russians. In 1769, 
Ottoman forces invaded Russian-ruled Ukraine but had to withdraw under harsh 
winter conditions. The 1768 Russo-Ottoman war was to turn into a disaster for the 
Ottomans since successive defeats at the hands of the Russian forces were to 
culminate in the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774. The Bar Confederation, the 
Koliivshchyna revolt, and the impact of the Russo-Ottoman War came along and 
contributed to the 1
st
 Partition of Poland as the civil war led by these was used as 
pretext by the intervening powers Russia, Austria, and Prussia.
266
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Interested in territorial gains, and taking into advantage the weakening of the 
Ottomans and Poland’s preoccupation with the civil war, Prussia, Russia, and 
Austria partitioned the Commonwealth first in 1772. With the 1
st
 Partition while 
Russia got most of Belorussia, Prussia got Pomerania and the territories between 
Brandenburg and East Prussia, and Austria annexed Galicia, Belz and south of the 
Vistula River. The 1
st
 Partition was followed by the 2
nd
 (1793), and the 3
rd
 (1795) 
Partitions. As a result of the Partitions, by 1795, the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth was wiped out of the map, thus ending the Polish rule over 
Ukrainian-inhabited lands, which went as back as to 14
th
 century, at least until 
1918. By 1795 of the Ukrainian-inhabited lands Galicia, Belz and Bukovina
267
 were 
part of Austria, Transcarpathia was a part of the Kingdom of Hungary, and in 
addition to formerly acquired lands, the entire Right Bank, palatinates of Kiev, 
Bratslav, Podolia, Volhynia,
268
 and eastern parts of Chelm became part of Russia.  
Even if the Polish rule was withering away, when assessing the cultural 
differences within modern Ukraine, the more than four centuries-long Polish rule 
over Galicia, more than two centuries long direct Polish rule in the Right Bank, and 
even the century-long rule in Kiev and parts of the Left Bank, should certainly be 
kept in mind. Still, the Partitions of Poland meant that for the time the fate of 
Ukraine would be in the hands of the Austrian and the Russian Empires. 
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3.2 Ruthenians of Habsburgs and Little Russians of Romanovs
269
 
 
During the imperial era the Ukrainian lands that came under the rule of the 
Habsburg Monarchy were the western Ukrainian lands that are eastern 
Galicia(1772), Bukovina (1774), and Transcarpathia (a part of Hungary since 11
th
 
century). The Ukrainian-inhabited lands ruled by the Romanovs were reorganized 
into 9 provinces. Accordingly, Chernigov and Poltava provinces were formed from 
the territories of the Hetmanate, Sloboda Ukraine became the province of Kharkov, 
Zaporozhia, which was incorporated into New Russia, was divided between two 
new provinces Ekaterinoslav and Kherson, and the territories of the Crimean 
Khanate became the province of Tavrida. As for the territories on the Right Bank 
acquired during the Polish Partitions of 1793-1795, former Polish palatinates of 
Kiev, Bratslav, Podolia, Volhynia, and eastern Chelm region were renamed by the 
Russian authorities as the provinces of Kiev, Volhynia, and Podolia.  
 
 
3.2.1 The Experiences of the Ruthenians under the Habsburg Monarchy 
 
The period the Ruthenian-inhabited territories were incorporated into the 
Habsburg Empire corresponded to the reign of two important reformers: Maria 
Theresa and her son Joseph II. The reforming atmosphere of the Empire especially 
in religious and educational matters provided the Ukrainians with a favorable 
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environment that contributed to the development of a sense of self-distinctiveness, 
cultural awareness, and national consciousness.  
Unlike that of the Russians, the Austrian nationalities policy encouraged and 
promoted the idea of a distinct Ruthenian nation both from the Poles and the 
Russians. Thus, the Habsburg imperial policies had a crucial impact on the national 
development of the Ruthenians. Furthermore, unlike the situation in the Russian 
Empire, where belonging to a common religion with the Russians, and linguistic 
similarities united the Little Russians with the dominant nationality, promoting a 
Russophile political culture in Russian-ruled Ukraine,
270
 being of the Greek 
Catholic or Orthodox religion in a Roman Catholic state and possessing a different 
language strengthened the Ruthenians’ sense of separate identity.271 Besides, the 
rise not only of the Polish nationalism but also of other nationalisms within the 
empire such as the German, Hungarian, and Czech nationalism stimulated the 
Ukrainian intelligentsia towards developing their own one taking “these 
nationalisms both as examples to follow and as threats to oppose,” promoting a 
Ukrainophile political culture in Habsburg-ruled Ukraine.
272
  
In a time during which the Romanovs were outlawing the Uniate Church 
within their domain, the Habsburg imperial government granted all religions within 
the Empire equal status and same rights, and responded to the abolition of the 
Uniate Church and forced re-“Orthodoxation” campaign of the Russian  mpire by 
creating an independent Greek Catholic Metropolitanate of Galicia in 1808.
273
 The 
environment the Greek Catholic Church found itself in helped it to further secure its 
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position in the region and set forward the development of the Greek Catholic clergy 
into the new elite of the Ruthenians
274
 (since the Ruthenian elite was already 
assimilated into the Polish szlachta).
275
 The Greek Catholic Church assumed the 
role of “custodian and reviver of national identity,”276 as especially prior to 1848 
national movement was comprised almost exclusively of Greek Catholic clergy.
277
 
Although with a traditionalist approach, the clergy was initially hesitant to support 
the activities of the flourishing secular intelligentsia, by the end of the 19
th
 century 
the Greek Catholic Church was to become a bastion of Ukrainianism.
278
 
With the decision of the imperial government to use local languages in 
elementary education the language issue became the major preoccupation of the 
Ruthenians.
279
 As by 1818 Ruthenian was made the language of instruction in 
Greek Catholic education institutions,
280
 Studium Ruthenum - the first university 
level institution established in  ’viv to offer courses only in the Ruthenian language 
- was established,
281
 and a Ruthenian college was found in the  ’viv ( emberg) 
University,
282
 Ruthenians embarked upon a process of refining and raising “the 
Ukrainian vernacular, free of Church Slavonic and other foreign ‘refinements,’ to 
                                                             
274 Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, 214. 
275
 Rudnytsky, Essays on Modern Ukrainian History, 315. 
276 Nahaylo, Ukrainian Resurgence, 7. 
277 Stella Hryniuk, Peasants with Promise: Ukrainians in Southeastern Galicia 1880-1890 
(Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1991), 195-196. 
278 Magocsi, The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism, 24. The Greek Catholic Church was to become the 
stronghold of Ukrainism specially with the elevation of Andrei Sheptytskyi to the Metropolitanate 
See of Halych where his services to the Ukrainian national cause would be of great importance until 
his death in 1944. 
279 Hryniuk, Peasants with Promise: Ukrainians in Southeastern Galicia, 64-65.  
280 Larry Wolff, “‘Kennst du das  and?’ The Uncertainty of Galicia in the Age of Metternich and 
Fredro,” Slavic Review  67, 2 (2008): 288. 
281 Paul Robert Magocsi, “A Subordinate or Submerged People: The Ukrainians of Galicia under 
Habsburg and Soviet Rule,” in Nationalism and Empire: The Habsburg Monarchy and the Soviet 
Union ed. Richard  . Rudolph and David F. Good (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Center for 
Austrian Studies, 1992), 95-107, 98.  
282 Yekelchyk, Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation, 37. 
62 
 
the level of a literary language.”283 The peasant vernacular written in modern 
Cyrillic was to become the foundation of the Ukrainian literary language,
284
 and 
“after protracted debate between Galician Ukrainians and their brethren in the 
Russian Empire, the language finally adopted was standard Ukrainian based on the 
Poltava dialects in Dnieper Ukraine.”285 The Narodovtsi (Populists, Ukrainophiles) 
favored the use of local peasant-spoken vernacular, and worked for this cause.
286
 
The “first publication to use vernacular Galician Ukrainian written in the modern 
civil script” which was entitled as Rusalka Dnistrovaia (The Nymph of the 
Dniester, 1837) “became the orthographic model subsequently adopted for the 
Ukrainian national movement in Galicia.”287 The literary works in the vernacular 
helped to demonstrate that the peasant language could be used as a literary 
language.
288
  
These positive developments however were to slow down by the second 
decade of the 19
th
 century with a change in Vienna’s nationalities policy as the 
successors of Joseph II preferred to cooperate with the existing dominant ruling 
classes of the imperial provinces, which in our case meant Poles of Galicia.
289
 As 
the education was reverted to German or Polish, the younger generations were 
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exposed to Polonization.
290
  acking the Imperial government’s support to turn this 
Polonophile trend, the Ruthenians would have to wait for the 1848 Spring of 
Nations.
291
 
As for the other two regions inhabited by the Ruthenians ruled by the 
Habsburgs, Bukovina and Transcarpathia, the national awakening could never 
match Galicia. Ruthenians constituting a majority in the northern part of Bukovina 
were dominantly Orthodox just as the Romanians of the province were. Thus 
religion was not a source of differentiation here, but the indicator of differences was 
the Romanian and Ruthenian languages which were not mutually comprehensible at 
all.
292
 However, although their languages were unintelligible, this did not create a 
major source of conflict among the Ruthenians and Romanians of the time who 
predominated separate parts of Bukovina, a fact which minimized their interactions.  
Under these circumstances, national awakening in Bukovina was out of question at 
least until 1848. The case of Transcarpathia was similar, however, the problems 
faced in trying to establish a separate Greek Catholic Church not subordinated to 
the Hungarian Roman Catholic Church promoted a sense of self-distinctiveness 
among the Transcarpathians, and the imperial reforms which provided the 
establishment of the separate Church and Ruthenian-instructing schooling helped to 
advance this awareness. Yet, Transcarpathians were far from developing a clear 
sense of national identity and began struggling among different options, among 
which Russophilism tended to be the dominant one.
293
 Living within a Magyar 
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context, Transcarpathians’ “identification with Russian culture represented 
resistance to alien domination and a positive effort toward self-definition.”294 
1848 was springtime for the Ruthenians as in that year alone they 
“established their first political organization, their first newspaper, their first 
cultural organization, and their first military units in modern times.”295 The year 
was marked with the rebellion of the nationalities of the Empire, Hungarians and 
Poles above all, against the conservative Austrian imperial domination. Galicia was 
one of the many microcosms of the revolutionary events that spread throughout not 
only the Habsburg Monarchy but most of Europe.  
All over the century, the Habsburgs were in trouble with the revolutionary 
activities of the Poles who aimed at reestablishing the Polish state. To counteract 
the Poles, the Austrian government supported the Ruthenian movement more than 
ever. In response to the creation of Polish National Council demanding autonomy 
for the “Polish” Galicia, the Governor of Galicia, Stadion pushed for the formation 
of a similar organization. Under such circumstances the Supreme Ruthenian 
Council (Holovna Rus’ka Rada) was created under the leadership of the Greek 
Catholic clergy and formulated a petition to the imperial government that 
counterweighted the Polish demands. With a manifesto, Ruthenians were declaring 
themselves a separate nation distinct from the Russians and the Poles, part of “the 
great Ruthenian people who speak one language and count fifteen millions, of 
whom two and one-half inhabit the Galician land.”296 They further petitioned the 
emperor to recognize them as such and divide the province of Galicia into Polish 
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western and Ruthenian eastern parts. These demands disturbed the Poles who 
denounced the Ruthenians “as the mere invention of Stadion.”297 
As the imperial government announced the abolition of serfdom in the 
spring of 1848, the national movement, which until then remained within the 
confines of the clerical and secular intelligentsia, started to penetrate the 
peasantry.
298
 The subsequent events were the establishment of the first Ruthenian 
newspaper ever to appear in all Ukrainian lands Zoria Halytska (The Galician Star – 
Galician Dawn), the formation of the first of the many to come Ruthenian cultural 
societies, the Congress of Ruthenian Scholars, the establishment of the Department 
of Ruthenian  anguage and  iterature in the  ’viv ( emberg) University, and 
Ruthenian participation in a modern political process for the first time by 
participating to the elections of the first Austrian parliament with 25 deputies 
including those of a peasant extract.
299
 The activities of Ruthenian “educational, 
cultural, and political organizations helped to cultivate a national identity” among 
the peasants of Galicia.
300
 Again in 1848, by attending the Slavic Congress in 
Prague as Ruthenians, they gained “recognition as a distinct nationality in the eyes 
of their fellow Slavs. This achievement had important psychological as well as 
political consequences.”301 
While the Bukovinian lands were again silent to the nationalist 
developments of 1848, Transcarpathia witnessed greater developments in terms of 
culture, use of Transcarpathian vernacular of Ruthenian in schools and literary 
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works.
302
 During this period the contacts with the Galician Ruthenians grew rapidly. 
However, the close relations developed with Galicians were not with the Galician 
Ukrainophiles but with the Russophiles, thus again it was Russophilism that 
dominated the self-identification of Transcarpathian elites.
303
 
After the suppression of the revolution, the Habsburgs decided to achieve a 
rapprochement with the local elites of the provinces. This meant the second come 
back of Polish dominance in Galicia. Poles monopolized the administration and 
Polish became the language of education and administration of the province, and 
the establishment of a Ruthenian University was prevented. As such, the 
educational system became an instrument of Polonization. This period also saw the 
immigration of Ruthenian peasants who sought an escape from the difficult socio-
economic situation they live in, mostly to the United States, Canada, and Brazil.
304
 
While Ruthenians were leaving their homeland, increasing number of Poles from 
western Galicia were migrating to the east. As such, the number of Poles especially 
in the cities of eastern Galicia increased steadily, turning them into “oases of Polish 
culture.”305 Under these conditions, Ruthenians were being treated as a minority 
group who had to struggle hard to secure their national aspirations. 
This unfavorable environment and indifference of the Habsburgs gave way 
to a transient period during which Russophilism rose among the Galician 
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Ruthenians.
306
 For a brief period, Russophiles began dominating the cultural 
organizations. However, eventually the Populists, who considered themselves to 
constitute one nation with the Little Russians distinct from the Russians,
307
 began 
establishing their own organizations, and in the course of time surpassed the older 
Russophile activities.
308
 The major achievements of the Populists were the 
establishment in 1879 of the popular political periodical Bat’kivshchyna 
(Fatherland) and in 1880 of the daily Dilo (Deed) in the vernacular which survived 
until the Second World War, and the formation of the Prosvita Society (meaning 
enlightenment) in 1868 spinning Galicia with a network of adult reading clubs and 
brotherhoods, and publishing books on literature and history by which vernacular 
Ukrainian was spreading and the national movement was penetrating the village.
309
 
The cultural achievements fostered dialogue between the Populists in Austria-
Hungary and the Ukrainophiles in Russia, and helped them to develop “a shared 
Ukrainian high culture” even before the word “Ukrainian” could “become an ethnic 
denominator” to embrace both sides by the very end of the century.310  
When examining the developments in northern Bukovina in this period, we 
can say that Populists were a source of inspiration for the Ukrainophile 
Bukovinians. Several works and periodicals began publishing in the vernacular, 
numerous cultural organizations were formed, and a department of Ruthenian 
Language and Literature was established in the University in Chernivtsi.
311
  
Although the national developments in Bukovina could not compete with those in 
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Galicia in any sense, they were at least promising when compared to the situation in 
the Hungarian-ruled Transcarpathia. As following the 1867 Ausgleich with which 
the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy was established giving the Hungarian 
Kingdom a free hand in internal affairs, and isolating Transcarpathians from the 
developments in Galicia, even the previous Russophile movement had disappeared. 
Ruthenian schools were closed and cultural activities were suppressed by the 
Hungarian authorities, which initiated a policy of Magyarization and as a result the 
leading members of Transcarpathian Ruthenians were assimilated into the 
Hungarian culture leaving the Ruthenian masses unaware and confused about their 
identity.
312
 The tiny populist movement in Transcarpathia, which developed in 
isolation, “gave rise to the view that the Transcarpathians were neither Russians nor 
Ukrainians, but rather a distinct Subcarpathian Rusyn nationality.”313 As such, in 
the following century Transcarpathia was to become the scene of struggle of 
Russophiles, Ukrainophiles, and Rusynophiles. 
Turning back to the developments in the Austrian half of the Habsburg 
Empire, the Austrian government and Vatican decided to support the Ukrainophiles 
(Populists) of Galicia as they were concerned about the Russian-Orthodox 
expansion into the  mpire’s Slavic lands during the last decade of the 19th 
century.
314
 The part that Vatican played in supporting Ukrainophiles was to work 
towards the elimination of Russophile elements in the Greek Catholic Church, 
which thence became the stronghold of Ukrainian national cause.
315
 Having the 
Austrian government in their corner, the Ukrainophiles embarked on publishing of 
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the first comprehensive dictionaries of Ruthenian in Austria-Hungary,
316
 and in 
1893 the Austrian government accepted the Ruthenian modeled according to these 
dictionaries as the official language of administration and instruction in Ruthenian 
schools. By 1914, there were 2500 Ruthenian schools in Galicia, whereas there 
were none in the Russian Empire.
317
  
In 1894, the Austrian government appointed Hrushevskyi to the newly 
created chair of Ukrainian history at  ’viv ( emberg) University where he wrote his 
seminal work History of Ukraine-Rus’.318 He also became the head of the 
Shevchenko Scientific Society which guided the publishing of numerous scholarly 
works turning the pre-war Galician period into “the apogee of Ukrainian scholarly 
endeavor” in a time when Ukrainian scholarship in Russia was being stifled by the 
Russian government. This situation made Hrushevskyi to consider that the 
relatively liberal environment provided by the Austrian rule which enables the 
flourishing of Ukrainian national life will make Galicia a “Piedmont for a future 
independent Ukrainian state.”319 The Society’s works were also crucial in linking 
the Ukrainians across the two sides of the Russian-Austrian border.
320
 
The progress of the national movement in Austria-Hungry was stunning as 
compared to that in Russia. In Russia, “there were until 1905 no legal Ukrainian 
political parties, no cultural organizations, no newspapers. There were never any 
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Ukrainian language school at any level, and the Ukrainian language itself was 
officially banned from 1863/1876 to 1905.”321 The words of Subtelny make the 
point clear: 
When Ukrainians from the Russian Empire visited Galicia in the early 
years of the 20
th
 century, they were invariably struck by the progress 
their western compatriots had made. In Kiev it was still forbidden to 
publish a book in Ukrainian, but in  ’viv one found Ukrainian learned 
societies, schools, headquarters of mass organizations and cooperatives, 
newspapers, political parties, and parliamentary representatives.
322
 
 
The last decades of the 19
th
 century saw an increase in the interactions 
between Galicia and Dnieper Ukraine. While Ruthenians of Galicia were deriving 
formative ideas from Dnieper Ukraine, Galicia constituted a “sanctuary from tsarist 
persecution,” the place where Dnieper Ukrainians could continue their cultural 
activities and publish their works freely. This mutual relationship both gave the 
modern Ukrainian nationalism much of its character, and fostered the feeling of 
unity among the people across the Austrian-Russian boundary. 
323
  
By 1890s, the national movement in Austria-Hungary had completed the 
cultural and organizational stages and passed into the political stage with the 
establishment of Ukrainian political parties.
324
 The program adopted by the 
Ukrainian Radical Party in 1895, which was founded in 1890, was the first ever to 
express the goal of creating an independent Ukrainian state incorporating both the 
western and Dnieper Ukrainian lands.
325
 Still, despite obtaining a consensus about 
their national identity and about their ethnolinguistic unity with the people to the 
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east of the border, it was “toward the end of the nineteenth century, the Galician and 
Bukovynian Ruthenians began to favor the adoption of a new national name – 
“Ukrainians,”326 and adopting this new all-encompassing term for their nation and 
language was not accomplished until the first decades of the 20
th
 century.
327
 
While the emergence of the goal of an independent statehood among the 
Ruthenian intelligentsia was a result of relatively benign conditions of the Austrian 
rule, the realization of such a goal necessitated the development of a national 
consciousness by the masses. Although it can be said that prior to 1914 “the idea of 
independent statehood had made headway” even among the masses in Galicia,328  
“the great majority of the Ukrainian intelligentsia [in Russian-ruled Ukraine] could 
not see beyond federalism, until war and revolution opened their eyes.”329 
 
 
3.2.2 The Experiences of the Little Russians under the Russian Imperial Rule 
 
In terms of demographics of Russian-ruled Ukrainian territory, the period 
saw the influx of ethnic Russians especially to the eastern and southern territories. It 
is known that as late as 1897, 95 percent of the ethnic Ukrainians were peasants 
living in the countryside
330
 making the Ukrainians living in towns a minority (30 
percent of the urban population) who were more often than not Russified (in Left 
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Bank), or Polonized (in Right Bank) as a result of the assimilationist pressures in 
the cities.
331
  
In the Left Bank, the Russification process was supervened with the steady 
migration of Russians. The process gathered pace with the setting aside of the 
autonomy of the Hetmanate. First arrived Russian military officers, then Russian 
nobles who brought with them Russian peasants. By 1880s, with the start of 
industrialization in Dnieper-Donbass area,
332
 Russian skilled-workers were to 
follow their factory owners into eastern Ukraine.
333
 The Russian population 
increased so rapidly that by 1897 they made up more than half of Nikolaev, 
Kharkov, and Kiev, and nearly half of Odessa, and Ekaterinoslav. As such, Russian 
became the lingua franca of the cities, which brought about disconnection between 
the cities and rural areas in the territory. As a result, cities emerged as isolated 
enclaves both ethnically and culturally from the surrounding countryside.
334
 
While the demographic situation in the mainland Ukraine was such, a 
similar influx of Russians was common in the Crimea. The 19
th
 century saw the 
imperial government’s resettlement of thousands of Russians, Ukrainians, Germans 
and some other non-Tatars to the area in masses.
335
 Although quite a many Crimean 
Tatars were already in migration be it of individual kind or large waves as in 1812 
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and 1828-29, this process turned into an exodus in the aftermath of the 1853-56 
Crimean War.
336
 As a result of these population changes, while before the Russian 
conquest the Crimean Tatars constituted almost the entire population of the 
peninsula, by 1854 their number dropped into 60 and by 1897 merely into 34 
percent.
337
 The end result of this process of Russian-Slavic influx and Crimean 
Tatar outflow was that as of then, non-natives (predominantly Russians) were to 
become the majority in the Crimean peninsula. 
During the late 18
th
 to early 20
th
 century, Romanovs gradually created a 
highly autocratic and centralized rule that did not give way to the development and 
manifestation of any kind of nationalist-oriented movement. In such a suppressive 
environment, development of the idea of Ukraine as “a distinct national entity was 
for the longest time virtually non-existent.”338 Still, despite the persecutions and 
suppressions of the Russian imperial rule, the nationalist intelligentsia managed to 
keep alive the idea of self-distinctiveness and to create a nationalist movement that 
prepared the necessary ground for the masses to eventually embrace the idea of 
independent nationhood and statehood.
339
 
In 1861, serfdom, which was instituted in New Russia in 1796, was 
abolished with the Great Emancipation. In the following years this process brought 
about the establishment of zemstvos that were equipped with the right to local self-
government especially in social and educational affairs. However, the extension of 
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zemstvos in the Right Bank took place almost 50 years later than its establishment in 
the Left Bank.
340
 The reason behind this relatively huge time gap was the hesitation 
on the part of the imperial government that zemstvos could serve to the mutinous 
activities in the area which was still dominated by Polish high culture, and in which 
the socioeconomic life rested with the Polish nobility who only recently revolted 
against the Russian rule twice in 1830 and 1863.
341
 
In this period, the main target of the Russian authorities was not the 
Ukrainians, who were then considered as an inert subgroup of greater Russian 
people and were called as Little Russians, but was the Poles. Thus, a local Little 
Russian identity was regarded even desirable in de-Polonizing the Right Bank. Still, 
the Russian government “tolerated a Ukrainian identity only in so far as it was 
compatible with an all-Russian one.”342 In order to take hold in the Right Bank, 
Russian government embarked upon a process of ‘ ittle Russification’ if not 
Russification. Besides establishing Kiev University as an outpost of Russian culture 
in the region, to prove at least the Little Russian character of the region, the 
government let loose the development of Little Russian culture while heavily 
suppressing the Poles. As such having the backing of the Russian government, the 
early stages of the imperial rule saw the development of the Little Russian 
identity.
343
  
In order to invalidate the Polish claims to the Right Bank, Little Russianness 
of the region was to be proved, and this required the development of Little Russian 
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cultural and historical studies. This thought propelled the imperial government to 
fund researches on Little Russian matters. The early decades of the 19
th
 century 
became the period when the institutions that served to the flourishing of studies on 
Ukraine, Kiev and Kharkov Universities were established.
344
 By the 1820s, 
Kharkov emerged as the first “center of the Ukrainian ‘renaissance’ and national 
movement,” harboring many influential Ukrainophile scholars345 and becoming the 
first place where the term ‘Ukrainian’ was used instead of ‘ ittle Russian’.346 The 
Ukrainian literary movement that was revived by the writers of Left Bank 
(especially in the centers of Kharkov and Poltava) next spread to the Right Bank, 
where the movement was to become hassling for the authorities.
347
 
The benign attitude of the imperial government was to change by mid-
1840s. It was during the reign of Nicholas I (1825-1855) that the Russian imperial 
model shifted from “imperial to the nationalistic model of citizenship.”348 The 
disturbance caused in St. Petersburg by the publishing by an unknown author of 
Istoriia Rusov ili Maloi Rossii (History of the Rus’ or  ittle Russia), in which  ittle 
Russians were described separate from and even in opposition to the Russians and 
were called for the establishment of self-government, was the first spark for the  
change of the imperial attitude.
349
 The major blow was to come with the discovery 
of the Brotherhood of Saint Cyril and Methodius, the secret organization created by 
Little Russian patriots who believed in the distinctiveness of their people and 
criticized the Russian rule with a membership extending to important figures such 
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as Taras Shevchenko, Mykola Kostomarov, and Panteleimon Kulish.
350
 The 
Brotherhood’s members were punished by varying sentences, but the harshest one 
was to be that of Shevchenko who was punished not only because of his 
membership to the Brotherhood but mostly because of his poems
351
 whereby he 
spread his ideas of Ukrainians’ distinctiveness from the Russians and proved that 
their vernacular language in itself was capable of becoming a literary language.
352
 
Thence, the importance of Shevchenko laid not only in “his role in the codification 
of modern Ukrainian,”353 but more important thing was that Shevchenko’s stance 
was “giving the movement an alternative to the provincial  ittle Russian mentality,” 
and provided it with a raison d’etre.354 Not only Shevchenko but also the tenets of 
the Brotherhood as a whole “determined the ideological orientation of the Ukrainian 
national movement in the second half of the nineteenth and the beginning of the 
twentieth centuries.”355 
The suppression of the Brotherhood marked the end of an era since after this 
the imperial authorities were to become ever cautious about all manifestations of 
Little Russian distinctiveness, those with patriotic feelings were silenced and all 
their activities were downgraded to the level of ‘harmless’ cultural work.356  
After years of inertia however, following a relative relaxation in the reign of 
tsar Alexander II, 1860s saw a re-boost in cultural activities with the establishment 
of Hromada (Community), “a clandestine society devoted to the promotion of 
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Ukrainian culture and enlightenment of the masses.”357 Hromadas created Sunday 
schools where peasant masses were thought Little Russian language and culture, 
and began publishing the influential journal Osnova (Foundation) in which 
Kostomarov published his seminal article “Dve russkie narodnosti,” laying his 
claims about the separate nationhood of the Russians and Little Russians. During 
1860s, even the Russian press began discussing if there was a separate Little 
Russian language, however reasoning it to be a mere Russian dialect corrupted by 
the intrusion of Polish words.
358
 
These activities alarmed the Russian authorities, culminating in the 1863 
Valuev Decree which banned the use of the Little Russian dialect in religious and 
educational publications,
359
 and was followed by the closedown of Hromada 
societies, Sunday schools, and the journal Osnova.  These developments meant that 
from then on the Ukrainophiles were to be subject of systematic Russian imperial 
persecution.
360
  
Since the Ukrainophiles tried to publish their works in neighboring Austro-
Hungarian lands where censorship in kind was non-existent, thus increased contacts 
with their brethren across the Russian-Austrian border, a stricter crackdown by the 
Russian authorities commenced.
361
 Convinced that the “Ukrainophile propaganda” 
was an Austrian plot, Alexander II issued the 1876 Ems Ukase (decree) as a result 
of which publication or importation from abroad of anything written in Little 
Russian was forbidden, and Ukrainophile newspapers and organizations were 
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banned.
362
 Hence, 1880s rolled by along with the Ukrainian patriots’ efforts for 
convincing the Russian authorities of the harmless nature of their endeavors by 
putting aside all their political interests and concentrating purely on literary and 
cultural activity.
363
 
By mid-1800s the education system in the Empire became a means of 
Russification since the authorities decided to use it as a “tool for unifying the 
Empire into a nation-state” as it was due for the new nationalistic understanding of 
citizenship.
364
 Still, its role in Russification was highly limited due to the limited 
reach of the schooling system. Coming to the last decade of the 19
th
 century, the 
illiteracy rate in the Russian-ruled Ukraine was as high as 91 percent. As under the 
imperial Russian rule education usually meant Russification, the lack of it helped to 
preserve the masses from the infiltration of the Russian high culture. In the absence 
of schooling, it was the Orthodox Church that could reach to the peasant masses. 
Under the jurisdiction of the Holy Synod, Orthodox Church evolved into an agent 
of Russification and transmitter of the official imperial ideology. Besides, the Greek 
Catholic (Uniate) Church which was flourishing in Austria-Hungary, and which 
became a bastion of Ukrainophilism in the Habsburg Monarchy, was gradually 
destroyed in the Romanov lands.
365
 
Progressive weakening of the absolutist rule on the eve of the 1905 
Revolution encouraged the intelligentsia towards imagining Ukrainian self-rule. A 
bold statement of these dreams came in 1900 by Mykola Mikhnovsky who wrote in 
a pamphlet titled Samostiina Ukraina his desire for “a single, united, free and 
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independent Ukraine from the Carpathians to the Caucasus.”366 However, until 1917 
his bold ideas were not shared by the most in Russian Ukraine. The uttermost that 
the majority could ask for was “an autonomous Ukraine in a decentralized and 
federative Russia.”367 Thus, the political parties that were to emerge in the 
upcoming years were to struggle between the ideas of an independent or an 
autonomous Ukraine.  
Until 1905 the Russian government did not allow the establishment of 
political parties, thus the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party, the first Ukrainian political 
party in Russian-ruled Ukraine, was found in 1900 by university students in 
Kharkov and aspired after an independent Ukraine remained underground.
 368
 It was 
followed by the establishment of other political parties such as the Ukrainian 
People’s Party (with a nationalist orientation aiming national independence) in 
1902, Ukrainian Social-Democratic Union – Spilka (with a purely socialist 
orientation) and Ukrainian Democratic Party (calling for Ukrainian self-rule within 
a federated Russian empire) in 1905.
369
 The significance of Ukrainians’ entrance 
into party politics is that only then it became “possible to speak in national terms of 
a Ukrainian political life” by which Ukrainians’ desire for self-rule (be it as an 
autonomous entity within a federated state or an independent statehood) became 
evident.
370
  
The Revolution of 1905 created new opportunities by stimulating positive 
developments for the nationalist movement. Ukrainian political parties left the 
underground and participated in the first and ensuing Dumas (representative 
                                                             
366 Rudnytsky, Essays on Modern Ukrainian History, 138. 
367 Ibid. 
368 Yekelchyk, Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation, 58. 
369 Magocsi, A History of Ukraine,  378-379. 
370 Ibid., 315. 
80 
 
assembly). The Constitution of 1906 was permitting publications in non-Russian 
languages,
371
 thus the period witnessed the first Ukrainian-language daily 
newspapers to be published in Russian Ukraine, Hromads’ka Dumka and Rada, 
which were published twenty-five years later than an equivalent, Dilo, was 
published in Austrian-ruled Galicia. On top of that, the first Ukrainian-language 
learned society in Russian territories, the Ukrainian Scientific Society was 
established.
372
 Furthermore, in 1907 Ukrainophiles in the Second Duma went as far 
as voicing their calls for Ukrainian language education, creation of department of 
Ukrainian Studies in the universities, and even for local autonomy.
373
 The 
Revolution also allowed the legalization of Hromada societies and the 
establishment, in line with the Galician example, of Prosvita societies. Now, the 
intelligentsia had an opportunity to reach the masses and spread national 
consciousness among the peasants.
374
 
However by 1908, with the defeat of the revolution, “the national movement 
again became the object of persecution and suppression.”375 The minister of interior 
Pyotr Stolypin embarked upon undoing the achievements of the period and took 
stringent measures against the activities suspected for separatist tendencies among 
which we can list Ukrainophilism. As such, the nationalist-oriented Ukrainian 
People’s Party and the more moderate Ukrainian Democratic Radical Party were 
disbanded, many members were arrested, Prosvita societies were closed and 
Ukrainian publications were banned.
376
 Until 1917, Ukrainian language education 
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was not permitted and the revision of the electoral law effectively precluded 
Ukrainian representation in the Duma. In consequence, “in the decade before the 
revolution, Ukrainian nationalists were unable to use the schools, the press, or the 
State Duma as a forum for national education and agitation.”377 Once again, 
Ukrainian intelligentsia was interrupted from educating the masses with a national 
spirit. 
With all the steps taken by the Russian imperial government, the national 
movement in Russian-ruled territories could not prosper as it did in Austro-
Hungarian-ruled lands. Still, the suppressive Russian rule could not prevent the 
development of a separate Ukrainian identity among the  mpire’s ‘ ittle Russian’ 
subjects since the developments across the border “encouraged the leaders in Russia 
to continue their battle for national rights under the Russian regime as well.”378  
Despite this, the Russian regime could prevent the penetration of the Ukrainophile 
ideas to the masses making it “a minority movement among the intelligentsia of 
Russian Ukraine,” while the Ukrainian movement in the Habsburg Monarchy, 
especially in Galicia, managed to penetrate “much more widely and deeply in 
society.”379 The masses in Russian Ukraine were being exposed to a constant 
process of penetration by the Russian imperial ideology. Whenever they got out of 
their villages, they were exposed to Russification be it in the cities, in schools, in 
the church, in the army, or in state affairs. The consequence was that it was the 
Ruthenians of Austria-Hungary who shouldered the nationalist movement during 
the 19
th
 century. 
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Living within the relatively liberal environment of the Habsburg Monarchy 
Ukrainians of Austria-Hungary had a critical advantage over their brethren in 
Russia in developing national consciousness. Furthermore Ukrainians living under 
the Habsburg regime had to fight with the dominant Polish, Magyar, or Romanian 
cultures for attaining their national aims and thus were pushed to develop a 
mutually exclusive identity. On the other hand, since they were seen as a part of the 
dominant nation and could reach up to the highest levels in the Russian system 
“Ukrainians in Russia had an incentive to retain multiple identities” that those in the 
Austria-Hungary did not.
380
 This “Habsburg heritage has contributed to making 
Galicians the most nationally conscious segment of the Ukrainian population.”381 
As such, the age of empires were crucial for the Ukrainian lands since “many of the 
twentieth-century developments in Ukraine were determined by dissimilarity 
between the Russian tradition of absolutism and social oppression and the Austrian 
tradition of parliamentarism and civil society.”382  
 The period of rule of Ukrainians by these two empires saw the accentuation 
of the differences between the Habsburg-ruled and Romanov-ruled Ukrainians on 
one hand, and their appreciation of belonging to a common Ukrainian nation on the 
other.  As such, while their social, cultural, and political developments and national 
consciousness levels were shaped differently in the hands of different sovereigns 
with different social and political conditions, the idea that they all constitute a 
common nation began blossoming. The period ended with the transformation of 
Ruthenians and Little Russians both into Ukrainians. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
UKRAINIAN LANDS DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND 
THE INTERWAR PERIOD 
 
 
4.1 WWI and Struggle for Independent Ukraine 
 
By the time of the outbreak of the First World War, in spite of the fact that 
the Ukrainian national movement got off the ground, “Ukrainian consciousness 
remained poorly developed” especially among the masses.383 While the Ukrainian 
masses of the Habsburg Monarchy could be considered as nationally-awakened, 
national solidarity among the Austrian Ukrainians “presented a stark contrast to the 
confusion about national and social allegiances in Russian-ruled Ukraine.”384 
However, the events of 1914-1920 were to push the people of Ukraine towards 
national-consciousness as the collapse of the once mighty empires was to clear the 
path for Ukrainian nationalism. 
Among the Ukrainians, it was the Galicians and Bukovinians who first faced 
the agony of war. At the start of WWI, Russian forces captured eastern Galicia and 
Bukovina taking control of the area until the joint Austro-Hungarian and German 
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forces drove the Russians out by June 1915. This brief period of Russian rule 
proved Russians’ desire to Russify these ‘Russian’ lands by liquidating Ukrainian 
national movement in these areas, which were considered as “the hotbeds of 
Ukrainian nationalism that had been spilling over (or so they suspected) into Dnipro 
Ukraine.”385 The Russians established a policy of supporting the activities of local 
Russophiles and began undoing the achievements of Ukrainophiles by suppressing 
the Greek Catholic Church, banning Ukrainian cultural organizations, cooperatives, 
and periodicals, and making the language of instruction in schools Russian.
386
 The 
hostile attitude of the Russian government against the Ukrainophiles was not 
limited to newly acquired lands because in the meantime the Ukrainians of Russia 
were also under tsarist persecution.
387
 To illustrate the position of the Russian 
regime toward Ukrainian movement, the Russian foreign minister Sergei Sazonov 
stated that “Now is exactly the right moment to rid ourselves of the Ukrainian 
movement once and for all.”388 
The Russification process in Galicia and Bukovina was cut short with the 
return of the Austrian-German forces. The ban on Ukrainian activities was lifted 
and the pre-Russian-occupation cultural life was reestablished. As the Austrian 
government sought to utilize Ukrainian nationalists as a weapon against the 
Russians, they not only supported further development of Ukrainian national 
consciousness among the Ukrainians under its control,
389
 but also sponsored the 
Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukra ny), Ukrainian 
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nationalist organization formed by a group of Dnieper Ukrainian émigrés who 
worked for the creation of an independent Ukrainian state on the territories of the 
formerly-Russian-ruled Ukraine following the victory of the Central Powers.
390
 On 
the other hand, the Galician Ukrainians of Austria seem to remain loyal to their 
state since with the outbreak of war the Supreme Ukrainian Council declared its 
loyalty to the Habsburgs and its readiness to fight against the Russians. Similarly, 
the General Ukrainian Council (as was later renamed) declared its intention to 
struggle for the independence of Russian-ruled Ukraine but only for autonomy in 
Austrian-ruled Ukraine.
391
 
The return of the Austrians did not mean an end to the struggle for the area. 
All through the war, parts of Galicia and Bukovina changed hand for several times, 
and became a military zone as none of the parties was able to take hold. 
 
 
4.1.1 The Bolshevik Revolution and Ukraine during the Russian Civil War  
 
The overall environment in the Russian Empire of the period was briefly as 
such: The Tsar abdicated, the empire collapsed, local soviets spread throughout the 
country, the Provisional Government was created and then toppled by the 
Bolsheviks, the Red forces entered into a civil war with the tsarist White forces, 
outside powers meddled in the war, and nationalists tried forming self-ruling states 
throughout the former imperial territories. Ukraine was a microcosm of this overall 
picture. Not only the Ukrainian patriots of different stripes, the Whites, the Reds, 
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the Austrian-German and Polish forces, but also smaller and local peasant groups 
such as the anarchist Blacks, and Greens fought for control over Ukraine.
392
 The 
one who was to emerge as the victor of this complex struggle was to determine the 
faith of Ukraine. 
The Ukrainian revolutionary era was to start in the wake of the February 
Revolution whereby two centers of authority, the Provisional Government and the 
soviets, emerged to claim authority over all post-tsarist imperial territories. As for 
the Ukraine, with the inclusion of the third center to claim authority over Ukraine, 
that is the nationalists, the picture became even more complex. However, the 
Ukrainian patriotic forces were ever confused about what kind of a Ukraine they 
wished for. To name the prominent ideas, they considered an autonomous unit 
within a democratic Russia, a conservative monarchy, a nationalist military 
dictatorship, or an independent socialist state.
393
 The Ukrainian revolutionary era 
can be divided according to the period of rule of the successive Ukrainian 
governments, as the Central Rada period, Hetmanate period, and Directory period. 
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4.1.1.1 Central Rada (March 1917 – April 1918) 
 
The news of revolution was followed by the creation of first soviets in 
Kharkov and Kiev, which were followed by the creation of Ukrainian National 
Council in Kiev named as Central Rada. With the freedom of speech and assembly 
now permitted by the Provisional government, there emerged political parties which 
were to constitute the Central Rada. The prominent ones were the Ukrainian Party 
of Socialist-Federalists, Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary Party (which won 
greatest public support and was headed by Hrushevskyi), and Ukrainian Social 
Democratic Labour Party (which was to be a crucial force influencing the 
development during the period, headed by Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon 
Petliura). The revolutionary environment provided Ukrainian patriots with great 
opportunities to reach the peasantry. For example, the newspapers published by one 
of the nationalist organizations Selians'ka Spilka (All Ukrainian Peasants’ Union) 
were in wide circulation among the peasantry and were instrumental in conveying 
the Ukrainian national message to the villages.
394
 Initiatives such as the the 
Selians'ka Spilka served to prepare the ordinary peasants for the upcoming 
developments. 
In the early stages of the period, none of the Ukrainian political parties 
demanded the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state but were contended 
with territorial autonomy (that is the nine Ukrainian provinces – Volhynia,  Podolia, 
Kiev, Poltava, Chernigov, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, and Tavrida – except 
for Crimea which was not part of Ukraine then – were to be autonomously ruled 
                                                             
394Guthier, 34. 
88 
 
and would have a separate army and school system
395
) within a federated Russian 
state. The difference between western and eastern Ukrainians manifested itself in 
the reluctance of the eastern Ukrainian nationalist leaders in breaking connections 
with Russia. They did not proclaim independence until they were forced to. On the 
other hand, with the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy their western brethren did 
not hesitate in proclaiming an independent Ukrainian state and fighting the Poles, 
never thinking of negotiating “for any settlement short of total independence.”396  
The Central Rada, headed by Hrushevskyi, conveyed its demand for 
autonomy within the Russian state, however to be rejected by the Provisional 
Government. The Central Rada’s reply was the issuing of the First Universal 
whereby Ukraine was unilaterally declared autonomous within a federated Russia. 
As a compromise, the Provisional Government convinced the Central Rada to take 
no further actions and recognized the authority of the Rada in five Ukrainian 
provinces (Kiev, Chernigov, Volhynia, Podolia, Poltava) until an all-Russian 
constituent assembly was convened.
397
  
The elections held during this period were illustrative of the weakness of 
support given to Ukrainian parties in urban centers and that the greatest support to 
Ukrainian parties was garnered from the peasantry.
398
 In major cities parties hostile 
or indifferent to the Ukrainian cause had the upper hand.
399
 As such, industrial and 
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“urban centers were islands of non-Ukrainian language and culture throughout the 
Ukraine.”400 
Furthermore, the elections made it evident that while Ukrainian nationalists 
garnered great support from the Right Bank, the eastern Ukrainian provinces 
preferred to support the Bolsheviks and pro-Russian parties. The Right Bank 
provinces Kiev, Podolia, and Volhynia constituted the heart of Ukrainian nationalist 
strength in 1917.
401
 In each of these provinces the proportion of the votes given to 
the Ukrainian parties corresponded to the proportion of Ukrainians living in those 
provinces. This situation suggests that “there was extraordinarily little crossover 
among Ukrainian voters on the right bank to non-nationalist parties.”402  
The support to Ukrainian parties was low in most eastern provinces such as 
Kharkov and Kherson. These provinces were the most Russified regions of Ukraine 
with significant Russian population. They were the power bases of Russian-socialist 
parties and Ukrainian organizations were not well entrenched in these provinces.
403
 
Chernigov and Ekaterinoslav represented middle-of-the-road, since Ukrainian 
parties garnered half of the votes casted in these two provinces. The situation in 
Chernigov “reflected the fact that the Russian-Ukrainian ethnic border passed 
through Chernigov and that the four northernmost districts had almost no Ukrainian 
population”. It can be further argued that “the poorer showing of the Ukrainian 
populists in Chernigov may reflect the progress of Russification along the northern 
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ethnic border.”404 The case of Ekaterinoslav was significant in that it was the 
industrial region of the Ukraine with a significant Russian proletariat residing in the 
city. As such, while the city votes went to the Bolsheviks, the villages voted for the 
Ukrainian parties. Similarly, it was the eastern industrialized cities, Ekaterinoslav, 
Iuzovka,  ugansk, Mariupol’, and the Donbass were the Bolsheviks could garner 
majority of the votes casted in Ukraine.
405
 
The casting of majority of the village votes in Ukraine to Ukrainian parties 
should not make one think that these votes were given with purely nationalist 
sentiments. This was more about “the success of the Ukrainian populists in linking 
the national and social questions in the political consciousness of the peasantry.”406 
The peasantry’s great support to the Rada in 1917 was linked with their expectation 
that Ukrainian nationalists would solve the agrarian problem and that their socio-
economic expectations could be better understood and fulfilled by a local rather that 
an all-Russian government.
407
 In any case, the one to achieve expropriation of the 
lands from the landlords and divide them among the peasants was to garner the 
peasant support. If this was not to be the Ukrainian nationalists then this could be 
the Bolsheviks who also promised similar land reforms.
408
 Still, this does not mean 
that the Ukrainian peasants were completely negligent of their ‘Ukrainianness.’ 
Although considering them as nationally conscious would be an exaggeration, it can 
be said that they were culturally and ethnically aware, but socio-economic 
considerations prevailed over ethnic ones. The reason of early peasant support to 
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national autonomy should be searched not in their national consciousness or even 
ethnic awareness but in their belief that in case of autonomy local rather that all-
Russian consideration will prevail in the reconstruction of the socioeconomic 
structure. As such, autonomy was not an end in itself, but was a means to attain 
one.
409
 Disaffection with the Central Rada that increased by the fall of 1917 was 
mainly caused by Rada’s inability to carry out social reforms and its procrastination 
on land reform, and when it became clear that “nationalists failed to back up their 
own agrarian reform, support rapidly evaporated.”410 
In November, Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional Government. The 
reflection of the Bolshevik revolution in Dnieper Ukraine was the emergence of a 
power struggle among the supporters of the Provisional Government, Central Rada, 
and the Soviets. During this struggle, with the Third Universal, the Central Rada 
proclaimed the creation of the Ukrainian National (People’s) Republic (Ukra ns’ka 
Narodnia Respublika) (UNR), having authority over the nine Ukrainian provinces. 
The Republic was still to be an autonomous republic within a future federated 
Russian state. This proclamation disturbed the Bolsheviks who did not want to lose 
the industrial and agricultural regions of Ukraine. The UNR took a further step by 
adopting “its own flag, anthem, symbols, and currency, all of which, it is worth 
noting, would be readopted by Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union”.411 
The swift response of the Bolsheviks was to proclaim the Soviet Ukrainian 
Republic in Kharkov.
412
 From then on, there were two competing powers for the 
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authority in Dnieper Ukraine: the Soviet Ukrainian government in the east, and the 
Ukrainian National Republic in the west.  
Concurrently, the Bolshevik government in Petrograd warned UNR that if 
the Republic does not suspend itself, then it would be considered a reason for 
war.
413
 Under the attack of the Bolshevik forces advancing towards Kiev, the 
retreating Central Rada declared the UNR as “independent, dependent upon no one, 
a free sovereign state of the Ukrainian people” with its Fourth Universal in an effort 
to win the support of the Central Powers against the Bolsheviks.
414
 While UNR was 
retreating to farther west, to Zhytomyr, Kiev was occupied by the Bolsheviks. The 
very day these were happening, in Brest-Litovsk, the UNR was signing a separate 
peace treaty with the Central Powers, whereby the authority of UNR over the nine 
provinces claimed by the Central Rada was recognized not only by the Central 
Powers but, although forcefully, also by the Soviet Russia.
415
 In line with the secret 
clauses of the Treaty, the German and Austrians promised to extend military aid to 
UNR in return for grain and other foodstuff and Germans entered the Ukrainian 
territories.
416
 With their support, UNR drove the Bolshevik forces out of Kiev and 
Soviet Ukrainian government was forced to flee to Russia. As such, all nine 
Ukrainian provinces claimed by the UNR were cleared of the Bolshevik forces.
417
 
While all these were happening, the south-eastern Ukrainian lands saw the 
formation of a self-proclaimed state which was established by Russian and 
Russified inhabitants of the area. Since they did not recognize the authority of the 
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UNR, they established the short-lived Donetsk-Krivoi Rog Soviet Republic in 
1918.
418
 The territories claimed roughly corresponded to the Donbass, Kharkov, 
Dnipropetrovsk, and parts of Kherson.
419
 According to Andrew Wilson, this 
republic “demonstrated the determination of the local population to have no truck 
with Ukrainian nationalism, and was a genuine expression of the desire of local 
inhabitants to remain part of Greater Russia.”420 Although this state was disbanded 
and incorporated in the Soviet Ukrainian government, the emergence of this short-
lived state was crucial in showing that the people of eastern Ukraine were against a 
Ukrainian state and its Ukrainization attempts, feeling themselves not distinct from 
the Russian and thus saw no need to secede from the Russian whole. 
Turning back to UNR, it became certain that the days of the Rada were 
numbered. While the inability of the Central Rada to realize its promises to the 
peasants was alienating the peasantry, its being ineffective in collecting the 
necessary amount of foodstuff requested by the Germans made the Rada 
undesirable for the German aims. As a result, the Germans deposed the Central 
Rada to install a pro-German one, led by Pavlo Skoropads’kyi.421 
 
 
 
                                                             
418 Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith, 12. 
419 Theodore H. Friedgut, Iuzovka and Revolution: Politics and Revolution in Russia’s Donbass, 
1869-1924, Volume II (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 352. 
420Andrew Wilson, “The Donbas Between Ukraine and Russia: The Use of History in Political 
Disputes,” Journal of Contemporary History 30, 2 (1995): 280. During this period, the inhabitants of 
the region preferred not to support the UNR’s nationalists but gave support to the Whites, the 
Bolsheviks, and even to Makhno’s Anarchists. (Wilson, “The Donbass,” 280.) 
421 Kubicek, 84. He was a former tsarist general and descendent of the Cossack Hetman Ivan 
Skoropads’kyi. (Arthur  . Adams, “Bolshevik Administration in the Ukraine: 1918,” The Review of 
Politics 20, 3 (1958): 294.) 
94 
 
4.1.1.2 Hetmanate (April – December 1918) 
 
Skoropads’kyi’s Hetmanate, as it was called, meant the restoration of pre-
revolutionary elites, landowners, bureaucrats, factory owners. As such, Hetmanate 
was disliked both by the peasantry and all left-of-center political parties be them 
Ukrainian nationalist or not.
422
 However, although it was true that the Hetmanate 
was under German tutelage, it deserves credit for the fact that among the Ukrainian 
governments of 1917-1920, the greatest successes in Ukrainian culture and 
education were achieved during the period of Hetmanate. It was in Skoropads’kyi’s 
Hetmanate that the first Ukrainian Corps were formed, autonomous Orthodox 
exarchate of Ukraine was created and efforts to gain independence (autocephaly) 
for the Ukrainian Orthodox met direct support of the government.
423
 Elementary 
schools were Ukrainianized, departments on Ukrainian language and history were 
opened in universities, 150 high schools and two new universities offering 
instruction only in Ukrainian and many institutions of national character such as 
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the State Archive, the National Library, and 
Ukrainian Academy of Fine Arts, which still exists today, were established during 
the eight-months-short Hetmanate period. 
424
    
Despite these achievements for Ukrainian national development, peasant 
unrest was growing and the Ukrainian political opposition forces were organizing 
against the rule of Skoropads’kyi under the roof of the Ukrainian National Union 
(UNU) headed by Symon Petliura and then by Vynnychenko, and were preparing a 
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revolt.
425
 Seeing that the tide of war was turning against the Central Powers he 
desperately relied upon, Skoropads’kyi embarked on a quest for new allies. In order 
to attract the support of the Entente Powers and the Whites who favored the 
territorial integrity of Russia but were opposed to the Bolshevik rule, Skoropads’kyi 
gave up the idea of independent statehood and declared the Hetmanate a part of 
future federative non-Bolshevik Russia.
426
 In the meantime, as the Central Powers 
capitulated, they began withdrawing from Ukraine. German withdrawal and 
Skoropads’kyi’s abandoning independent statehood gave way to an armed uprising 
of the UNU, as a result of which Skoropads’kyi had to flee behind the Germans and 
the new government, the Directory, formed by the UNU reclaimed the 
independence of the UNR,
427
 rejecting union with either a federative non-Bolshevik 
or Bolshevik Russia, thereby facing the opposition of both the Reds and the 
Whites.
428
  
 
 
4.1.1.3 Unification of the ‘two Ukraines’: Directory in Dnieper Ukraine, 
Western Ukrainian National Republic in Western Ukraine  
 
While the control of the UNR was being handed over from the Hetmanate to 
the Directory, in the west Ukrainians of Austro-Hungary were left to fend for 
themselves as the Empire was disintegrating. The situation prompted the Galician 
and Bukovinian Ukrainians to form the Ukrainian National Council, which 
proclaimed the establishment of a Ukrainian state and claimed all Ukrainian-
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inhabited lands of the former-Austro-Hungarian Empire, including 
Transcarpathia.
429
 On 1
st
 of November 1918, the state was declared independent and 
named as the West Ukrainian National (People’s) Republic (Zakhidno-Ukraїns’ka 
Narodna Respublyka). However, it was only in the eastern Galicia that ZUNR could 
operate effectively since ZUNR could never control Transcarpathia, which 
remained under Hungarian control until its incorporation into Czechoslovakia and 
northern Bukovina was under Romanian occupation. However, as Poles were not to 
leave what they regarded as their patrimony to the Ukrainians, Polish forces drew 
Ukrainians out of ZUNR’s capital  ’viv whereby ZUNR had to retreat eastward, 
and since the Entente powers favored the Polish position, Galicia was to be 
incorporated into the Polish lands. Still, Galician Ukrainians formed Ukrainian 
Galician Army and fought vigorously against the superior Polish forces. Unlike the 
Dnieper Ukrainians who could not act in unison but fell out with each other, the 
struggle given against the Poles by the western Ukrainians was demonstrative in 
how they put social problems aside and unified against their archenemy.
430
 Galician 
Ukrainians’ national mobilization was impressive when compared with their 
Dnieper Ukrainian brethren. Numbers are demonstrative at this point. While the 
Galician Ukrainian Army numbered 37.000 men, Petliura’s army numbered less 
than half this number, that is 16.000 men. These figures are crucial considering that 
there were only over 3 million Ukrainians in Galicia
431
 whereas over 17 million in 
Russian Ukraine.
432
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Developments in war-time Transcarpathia were somewhat independent from 
other Ukrainian-inhabited lands of the former-Habsburg Monarchy. Following the 
proclamation of independent republic of Hungary, which laid claim to the lands of 
Transcarpathia, discussions over the future of Transcarpathia set in. While some 
favored remaining a part of Hungary, some favored joining independent Ukraine or 
the new state of Czechoslovakia. After all, the decision was made and 
Transcarpathians declared their voluntary unification with Czechoslovakia to 
become an autonomous part of the new state.
433
  
In the meantime, the desire of the Ukrainians to unite under one state was 
realized in January 1919, whereby ZUNR became the western province of the 
unified UNR. However, this first unification of ‘the two Ukraines’ was problematic 
since it was realized under the attack of the Poles from the West and Russians from 
the East. Under totally different and even conflicting conditions the two parts could 
not act in unison, had to fight different enemies and pursue different strategies that 
eventually led to a conflict of interests between them. 
Coming back to the developments in the Dnieper Ukraine, the Directory 
which took power in the last month of 1918, quickly embarked on nation building 
by making Ukrainian the official language and declaring independence 
(autocephaly) of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.
434
 However, before any advance 
could be made in national development, the Directory fell in the middle of the 
fighting of the Bolsheviks, the Whites, and the anarchist-peasant forces all of which 
claimed the territories of Ukraine for themselves. 
To make the picture clear, we should provide the situation between 1919-
1920 in Ukraine. Those years signified a period of complete anarchy, since anyone 
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to claim Ukraine could not ever control the whole of it. There was a constant state 
of war, invasions by the Poles or Soviet Russians, and frequently changing alliances 
among all these forces. While Bolsheviks were invading Ukraine from the north, the 
Whites were dominating the south, and Makhno’s Black Army was in control of 
south-east.  
While the Poles forced the Galician Ukrainians to retreat, crossing the 
Zbruch river (the traditional boundary between Austrian and Russian Empires), 
Bolsheviks were to drive the Directory out of Kiev to set up the Ukrainian Soviet 
government there. The retreating forces of the two sides met in Kam’ianets’-
Podil’s’kyi and the joint forces of the Directory (now headed by Symon Petliura 
since Vynnychenko resigned) and the Ukrainian Galician Army and the Whites 
drove the Bolsheviks out of Ukraine. In the meantime, the Whites seized power in 
Ukraine, and since the Ukrainians considered the Whites as a potential ally, they did 
not go counter this situation until the Whites reestablished prerevolutionary order, 
restoring the landlords, arresting the Ukrainian intelligentsia and banning the use of 
Ukrainian. These prompted the Directory to declare war on the Whites. The 
Directory was forced to look for a strong ally against both the Whites and Reds, 
which were to be the Poles.
435
 
The actions of the West and Dnieper Ukrainians after their unification under 
the name of UNR were crucial in testing their solidarity. As Petliura decided to 
reach an agreement with the Poles to save the UNR, the Galician Ukrainians were 
negotiating with the Whites. Since Petliura was cooperating with the Poles which 
were the archenemy of the western Ukrainians, and since Galicians were favoring 
cooperating with the Whites, the Petliurists would never reconcile with, a rupture 
                                                             
435 Yekelchyk, Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation, 81-82. 
99 
 
was inevitable. As a result of the negotiations, Petliura accepted Polish control of 
Galicia and western Volhynia in return for the Polish-Petliurist joint offensive 
against the Bolsheviks who recently seized power in Dnieper Ukraine, and restored 
the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.
436
  
While the Western Ukrainian forces were defeated by the Poles, losing 
Galicia and western Volhynia by July 1919, the White forces of Denikin were 
retreating to Crimea after heavy defeats at the hands of the Reds by December 1919 
and despite attempts to recover under Wrangel during 1920, the Whites were 
defeated and were to evacuate Crimea by November. As such, the war turned into a 
Polish-Soviet war with the advance of the Polish-Petliurist forces into Dnieper 
Ukraine. This war ended with the victory of the Bolsheviks, whereby the Poles and 
the Soviet Republics of Russia and Ukraine recognized the territories of each other 
with the Treaty of Riga of March 1921. This meant that from then on, of western 
Ukrainian lands eastern Galicia was to be incorporated into Poland, northern 
Bukovina into Romania, and Transcarpathia into Czechoslovakia. On the other 
hand, Dnieper Ukraine and Crimea were to be incorporated into future Soviet Union 
by becoming the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Crimean Autonomous 
Socialist Soviet Republic of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. 
After all was said and done, neither the western nor the Dnieper Ukrainians 
gained anything from their decisions to side with the Whites and the Poles, 
respectively. They ended up not only losing trust to each other, but also losing the 
independence of their lands. The actions of each side were to test the solidarity of 
the first-time unified ‘Ukraines,’ unfortunately becoming a test they failed. 
However, one fact should not slip past the notice. Ukrainian leaders, especially of 
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Dnieper Ukraine, were to adapt themselves to the rapid developments of the 
revolutionary environment by moving from “what was essentially an apolitical 
cultural nationalism to positions of autonomy and federalism and, finally 
independent statehood in a matter of one year.”437 Sure enough, “the need for such a 
rapid reorientation inevitably produced some uncertainty and disagreement.”438  
Speaking of the Crimea, it should be mentioned that none of the Ukrainian 
governments of the era had any authority over the peninsula. During the period 
Russians and Ukrainians, who constituted the majority in the Crimea and were 
mainly anti-Bolshevik, formed the Crimean Provincial Assembly. In the meantime, 
the Crimean Tatar leaders founded the Crimean Tatar Nationalist Party (Milli Fırka) 
and the Kurultay (The Crimean Tatar National Assembly) broadened its demands 
from cultural to territorial autonomy and finally to independence.
439
 The two 
governments existing in the Crimea did not agree on the issue of Crimean secession 
from the Russian whole but were on the same terms in opposing the Bolsheviks, 
acting cordially against them. However, they were to lose the control of the 
peninsula and thenceforth would have no say about the developments since the 
authority of the peninsula was to change hand several times among the Bolsheviks, 
German invaders, and the Whites until the seizure of control by the Bolsheviks in 
November 1920, whereby the Crimea was completely incorporated into the Russian 
SFSR as an autonomous unit.
440
 As such, the attempt of the Crimean Tatars “to 
establish an independent Crimean Tatar state in the Crimea which was almost 
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realized in the years 1917-18” ended with the fall of the Crimea under the Soviet 
rule
441
 
Although the revolutionary period may seem to end with a fiasco, still, there 
were important gains from this period. First, the period helped the Ukrainian 
national movement to reach the masses, spreading national consciousness 
previously limited to a handful of intellectuals to the ordinary peasant masses of 
Dnieper Ukraine. Secondly, following the revolutionary period the Russians 
became compelled that they were to abandon their practice of calling Ukrainians as 
‘ ittle Russians,’ and “to concede, at least in theory, that the Ukrainian SSR was 
‘sovereign’.”442  Furthermore, the Soviet Ukrainian government, which during the 
revolutionary period was the UNR’s most bitter adversary, was to find itself 
defending Ukrainian rights.
443
  Hereinafter, the experiences under Soviet and non-
Soviet regimes were to shape the identity and political culture of the Ukrainians. 
 
 
4.2 The Ukrainian Lands in the Interwar Period and Prior to the Operation 
Barbarossa 
 
In the interwar years, while the western Ukrainian lands
444
 were divided 
among Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania, the rest of the Ukrainian-inhabited 
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lands were being ruled by the Soviet Union as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic. During this period Poland acquired eastern Galicia [named it “ astern 
 ittle Poland” (Malopolska Wschodnia)445] and Western Volhynia while northern 
Bukovyna was transferred to Romania, and Transcarpathia became part of 
Czechoslovakia.  
The first to witness the great changes in the following years was 
Transcarpathia. With the 1938 Munich Pact, the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia 
began, and subsequently Transcarpathia, officially Subcarpathian Rus’ 
(Podkarpatska Rus’), acquired first autonomous status and then independence, but 
only for a brief period, since Hungary concurrent with Germany annexed 
Subcarpathian Rus’ in the very same day of its declaration of independence. Until 
1944, Transcarpathia was to be ruled by the Hungarians.
446
 Hitler’s next move on 
Poland was to set off the Soviet occupation on 17 September 1939 of Ukrainian 
inhabited lands of Poland east of the San and Buh Rivers, that are eastern Galicia, 
western Volhynia, and western Polissia.
447
 Following June 1940, northern Bukovina 
and the predominantly Ukrainian southern part of Bessarabia were annexed to the 
Ukrainian SSR.
448
  
Pre-Barbarossa Operation boundary changes in favor of the Soviet Ukraine 
were of great significance for the future independent Ukrainian state, as these 
boundaries were basically adhered to in the formation of contemporary Ukrainian 
state. Only following the incorporation of Transcarpathia in 1945 and the Russian 
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SSR’s “gift” of the Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954, the contemporary 
boundaries of Ukraine were drawn. 
 
 
4.2.1 Ukrainian Lands of the Soviet Union during the Interwar Period
449
 
 
During the interwar period Soviet Ukraine passed through three stages. 
During the 1920-1927 period the trend was towards autonomy within the Soviet 
state with the “Ukrainization” program in full force. With the redefinition and 
restructuring of central Soviet government’s priorities and policies, Soviet Ukraine 
entered into a transitional period between 1928 and 1932, which culminated in the 
third stage from 1932 to 1939 wherein the full integration of the Soviet Ukrainian 
society with the rest of the Soviet society was witnessed.
450
 The first stage of the 
evolution of the Soviet Ukrainian society helped the Ukrainians to develop a 
consciousness of being Ukrainian, a process which was already in effect as a 
repercussion of the post-WWI and Ukrainian revolutionary era. This period of 
“Ukrainization” laid the foundation for a Ukrainian culture, which had not been 
prevalent in Eastern Ukraine.
451
 On the other hand, the stages that followed curbed 
the development of a Ukrainian national consciousness by imposing upon the 
society the Soviet-Russian culture. As a result, the eastern Ukrainian Soviet society 
evolved into a more Sovietized and Russified society as compared to the western 
Ukrainian society which was free from Soviet influence for twenty more years. 
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Following the December 1922 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and 1924 
Constitution, the subordination of Soviet Ukraine to the all-Union center was clear. 
Thus, the autonomists in Ukraine realized that a political autonomy was an illusion, 
and canalized their efforts towards the attainment of some kind of a cultural 
autonomy. The result was “Ukrainization” behind which lied the korenizatsiia 
(indigenization) policy of the all-Union government.
452
 As of then, even if for a 
borrowed time, Ukrainian culture could count on some state support. 
Although the presentation of “Ukrainization” of the Soviet Ukraine in this 
section may give the impression that “Ukrainization” was a process in which all 
people of the Soviet Ukraine without dispute felt Ukrainian and wanted to use 
Ukrainian as their native tongue, one should be aware, that not to mention the 
people of other nationalities living in Soviet Ukraine, not all Ukrainians felt that 
way. There were many Ukrainians, especially in the south-easternmost parts of 
Ukraine who felt no need for any kind of “Ukrainization,” let alone Ukrainizing 
their native tongue, which had become Russian. These lands were not Ukrainian 
lands but were under the control of the Crimean Tatars before the Russians 
incrementally gained control during the eighteenth century.
453
 Because the new 
settlers of these easternmost parts of Ukraine included Russian as well as Ukrainian 
colonizers, these areas were never solely Ukrainian in character, but harboured 
more Russian elements than anything else. For many in the region, the 
“Ukrainization” campaign disturbed the status quo, and was an abnormality, and the 
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supposed Russification which took place after the war was dealing with the negative 
impact of the artificial “Ukrainization” of the 1920s.454  
Another process that ran hand by hand with “Ukrainization” was the rapid 
industrialization of the Soviet Ukraine.
455
 As Soviet industrialization led thousands 
of Ukrainian peasants to migrate from the countryside to the cities, the previously 
Russian character of the cities was to change towards a more Ukrainian kind.
456
 
During 1920s, Soviet propaganda aimed at convincing the Ukrainians living 
outside Soviet Ukraine that “their national aspirations could be better realized and 
their cultures better protected” in the Soviet Union.457 Apparently, the Soviet 
propaganda had a considerable effect on the émigré Ukrainian intelligentsia. The 
policy of “Ukrainization” brought about the return of prominent Ukrainian figures 
from emigration, the most renowned of which was Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, who 
with his arrival boosted the studies of Ukrainian history and language.  With the 
flourishing of the studies on Ukrainian history the 1920s witnessed a period in 
which Ukrainian historians began to challenge the old Russocentric imperial 
conception of the past.
458
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From this boost in “Ukrainization,” Soviet Ukrainian education system also 
got its share. Following 1925, Ukrainian was used in 81 percent of adult literacy 
schools, and 82 percent of elementary schools. As for the vuzy, the higher education 
institutions in the Soviet Ukraine, knowledge of the Ukrainian language became a 
prerequisite for entering and graduating from them. Along with these, all students 
were obliged to take courses on Ukrainian language, history, geography and culture. 
As the attitudes and understandings of generations are shaped by the education they 
receive, this short period of “Ukrainization” facilitated the emergence of an 
unprecedentedly large Ukrainian intelligentsia in Dnieper Ukraine.
459
 
The use of Ukrainian language spread also to the Soviet Ukrainian party and 
government. By 1925, officials were instructed to use Ukrainian in all 
correspondences.
460
  Consequently, Ukrainian-language media flourished in this 
period. Whereas in 1922 less than 10 newspapers and just 27 percent of the books in 
Ukraine were published in the native language, by 1927 over 50 percent of the 
books, and by 1933 373 out of 426 newspapers published in Soviet Ukraine were in 
Ukrainian.
461
 
In terms of religion, because the program of the Soviet government was 
eventual destruction of it, as the first step came “divide and shatter.” The all-Union 
government supported the tripartition
462
 of the Orthodox Church for this would 
further weaken its grasp of the devout people. The Soviets perceived the Russian 
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Orthodox Church as the main danger; hence they tolerated the emergent churches 
that undermined its influence.
463
  
Whatever great the contributions of “Ukrainization” on the penetration of 
the Ukrainian culture and language on the Soviet Ukrainian public may be, the point 
that it was aimed at building a Soviet Ukrainian culture, and not a national one, 
should not go unnoticed. In accordance with a program of social transformation, the 
Ukrainian language and “Ukrainianness” were being exploited for the ingraining of 
the Communist ideology and Soviet way of life into the Soviet Ukraine.
464
 
Although the policy of “Ukrainization” helped eastern Ukrainians of the Soviet 
Ukraine apprehend their “Ukrainness,” the Ukrainian society as a whole grew into a 
Soviet-Russian rather than a nationally conscious one.   
By 1928, while “Ukrainization” was still in full force and was bearing its 
fruits, the Soviet government began questioning what the goal and extent of it 
should be, and thus a transitional period commenced.
465
 As the authorities emerged 
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more repugnant than supportive of the “Ukrainization” policy, Communist Party of 
Ukraine [CP(b)U] began to back away from its implementation.
466
  
In 1932-1933, an unprecedentedly devastating famine raged throughout the 
Soviet Ukraine. This Great Famine of 1933, which came to be known as the 
Holodomor (killing by hunger), cost the lives of millions because of starvation or 
diseases caused by malnutrition. By the winter of 1933 starvation was the norm in 
the Ukrainian countryside, and despite the miserable situation Soviet authorities 
proceed their grain procurement policy pitilessly.
467
  
The crucial fact about this famine was that it was not an act of God. Indeed, 
the average of 1926-30 harvest was only 12% above the harvest of 1932.
468
  The 
main reason for the famine was Stalin’s policy to raise Ukraine’s grain procurement 
quotas in 1932 by 44%,
469
 which meant that the harvest was confiscated, 
irrespective of the people’s needs. Yet more, the Soviet authorities strove to erase 
the famine from public consciousness and denied the existence of it not only when 
it was happening but even for decades later.
470
 Even during the Khrushchev-era de-
Stalinization, although Stalin’s policies on Ukraine were repudiated, there was a 
complete silence about the “Great Famine.”471 It was possible to give voice to its 
occurrence only in mid-1980s, during the Gorbachev period. 
As the nationality policy was being reconfigured, the efforts of Ukrainizers 
were being more and more undermined. The “internationalist elements” in the 
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CP(b)U decided that the “Ukrainization” policy should be narrowed and the 
Ukrainian peasants migrating to the cities should be Russified, to protect the 
Russian character of the cities. Soviet authorities started targeting Ukrainian 
intelligentsia. As of then, if an intellectual was against the new approach to the 
nationality question, he could soon be accused of being a “counterrevolutionary 
bourgeois nationalist.”472 The Ukrainian intelligentsia was suspected of “nationalist 
deviation” and opposition to the state, and the first big strike came in late 1929 
when 45 Ukrainian intellectuals were accused of forming the Union for the 
Liberation of Ukraine (Spilka Vyzvolennia Ukraїny - SVU) in order the overthrow 
the government and were sent to a Siberian labor camp.
473
 As the Soviet authorities 
claimed, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church was linked to the very formation, 
and so it was dissolved in January 1930, following a show trial, which “served to 
equate nationalism with treason.”474 As such, between 1931 and 1934 leading 
figures of the Ukrainian intelligentsia were deposed of their positions for being 
“Trotskyist” or tolerating Ukrainian nationalism. Among the early victims of the 
Stalinist purges were the West Ukrainian émigrés of 1920s who escaped Polish 
persecution and fled to Soviet Ukraine to contribute to the “Ukrainization” process. 
During their accusations, these West Ukrainians were called as “Galicians” to show 
their alien origins.
475
  
Because the “Ukrainization” policy was now being reversed, the 
achievements of the period were to be erased. By late 1930s, the Ukrainian 
historiography that was permitted to develop in contradiction to the imperial 
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Russian historiography was now brought in line with the latter, which as well led to 
the denunciation of Hryshevskyj’s.476 As such, the Soviets rehabilitated “the 
imperial vantage point under the guise of the slogan ‘friendship of peoples’ 
according to which the Russians were the older brothers for the rest of the 
peoples.”477 Any contrary attempt at interpreting history was punished for being 
“bourgeois” or “counterrevolutionary nationalist deviation.” In this manner, 
authorities started “cleansing” the Academy of Sciences of the “undesirable 
elements.”478  
The process of “Ukrainization” and thus the transitional period came to an 
end with the death of commissar of education, Mykola Skrypnyk.
479
 By being a 
vigorous advocate of “Ukrainization,” and by promoting linguistic purism and 
introducing in 1928 a new orthography of Ukrainian came to be known as 
skrypnykivka, Skrypnyk became the object of accusations of “nationalist deviation” 
as a result of which he was deposed of his post as the commissar of education.
480
 
Actually, the Skrypnyk affair was a message to all; if even Skrypnyk could be 
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accused of “nationalist deviation,” no national communist should feel safe 
anymore.
481
  
By a modest effort, in 1934 Kiev was made the capital of Soviet Ukraine
482
 
as “a minor and propagandistic concession”483 to nationalist sentiments, and there 
appeared some attempts to maintain a “Bolshevik Ukrainization” with a limited 
scope and directed toward Soviet goals.
484
 Still, it was obvious that reconciling the 
“Soviet demands for unity and conformity” with “Soviet sponsorship of local 
development” was impossible for the Soviet authorities. Because of this 
incompatibility, they reasoned that Ukrainian themes were “contributing to 
divisiveness and disunity in the Soviet Union.”485  
In 1933, Stalin declared “local nationalism (not Russian chauvinism) the 
main threat to Soviet unity.”486 Under the cover of “friendship of peoples”, unity 
and solidarity, and internationalism began a glorification campaign of Russian 
ways, Russian language and culture with a stress upon the principal role the 
Russians played in the USSR.
487
 Hence came de-Ukrainization, centralization, full 
integration and Russification accompanied with “the ‘Great Retreat’ to the 
prerevolutionary Russian traditions.”488  
By mid-1930s, purges became more widespread and illogical than the earlier 
purges. It struck so widespread that later this period was to be known as the Great 
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Terror. As for the future of the Soviet Ukrainian leadership, the goal was to 
reorganize the CP(b)U and Union officials by cleansing all the ones identified with 
the Ukraine and replacing their positions with men whose loyalty to Stalin was 
indisputable and who were having no connection with Ukraine and the previous 
officials.
489
 Thereupon, by 1937 the purges gradually reached higher party levels,
490
 
and as such “within a year entire hierarchy (politburo and secretariat) of the CP(b)U 
was purged.”491   
In the upshot, the prominent historian of Ukraine, Orest Subtelny argues that 
“over 15,000 people holding responsible positions were purged on charges of 
nationalism.”492 As a result of the party purges, the complete subordination of the 
CP(b)U was achieved. The incursion of thousands of Russian functionaries was 
followed with the arrival of the new leaders of CP(b)U who were sent from 
Moscow and were foreigners to Ukraine.
493
 Naturally, as the new officials did not 
know Ukrainian, use of Ukrainian in the administrative affairs was also curtailed.
494
 
Being probably the principal manifestation of national consciousness, 
language was a major concern for the Soviet authorities. As the earlier “Bolshevik 
principle of the supremacy of local languages in the republics” was now 
denounced
495
 and the policy of Russification commenced, the All-Union 
government started to show its displeasure with the language policies of the 
“Ukrainization” campaign, remonstrating that the Russian, Polish, and Jewish 
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minorities of Ukraine were being forced to learn Ukrainian.
496
 As the Russian 
language was considered to be “the medium through which world’s ‘first socialist 
state’ had been created,”497 Ukrainians were to “adopt Russian as an alternate if not 
a primary tongue.” As said by a new law, all Ukrainians were to “converse fluently 
in simple Russian and to read and write the language in an elementary way;” and 
accordingly Russian was to penetrate into the countryside where Ukrainian was 
preponderant.
498
 In 1938, mandatory Russian-language instruction and universal 
curriculum and schedule were established throughout the Soviet Union.
499
  
Next came the efforts to make the Ukrainian alphabet, grammar, and 
vocabulary closer to Russian.
500
  In 1933, Skrypnyk-time language reforms were 
abolished. In 1937, a newly published Ukrainian-Russian dictionary was 
denounced
501
 and a new dictionary emphasizing the similarities between Russian 
and Ukrainian languages was prepared, which “for the first time excluded the 
distinctive Ukrainian letter [‘ґ,’] retaining only the Russian [‘г’].”502  In terms of 
printed media, while by 1931 Ukrainian language newspapers and journals 
constituted respectively 90 and 85 percent of the overall newspapers, in 1940 these 
figures had dropped to 70 and 45 percent.
503
  
It would be appropriate to give a brief account of the situation of non-
Ukrainian peoples of Ukraine during this period. In fact, Jews, Tatars, Poles, 
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Germans, and Greeks, all went through the same processes of indigenization, and 
then the reversal of these policies, just like the Ukrainians.
504
 As one might expect, 
the Russians who were mainly concentrated in the industrial regions of eastern 
Ukraine, mainly around Kharkov and Donbass, were not exposed to these ever 
changing processes, and felt bothered especially because of the linguistic aspect of 
“Ukrainization” as they never thought of being a minority in Ukraine but saw the 
Russian culture and language as the ever dominant one.
505
  
The pre-WWII historical experience of different regions varied 
considerably. While Ukrainians living in interwar Poland, Czechoslovakia, and 
Romania were terrified by the news of the artificial famine and mass deportations 
which the Soviet Ukrainians were enduring, many Soviet Ukrainians who were 
lucky enough not to be exposed to the terror and the famine were unaware of their 
extent due to the “totalitarian nature of the Soviet society, censorship, and 
propaganda”.506  
The Sovietization and Russification, purges, deportations, and executions in 
the Soviet Ukraine of 1930s were certainly the factors which suppressed the 
manifestations of Ukrainian national consciousness among the Soviet Ukrainians 
during the WWII period. By the end of this period, not only the most nationally 
conscious Soviet Ukrainians were liquidated with the purges,
507
 and a vacuum of 
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national leadership had emerged,
508
 but also the Ukrainian people at large was 
terrorized by the Soviet policies of 1930s. Moreover, the news of the developments 
in Soviet Ukraine contrarily fueled western Ukrainians’ distaste of the Soviets and 
ignited their desire to struggle not to become one of the many submerged nations of 
the Soviet Union.  
 
 
4.2.2 Western Ukrainian Lands in the Interwar Period 
 
While the interwar Ukrainian populations of Poland and Romania were 
treated intolerantly, had to endure repression and were denied self-rule and the use 
of Ukrainian both in public life and in education, and faced Polonization or 
Romanization as the case may be, the Transcarpathians found themselves with a 
favorable political environment in a country which could be considered as “the only 
new state in eastern Europe that remained a liberal democracy during  the entire 
interwar period,”509 thus “interwar era of Czechoslovak rule witnessed a true 
cultural and national renaissance for Subcarpathian Rus’.”510  
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4.2.2.1 Ukrainian Lands in Interwar Romania 
 
During the interwar period around 582.000 to one million Ukrainians lived 
in northern Bukovina and southern Bessarabia which were incorporated into the 
Kingdom of Romania following November 1918.
511
 Obviously, although its 
southern parts were inhabited by a considerable amount of Ukrainians, Bessarabia 
was not a historically and ethnically Ukrainian land.
512
 As such, the region was not 
a place to claim Ukrainian, and thus is out of the purview of this chapter.  
Before WWI, predominantly Ukrainian-inhabited northern Bukovina was a 
part of the autonomous Austrian province of Bukovina. At that time with “extensive 
local self-government, and a well-developed system of Ukrainian-language 
education,” Ukrainians of Bukovina were said to be “the most favored West 
Ukrainian community.”513 Unfortunately, all these privileges were to be lost in the 
hands of the interwar Romania as Romanian authorities even denied that Ukrainians 
were a distinct nationality and claimed that they were Romanians who lost their 
native tongue, and a fierce campaign of Romanization set in. Ukrainian language 
schools were Romanized. Furthermore, Ukrainian newspapers and cultural societies 
were banned.
514
 For the Bukovinian Ukrainians accustomed to the favorable 
environment provided by the former Austrian rule, the oppressive Romanian rule 
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was a shock.
515
 As a result of these repressive developments, by mid-1930s a 
growing number of Ukrainians in Romania joined radical nationalist underground 
organizations.
516
 
 
 
4.2.2.2 Ukrainian lands in Interwar Czechoslovakia 
 
Since the Middle Ages Transcarpathia was uninterruptedly a part of 
Hungary. It was only in 1919 that Transcarpathia joined Czechoslovakia.
517
 
Czechoslovakia considered itself a Slavic state and the Rusyns as the “state 
nationality” in Subcarpathian Rus’, hence it provided a favorable environment not 
only for its Rusyn/Ukrainian population, but also for those Ukrainians who 
emigrated from Galicia and Dnieper Ukraine and settled in Transcarpathia.
518
 
Rusyns/Ukrainians of Transcarpathia were still confused about their national 
identity and therefore, the interwar Transcarpathia was a playground of Russophile, 
Rusynophile,
519
 and Ukrainophile orientations.
520
  
In the religious sphere, the Greek Catholic and the Orthodox churches were 
fighting for the allegiance of the interwar Ukrainians of Transcarpathia. Whereas 
the Orthodox Church was the stronghold of Russophiles, the Greek Catholic Church 
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became “a bastion of the Rusyn national identity.”521 Although by 1930s, the 
Czechoslovak government officially supported pro-Czechoslovak-to-be 
Rusynophiles and despite its relatively late appearance in Transcarpathia,
522
 the 
Ukrainophile orientation became dominant in 1930s.
523
  
Being able to express their political and national aspirations freely, 
Transcarpathians of 1930s did not promote much the Organization of Ukrainian 
Nationalists (OUN),
524
 the western Ukrainian nationalist organization which took 
suppressed people of Galicia, western Volhynia, northern Bukovina, and even 
Dnieper Ukraine by storm.
525
 Yet, with the creation of firstly autonomous, then, 
however ephemeral, independent Carpatho-Ukraine in 1939,
526
 Transcarpathians 
were to mingle with the members of OUN, because “eager to protect the first 
Ukrainian land to gain its freedom, many young integral nationalists [that is OUN 
members] from Galicia illegally crossed the border and joined the [Carpatho-
Ukrainian military force] Carpathian Sich.”527 
Developing a Ukrainian national identity and a feeling of unity and 
solidarity with the people to the east who are said to be their co-nationals was not 
that easy. In the first place, it was only after Transcarpathia’s incorporation into the 
Soviet Ukraine in 1945 that the Transcarpathian Ukrainians for the first time ever 
united under one state with their co-nationals on the other side of the border.
528
 
Besides, when considering the influence of the establishment of an independent 
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Ukrainian state in Transcarpathia, it should be noted that one-day independence 
during the chaotic war-times was most probably unknown to the Transcarpathians 
of the time. Still, although the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state in 
Transcarpathia could not have an impact on the Ukrainians of the day, we can talk 
about its impact on the future Transcarpathians. As the narrative of the 
establishment of independent Ukrainian national states during 1917-1920 period in 
the heartland Ukraine had a nationalizing impact on the region’s future population;  
the way the Ukrainian historians told the story of the once independent Ukrainian 
state in Transcarpathia, and the thus created narrative of the establishment of the 
independent Carpatho-Ukraine, similarly helped most, especially the young 
generation of Transcarpathians, turn into nationally conscious Ukrainians.
529
  
 
 
4.2.2.3 Ukrainian lands under the Polish rule 
 
The two main Ukrainian-inhabited lands of Poland, western Volhynia and 
eastern Galicia, were different from each other. Volhynia was formerly a part of the 
Russian Empire, its Ukrainian population was mainly Orthodox and had strong 
communist traditions (as compared to the latter). It was subject to Russian imperial 
policies which suppressed Ukrainian culture and language, thus had a much weaker 
nationalist tradition as compared with Galicia. Although Volhynia’s incorporation 
into Poland increased the interaction between the Ukrainians of Volhynia and their 
nationalistic brethren in Galicia and made them “become basically assimilated in 
outlook to the Galicians,” still their role in nationalistic developments was 
                                                             
529Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, 451.  
120 
 
comparatively minor.
530
 On the other hand, eastern Galicia was a former province 
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until WWI and the center of the short-lived 
Western Ukrainian People’s Republic (ZUNR).  astern Galicia’s Ukrainian 
population was predominantly Greek Catholic and had a well-developed sense of 
national consciousness. 
The developments in the interwar Poland are the most crucial ones to be 
emphasized in this chapter, as it was the Polish-ruled eastern Galicia that the most 
crucial Ukrainian actor of the interwar and WWII period, the Organization of 
Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN – Orhanizatsiia Ukrayїns’kykh Natsionalistiv) came 
out of. By having the greatest impact on not only the developments of its playtime, 
but also on the evolution of different political cultures in western and eastern 
regions of the contemporary Ukraine, the OUN deserves to be evaluated 
comprehensively,  and thus encompasses the greatest part of this chapter.  
Under the dictatorship of Jozef Pilsudski, Galicia harboured the most 
nationally conscious Ukrainians. The state banned Ukrainian in governmental 
agencies, made Polish the primary language in education, and banned several 
Ukrainian organizations.
531
 Still, Ukrainians of Poland were organizing in 
cooperatives and civic organizations,
532
  printed their own newspapers,
533
 and 
established several Ukrainian political parties of which Ukrainian National 
Democratic Alliance (Ukraїns’ke Natsional’no Demokratychne Ob’’iednannia – 
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UNDO) was the most prominent one.
534
 While UNDO believed that Ukrainians 
could attain their rights through legal means,
535
 the policies of the Polish state made 
the Ukrainian population feel disappointment and despair, losing their trust in legal 
ways. 
Another issue that increased resentment toward the Polish state was the land 
reform laws of 1920, 1925, and 1936. With these laws the Polish government 
settled Polish soldiers and colonists to the Ukrainian-inhabited lands. By the law of 
1936 it was stated that “a strip of land thirty kilometers from the Soviet border was 
directly subject to state authority.”536 Nay, this law laid ground for the Polish 
authorities to “exile individuals from this region for varying lengths of time, 
whenever they consider such a course of action to be in the interest of the State.”537  
Meanwhile, hearing the bad news about the Soviet treatment of Ukrainians, 
such as the purges and the Holodomor (artificial famine) of 1932-33, the population 
started to lose its pro-Soviet sentiments. On the other hand, people increasingly 
began accusing UNDO for its “fruitless collaborationism” with the Polish 
government. As both the moderates and radical leftists were losing ground, the way 
was cleared for the radical nationalists.
538
  
At this point, the Ukrainian Military Organization (Ukrainska Viiskova 
Orhanizatsiia, UVO), formed by İevhen Konovalets’539 from the disbanded army of 
the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) in 1920, came to the scene. It was a 
Ukrainian radical rightist resistance movement using terror, political assassination, 
                                                             
534Other important ones were Ukrainian Socialist-Radical Party, and the Communist Party of 
Western Ukraine (KPZU). 
535 Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, 592. 
536 Marples, Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1930s, 27. 
537 Stephan M. Horak, Poland and Her National Minorities, 1919-39: A Case Study  (New York: 
Vantage Press, 1961), 153. 
538Yekelchyk, Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation, 127. 
539A commander of the army of the UNR, and later leader of UVO and the first leader of OUN. 
122 
 
bomb attacks, and sabotage as its methods to destabilize the Polish rule and achieve 
its goals.
540
  
In 1929 at a meeting in Vienna, Konovalets’ succeeded in uniting nationalist 
organizations under the umbrella of the OUN. OUN was “an extremist underground 
political organization established by Ukrainian nationalists in inter-war Poland with 
the goal of establishing independent Ukrainian state”.541 It was “a highly disciplined 
underground revolutionary movement dedicated to the overthrow of Polish, 
Romanian, and eventually, Soviet rule on Ukrainian territories.”542 Soon Ukrainian 
students, peasant youth, war veterans, and impoverished peasants were attracted by 
OUN.
543
 Though it is not easy to give precise numbers, Orest Subtelny states that 
“on the eve of the Second World War it is estimated to have had about 20.000 
members,” while “the number of sympathizers was many times greater.”544 
In the meantime, in 1930, the Polish government responded to the 
assassinations and sabotages of the Ukrainian nationalists very harshly. With the 
“Pacification” of 1930, the Polish government cracked down on Ukrainians, and the 
Polish army and police occupying the region brutally searched for every Ukrainian 
house in a terrorist hunt. This event only served to further alienation of the 
Ukrainians and increase in sympathy and support for the OUN.
545
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During this period OUN activities became so fierce that they did not hesitate 
in assassinating even Ukrainians who disagreed with their activities.
546
 OUN’s 
assassination of the Polish Minister of the Interior Bronislaw Pieracki in 1934, and 
the subsequent Polish crackdown on the krai (regional) leadership of OUN in 
Galicia fueled an increasing internal conflicts. Following the death of its leader 
Konovalets’ in 1938547 internal strife in OUN deepened culminating in the OUN’s 
split in the spring of 1941 into two factions as moderate OUN-M (Melnykites), 
headed by Andrii Mel’nyk who was the lieutenant of Konovalets’, and more radical 
and revolutionary OUN-B (Banderites), led by the head of the Galician krai 
leadership, Stepan Bandera. 
While the Soviet occupation approached, western Ukrainians led by OUN 
were ready to struggle for their national right, and thus were to constitute great 
problems for the Soviet regime to come.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
UKRAINIAN LANDS DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR  
AND IN THE POST-WAR SOVIET UKRAINE 
 
 
5.1 Ukrainian Lands during the Second World War 
 
The Second World War can be divided into two periods for its importance in 
the evolution of the Ukrainian political culture. The first was the twenty-one-month-
long occupation of western Ukrainian lands by the Soviet Union. During this 
period, western Ukrainians’ encounter with the Soviet rule increased their dislike of 
the Soviet regime. The second crucial period was the Nazi rule which shaped the 
developments in Ukraine from the Operation Barbarossa until the return of the 
Soviets. Although it was a short period of time, the Nazi rule in Ukraine should be 
analyzed in dept for the period saw important developments that influenced the 
future Ukrainian society. The developments of this period provide significant 
insights about the regional diversities in the contemporary Ukraine. 
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5.1.1 Soviet Occupation of Western Ukrainian Lands (September 1939 – June 
1941) 
 
Following the Soviet occupation of Polish-ruled Ukrainian territories in 
September 1939, OUN from then on was to fight a new enemy, the Soviet Union. 
Although initially the Soviets celebrated this as the “reunification” of these newly 
acquired lands with their motherland and initiated a policy of “Ukrainization” in 
order to win the hearts of their new “subjects,” soon the oppressive face of the 
Soviets came to the fore. As the Soviet authorities were deeply apprehensive of the 
“dissemination of nationalist ideas” from the western to the eastern Ukraine,548 they 
could not wait much to initiate the policy of Russification and Sovietization. 
As such, the intelligentsia was accused of “bourgeois nationalism,” state 
revealed its totalitarian nature by censorship and propaganda,
549
 and state and 
collective farms began to be formed. The Ukrainian cooperatives, political parties 
and “bourgeois” newspapers were banned, the Greek Catholic Church was 
suppressed and its landholdings were expropriated, religious instruction was 
suspended, but most importantly in 1940 mass arrests and deportations started. To 
escape arrest or deportation, great numbers of Ukrainian nationalists and 
intelligentsia fled to the German-occupied lands, mainly to Lemko and Chelm 
regions, while the remaining ones were to face arrest.
550
  
The twenty-one-month-long Soviet rule in Western Ukraine had a historical 
importance, as for the first time in centuries ethnically Ukrainian territories were 
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united in a single, albeit Soviet, Ukrainian state.
551
 Nevertheless, Western 
Ukrainians’ first exposure to the Soviet system had an immediate negative impact 
on them so that they would naively greet the Nazis as liberators.
552
 
 
 
5.1.2 Operation Barbarossa and the Nazi Rule in Ukraine 
 
Since September 1939, OUN and the Nazis had a problem-free relationship. 
As Ukrainian nationalists longed for the destruction of the Polish and Soviet rule 
over the Ukrainian territories, they initially hoped for the victory of the Nazi 
Germany. The possibility of the destruction of the greatest obstacle before the 
establishment of a Ukrainian state surpassed all other considerations.
553
 So that, 
without considering possible future clashes of interest with the Germans, Ukrainian 
nationalists jumped into collaboration with the Germans as they thought this would 
help them establish their own military units to become the nucleus of the future 
Ukrainian army, and help them to gain a foothold in eastern Ukraine.
554
  
“When preparing for an attack on the USSR, the Nazis first planned to make 
use of Ukrainian nationalists,”555 so Mel’nyk could establish “close links with the 
Gestapo and the Wehrmacht, whereas Bandera maintained contact and worked with 
the Abwehr [the German intelligence].” By the end of 1940, not only the units of 
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Ukrainian auxiliary police had been created”556 by the German Army, who were to 
become Ostpolizei, but the Germans also “surreptitiously formed military training 
units for Ukrainians.” Soon, in the spring of 1941, shortly before Operation 
Barbarossa, “the comparatively unconcealed development of Ukrainian units was 
begun by the Wehrmacht.”557  Unofficially called by the Germans as the Legions of 
Ukrainian nationalists, Ukrainian battalions Roland and Nachtigall were established 
by the German military and were composed of mainly OUN-B activists.
558
 While 
the officers were German, “there was a whole staff of ‘unofficial’ Ukrainian 
officers, headed by the leader of the ‘military tendency’ in the OUN-B, Roman 
Shukhevych.”559 Of these two battalions, Nachtigall needs a special attention as it 
was among the German forces that took  ’viv in the beginning of the Operation 
Barbarossa.
560 
On 22 June 1941, the Nazi Germany launched Operation Barbarossa, 
catching the Soviets off-guard. As a result, the Nazis swept away and occupied 
almost all Ukrainian territories in about four months, with the exception of the 
Hungarian-controlled Transcarpathia and Romanian-ruled Transnistria.
561
 During 
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this process, a considerable number of Ukrainians conscripted to the Red army from 
western Ukrainian territories left their posts despite the death penalty for desertion 
attempts. The Red Army and NKVD had to beat a retreat, and while retreating they 
not only destroyed the cities they left behind, but also slaughtered prisoners en 
masse. Unlike the rapid and destructive retreat in western Ukrainian regions, a 
much more planned evacuation could be secured in eastern regions, as a result of 
which the war experiences of western and eastern Ukrainians were varied to a 
considerable extent.
562
 These developments added to the Soviets’ unpopularity in 
the eyes of the western Ukrainians as they often greeted the Nazis eagerly while, 
eastern Ukrainians who were more on the same terms with the Soviet system 
received the Nazis in a more guarded way. 
The early days of the Nazi occupation witnessed an important development 
for the Ukrainian nationalist cause. On June 30, the first group of Banderites headed 
by Iaroslav Stets’ko entered  ’viv following the German armies and the Nachtigall. 
Here, OUN-B activists led by Stets’ko, who was speaking on behalf of his vozhd’ 
Bandera, proclaimed the creation of an independent Ukrainian state. This 
proclamation was known as the “Act of Proclamation of the Ukrainian State” (or 
shortly the Akt).
563
 This Akt was proclaimed without the knowledge of Berlin, as the 
Ukrainian nationalists wanted to catch the Nazis with a fait accompli. While it can 
be said that Ukrainians of Volhynia and Eastern Galicia regarded the proclamation 
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of the Akt positively, it is highly suspicious that the central and eastern Ukrainians 
agreed with the western Ukrainians.
564
  
Following the Akt, as the next step, OUN-B created mobile task forces 
(expeditionary groups – pokhidni hrupy) which were to follow the advancing 
German armies into eastern Ukraine in order to expand their nationalist cause, the 
proclamation of the Akt, and to be able to organize local administration in eastern 
Ukraine.
565
 These expeditionary groups were casted an important role as they were 
to carry the nationalist message onto the eastern Ukrainian lands, and thus the 
Ukrainian nationalist cause was to reach the Soviet Ukrainian masses. Their 
ultimate aim was to reconfigure the Sovietized and Russified Soviet Ukrainian 
masses as nationally conscious Ukrainians.  
Unfortunately, Germans did not buy the fait accompli and in three days after 
the proclamation, an SS Einsatzgruppe was sent to  ’viv and arrested the OUN-B 
leadership there.
566
 Although Germans attempted to reach a rapprochement by 
asking the OUN-B leaders to renounce the Akt, when they refused, Germans started 
the crack down on OUN-B.
567
 “By mid-September, mass arrests and executions of 
OUN-B members began, and on 25 November, the Gestapo ordered the elimination 
of the group on the grounds that it was preparing an uprising against the 
Reichskommissariat Ukraine.”568  
The next to eliminate were the OUN-B expeditionary groups. While one of 
these groups was destined to Kiev, two were to cross the northern Ukraine, another 
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had Kharkov as its destination, and one was to disperse throughout the southern 
Ukraine.
569
 Despite the measures taken against them by the Nazi authorities, these 
groups were able to reach their destinations.
570
 The expeditionary groups were vital 
not only for their purpose, but also as their encounter with Central and East 
Ukrainians helped them find out that these people possessed different views and had 
other concerns than the West Ukrainians. OUN members realized that eastern 
Ukrainians perceived western Ukrainians as high-handed, virulently anti-Russian, 
and sacrificing civil rights and social welfare issues on the altar of national 
independence.
571
 This realization stimulated a change in OUN’s ideology, which 
emerged from the 1943 Convention with a new and more universal program
572
 
incorporating “concerns of eastern Ukrainian audience and de-emphasizing racial 
theories.”573  
While OUN-B’s influence on the local administration was setting aside as its 
supporters diminished following their rift with the Germans, OUN-M, which could 
still preserve its good relations with the Nazi authorities, filled the gap in every 
aspect of local administrative activities. OUN-M which also organized 
expeditionary groups had the German approval behind them.
574
 “OUN-M managed 
to get its representatives into key leadership posts in the organs of civil government 
in Kyiv, Kharkov, Zhytomyr, and other towns and smaller settlements of Central 
and Eastern Ukraine.”575  
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As a result of local initiatives by the Ukrainians, the period saw the revision 
of school curriculums in many cities in a way to “communicate a Ukrainian national 
message stressing language, history and, culture.” In Poltava, Ukrainian national 
songs forbidden by the Soviets were now taught to children. Books published 
during the “Ukrainization” period but forbidden in 1930s were now free, and “the 
classics of Ukrainian history could now be read.”576 
The arrival of the Nazis also stimulated the revival of the religious life in the 
Ukraine. As soon as the authority was transferred to the Germans, people began 
restoring the Churches demolished during the Soviet period.
577
 Still, this did not 
mean that the religious life in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine was set free from its 
chains. In the Reichskommissariat, there were two churches. The first was the 
Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) with most of its 
members being Russophiles. The second was the Ukrainian Autocephalous 
Orthodox Church, which was revived in February 1942,
578
 and was dominated by 
the Ukrainian nationalists. At the early stages of the Nazi rule, the two Churches 
experienced a remarkable rebirth, but because of their association with Moscow (for 
the former) or the nationalists (for the latter), the two Churches started to become a 
cause of disturbance for the Nazi authorities.
579
 As the German authorities wanted 
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to “prevent the creation of a Ukrainian spiritual force that could have political 
importance,”580 they decided that the activities and the jurisdiction of every church 
eparchy should be confined to a certain Generalbezirk (General region-district), and 
that there should be no jurisdictional and hierarchical connection among them. The 
German policy thus brought about the division of both Churches into six 
jurisdictions each. As of then, in fact “the Reichskommissariat Ukraine had twelve 
Orthodox Churches.”581 Moreover, each Generalkommissar had the right to 
intervene in the Church activities in his area of jurisdiction, and to dismiss the 
priests.  
As for the influence of the Churches in the Reichskommissariat, even 
though the nationalist overtures of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church 
had an impact on the older generation, the youth who grew up under the Soviet 
regime was indifferent and even hostile to religion. Thus, nationalism’s 
identification with religion did not help but deprived the young Soviet Ukrainian 
generation of the nationalist cause.
582
 As for the competition between the two 
Orthodox Churches, the Autonomous Church seems to have won the hearts of more 
parishioners than the Autocephalous Church. One of the main reasons for this is the 
conviction among the majority of the people that the Autocephalous Church was 
uncanonical and self-consecrated. While this served to the disturbance of the 
Ukrainian Orthodox people, the Ukrainophile Autocephalous Church’s practice of 
using Ukrainian (if this was not possible then the Church Slavonic pronounced in 
Ukrainian) in liturgical services further alienated the Ukrainian Orthodox people 
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especially of the Dnieper Ukraine.
583
 In Poltava, 80 percent of the parishioners 
attended the Autonomous Church. In Dnepropetrovsk, all working churches were 
Autonomous. German reports state that the two Churches equally shared the 
parishioners in the Kiev region, while southern Kiev was dominated by the 
Autocephalous. Also according to the German reports, the Cherkasy and 
Kirovohrad regions were dominantly Autocephalous.
584
 Although the desire on the 
part of the Dnieper Ukrainians not to use Ukrainian and their preference to adhere 
to the Autonomous rather than the Autocephalous Church does not necessarily 
indicate their non-commitment to a Ukrainian national identity, still it gives us 
some clue about the relative strength of Ukrainian national consciousness in 
different regions of Ukraine. 
Although Soviet historians refer to an extensive Soviet partisan movement 
fighting the Nazis in the Ukraine, denying any role to the Ukrainian Insurgent Army 
(UPA)
585
, later Ukrainian and Western sources maintain that the effect of the Soviet 
partisans was confined to a limited area and thus had a moderate impact on the 
developments in the Nazi-ruled Ukraine at least until 1943.
586
 The most renowned 
Soviet partisan group led by Sydir Kovpak dominated northern Ukrainian oblasts, 
while the Soviet partisan groups in the western Ukrainian areas were hardly 
competing with the OUN groups.
587
 As a whole, the penetration of Soviet partisan 
groups in Ukraine prior to 1943 was too weak to give the people “the sense of a 
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‘Soviet presence’ Russian leaders hoped” for.588 As such, in the early stages of the 
war the Soviet partisan movement had no popular base but was “a creation of the 
authorities and the NKVD in particular.”589 However, in 1943, when the tide of war 
turned towards the Soviets, the Soviet partisan movement in Ukraine began to mean 
something. Still, “even in the summer of 1943, a matter of months before Kiev was 
recaptured by the Red Army, partisan movements in Central Ukraine were minor 
compared to the rival insurgent movements in  the western oblasts of Ukraine.”590 
As popular support for OUN-M grew and exposed OUN-M’s ability to build 
an organization, and as in October 1941 Melnykites “created in Kiev the Ukrainian 
National Council as a potential nucleus of a Ukrainian national government,”591 and 
organized a patriotic rally in Kiev to demonstrate the popular support to their cause, 
German authorities pressed the button for the crack down on OUN-M. Hence, “by 
1942, the nationalist gamble on using the German invasion to promote Ukrainian 
national assertion ended in fiasco.”592  
With Erich Koch, who favored anti-Ukrainian policies, appointed as the 
Reichskommissar of Ukraine in November 1941, the Nazi policies towards the 
Ukrainian civil life were brutalized.
593
 Ukrainians were subjected to discriminatory 
policies with the increasing number of German-only shops, by the reduction of 
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medical services for the Ukrainians,
594
 and shutting down of all higher learning 
education institutions and schools beyond the fourth grade. As of April 1942, only 
40 out of 115 newspapers which began to be published since the arrival of the Nazis 
were permitted. Still, those remaining were kind of “heavily censored propaganda 
broadsheets,”595 and were called by the locals as “German newspapers in Ukrainian 
character.”596 The decision to preserve collective farms (Soviet kolkhozy), severe 
shortage of food, and forced deportation of Ukrainians to Germany as forced labor 
with the Ostarbeiter program (taking them back to the times of Soviet deportations 
to Siberia)
597
 further alienated Ukrainian people.
598
 The sufferings caused by the 
twenty months of German rule “played an enormous part in the development of the 
nationalist movements in the  ast Ukraine.”599 As a consequence, “arbitrary and 
brutal behaviour of the German authorities played into the hands of OUN, by 
convincing the desperate population that their only hope (except for the Bolshevik 
alternative) lay in joining OUN.”600 The brutality of the Nazis also served as a basis 
for the legitimizing of the Soviet rule especially in pre-1939 Soviet Ukraine.
601
  A 
city joke of the period is illustrative: “What was Stalin unable to achieve in twenty 
years that Hitler achieved in just one year? That we started to like Soviet rule.”602  
In 1943, when the tide of war turned against the Nazis, they reconsidered 
rapprochement with the Ukrainian nationalists and asked them to form a volunteer 
                                                             
594 Yekelchyk, Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation, 140. 
595 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 48. 
596 Kosyk, 218. 
597There are different figures about the number of Ukrainian deportees to Germany. According to 
Magocsi, out of 2.8 million forced deportees between 1942-45, nearly 2.3 million were from 
Ukraine. (Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, 634.) According to Armstrong, the number of Ukrainian 
workers in Germany was approximately 1.500.000. (Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 90.) 
598See Yekelchyk, Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation, 138-141; Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, 
633-634; Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, 468-469; Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 85-90; 
Katchanovski, Cleft Countries, 142-145. 
599Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 90.  
600Hunczak, 183. 
601Katchanovski, Cleft Countries, 143. 
602 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 224 
136 
 
unit in the German army. For this purpose, they approached the only Ukrainian 
organization they recognized, that was the Ukrainian Central Committee (UCC) in 
Cracow. Despite the fierce opposition by the Banderites, who no longer saw the 
Nazis as a power to reconcile, Melnykites and the Greek Catholic Church supported 
this initiative. Thus, in April 1943, with 13.000 Ukrainian volunteers, SS Volunteer 
Galicia Division (14. SS-Freiwilligen Division “Galizien”) was formed. In order 
not to make reference to the Division’s Ukrainianness, Germans ensured that its 
insignia becomes the Galician Lion but not the Ukrainian trident.
603
 The 
Reichsführer of the SS, Heinrich Himmler even forbade the use of the word 
“Ukrainian” with regards to the Division.604 Still, most of the volunteers viewed the 
Division as “Ukrainian,” and “either overlooked or failed to grasp the meaning of 
‘Galicia,’ and the significant absence of the word ‘Ukraine’.”605  
In the meantime, OUN-B was forming a “large-scale partisan force” which 
was to constitute the nucleus of the future regular Ukrainian army.
606
 In the summer 
of 1943, OUN-B forcibly joined all nationalist units under its jurisdiction.
607
 
Subsequently, OUN-B ordered its members who joined the German police forces 
during the years of collaboration, to desert and join the UPA.
608
 Additionally, 
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former soldiers of the SS Volunteer Galicia Division who escaped captivity joined 
them.
609
 Apart from appealing to their co-nationals to join their cause, OUN-UPA 
further invited Soviet partisans, volunteers in the German army, and other Soviet 
nationalities to join the forces of UPA.
610
 UPA soon turned out to a “well-organized 
partisan army which took control of large parts of Volhynia, Polissia, and, later, 
Galicia,”611 fighting not only against the German and Soviet armies, but also against 
the Polish guerillas and Soviet partisans.
612
 While UPA was strong in western 
Ukraine, it did not count for much in eastern Ukraine where UPA forces were 
“more often than not destroyed by Soviet partisan formations.”613 
OUN today constitutes a divisive issue between eastern and western 
Ukrainians. Today some people argue that OUN members were Nazi collaborators, 
whereas others believe that they rather represented a national liberation organization 
that deserves the title of “Hero(s) of Ukraine”. While majority of contemporary 
eastern Ukrainians possess negative impressions about OUN-UPA, majority of their 
western Ukrainian counterparts praise OUN-UPA as a national liberation 
organization whose members strove for an independent Ukrainian state.
614
 Evidence 
suggests that although OUN collaborated with the Nazis especially in the early 
months of the Operation Barbarossa, this collaboration was not an end in itself, but 
it was the result of their belief that the German power could be their only chance in 
building their own army and communicating their cause to eastern Ukrainians, 
ultimately establishing their own independent state. As such, “the relationship 
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between OUN-UPA and Nazi Germany was far too complex to be described as 
collaborationist,” but in attaining their goal, Ukrainian nationalists must have seen 
the Nazis as the lesser evil, collaborating with them in line with the “enemy of my 
enemy is my friend” understanding.615 
It can be said that OUN-UPA meant different things not only for the 
contemporary but for the WWII-period East and West Ukrainians as well. 
Comparing the psychological differences between the western and eastern 
Ukrainians, one should think back on the fact that while western Ukrainians fought 
on the side of Nazis or OUN-UPA forces, the Red Army included over five million 
eastern Ukrainians.
616
 Whereas western Ukrainians saw the WWII experience as a 
rare opportunity to unite Ukrainian lands within a Ukrainian state free of Russian, 
Polish, and German dominations, and considered Bandera, OUN, and UPA as “the 
embodiment of the Ukrainian love of freedom and determination to attain 
liberation,” outside western Ukraine Bandera, OUN, and UPA were Nazi 
collaborators, and the Soviets were the victors of the epic “great patriotic war”. 
Whilst the Red Army soldiers were glorified in eastern Ukraine, western Ukrainians 
charged them as “brutal oppressors.”617  
The influence of Western Ukrainian nationalists over the Eastern Ukrainians 
is an important question which is difficult to answer. The impact of the OUN 
groups was not in uniformity throughout the Soviet Ukraine. The fact that both 
Banderites and Melnykites were suppressed by the Germans well before they could 
establish themselves in eastern Ukraine made their impact fall short of what they 
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intended to achieve.
618
 Thus, in most occasions nationalism in eastern Ukraine was 
locally led by eastern Ukrainian intellectuals. Sometimes eastern Ukrainians could 
form “vigorous and successful local nationalist organizations independent of, and 
even hostile to, the OUN.”619  
As a whole, the OUN’s penetration was successful in terms of influencing 
eastern Ukrainian intellectuals and technicians but was unsuccessful when it came 
to the mass of the populace who remained uncommitted to the Ukrainian nationalist 
cause. If there was patriotism outside western Ukraine, it was of a territorial kind. 
Eastern and southern Ukrainians had an “attachment to the Ukraine as a territorial 
entity,”620 but were not committed to the idea of a Ukraine based on cultural and 
ethnic distinctiveness vis-à-vis Russia or the Soviet Union. The general tendency of 
the Ukrainians of pre-1939 Soviet Ukraine seems to be the rejection of “any ethnic 
national creed in favor of some ideology based on territorial identity.”621 
An important issue to be discussed here is the question how western and 
eastern Ukrainians (pre-1939 Soviet Ukrainians) of the interwar and WWII period 
perceived themselves and each other. While the western Ukrainian generations 
came from a society which had a developed national awareness, ordinary people in 
eastern Ukraine could hardly differentiate between nationality and religious 
orientation. Many in eastern Ukraine equated Catholicism (no matter Roman or 
Greek) with Polishness. Their self-identification was confined with the terms 
“nashi” or “svoi”, meaning our people. These “nashi” certainly included the 
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Russians. What Ukrainian nationalists called the “western Ukraine” was called 
“Poland” by the eastern Ukrainians.622 
Having grown up with the Soviet indoctrination and isolation, the young 
people in eastern Ukraine were predominantly believers of communism. Thus, 
because of their being Greek Catholic, talking in a “bizarre Ukrainian,” and coming 
from the Polish lands of Galicia or western Volhynia, accepting western Ukrainians 
as “nashi” was not simple to comprehend for the eastern Ukrainians. Still, although 
OUN-B activists realized that the eastern Ukrainians were mostly indifferent to the 
establishment of a Ukrainian state, they noticed that eastern Ukrainians had a 
memory of the Ukrainian National Republic of the revolutionary period. For 
example when eastern Ukrainians encountered Ukrainian nationalists they asked 
“about Vynnchenko (and sometimes Petliura), whether there was already a 
Ukrainian authority, … a Ukrainian army.”623 Furthermore, according to the OUN 
expeditionary groups, east Ukrainian national consciousness was much developed 
as compared to 1918-1919 period. They thought this was mainly due to existence of 
a Ukrainian state, albeit a “Soviet” one, which implemented “Ukrainization”.624 On 
the other hand, western Ukrainians saw Soviet Russians as brutal oppressors and 
eastern Ukrainians as their co-nationals, they wanted to extend their nationalist 
views to them and belong to a common Ukrainian independent state.  
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5.1.3 Return of the Soviet Union 
 
When the Soviets took all Ukrainian territories, they were busy in 
‘sovietizing’ the west, which was in historian Roman Szporluk’s words “the least 
Soviet” and “the least Russian and the least Russified”625 region in the Soviet 
Union, while in the already Sovietized east they merely focused on rebuilding 
economy.
626
 The way OUN members realized that “for the bulk of  ast Ukrainian 
population independence could be presented as a means to the attainment of other 
values, but not as the ultimate value in itself”627 reminds one that there were similar 
reasons behind the support of many East Ukrainians of the December 1991 
referendum for independence. 
Starting from January 1943, which was the end of the Battle for Stalingrad, 
the Red Army advanced into the Nazi-held Ukrainian territories. As such, “in the 
fall of 1944, virtually all Ukrainian ethnographic territory for the first time had 
come under Soviet control.”628 This, however, did not mean the end of OUN-UPA 
resistance. Although Soviets could easily establish themselves in the cities, UPA 
units controlled the countryside for a time.
629
 “During the spring and summer 1944, 
the UPA became a major obstacle to the establishment of Soviet control over the 
area [western regions],”630 and even in early 1950s, they carried on their fight 
against the Soviets,
631
 thus “bourgeois Ukrainian nationalists” confronted mass 
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deportations for the expedition of “Sovietization of this recalcitrant region.”632 UPA 
resistance delayed the Soviet reconstruction of the western Ukraine, while things 
went smooth for the Soviet authorities in the eastern Ukraine.
633
 In 1947, sick and 
tired of UPA resistance, the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, 
 azar Kaganovich, “signed an agreement with Poland and Czechoslovakia for 
joined action against UPA insurgents in the borderland areas.”  scaping state 
persecution, quite a few members of the OUN and the SS Galician Division 
emigrated to Canada and the United States, constituting a part of the Ukrainian 
diaspora.
634
  
As for the UPA groups who remained on the other side of the Polish-Soviet 
border, they fought the Polish authorities for some more years.  They were 
liquidated with the 1947 Operation Wisla (Vistula),
635
 and the Ukrainian population 
of Poland was forced to “de facto deportation” in the 1944-1946 Polish-Ukrainian 
population exchange agreement between Poland and the Soviet Union.
636
 
The nationalist-oriented Greek Catholic Church of Galician Ukrainians got 
its share from the Soviet cruelty. While by 1944 the Soviet official press increased 
its attacks on the Church, in 1946 its buildings and possessions were handed over 
the Moscow Patriarchate since the Greek Catholic Church was forced to be united 
with the Russian Orthodox Church by a Soviet-staged sobor, the  ’viv sobor.637 As 
such, the Union of Brest of 1596 which united the then Ruthenian Church with the 
Catholic Church was abolished. “By forcing the Greek Catholics into the state-
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dominated Russian-Orthodox Church,” the Soviet authorities desired to “remove the 
religious and ecclesiastical barriers to Russification of the Ukrainians.”638 The post-
war Soviet policy towards the Greek Catholic Church strikingly resembled the 
Tsarist anti-Uniate policies of the 1770s, 1830s and 1870s.
639
 However, the 
suppression of the Greek Catholic Church would not culminate in its extinction 
since the Western Ukrainians succeeded in preserving the Church which remained 
functioning underground, waiting for the day to come out.
640
 Until that day, 
although remained functioning as a catacomb church, its influence on the 
developments were reduced to minimal as compared to its previous significant role 
as a bastion of Ukrainian nationalism. 
 
 
5.2 The “Two Ukraines” United Under the Soviet Rule 
 
With the incorporation of Galicia, Bukovina, and Transcarpathia to the 
Ukrainian SSR virtually all Ukrainian lands came under the Soviet control. Since 
the newly acquired western regions of the Ukrainian SSR began to be called as 
“Western Ukraine” with the establishment of the Soviet rule, the phenomenon of 
West and East Ukraine became a factual reality as of this period.  
With the end of the WWII many countries initiated a policy of population 
transfers. The impact of these population exchanges on the Ukrainian SSR was the 
ethnic homogenization of the country since the Poles, Czechs, and people of other 
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neighboring states were deported from the western Ukrainian lands, being replaced 
by the Ukrainian newcomers who inhabited the lands outside the Ukrainian SSR.
641
  
The incorporation of western Ukrainian lands which were considered as the 
hotbeds of Ukrainian “bourgeois” nationalism was a serious challenge for the 
Soviet authorities since they knew that integrating these lands to the Soviet Union 
would not be easy.
642
 Hence, the state embarked upon a campaign against the 
Ukrainian nationalists and rapidly extended its policy of Russification to the 
western Ukrainian lands. This process was accompanied by the influx of ethnic 
Russians and Eastern Ukrainians as officials, technical personnel, industrial 
workers, academicians and school teachers to the area.
643
 Since the Soviet 
leadership viewed Western Ukrainians generally unreliable, there emerged a 
practice of transferring tested East Ukrainians to leadership positions in the Western 
Ukraine rather than recruiting local ones. Furthermore, in order to precipitate 
Russification the language of instruction in higher education institutions was shifted 
to Russian.
644
  
In the meanwhile, the Eastern Ukraine was under heavy assimilationist 
pressure with the influx of Russians to the industrial urban centers. As a result, 
while the Republic was becoming more ethnically Ukrainian with the outflow of the 
Poles and other ethnic groups, it was culturally becoming more Russian with the 
inflow of the Russians. The increasing industrialization of the 1950s also meant the 
urbanization of the Ukrainians. The period saw the Ukrainians coming out of their 
villages and moving into cities. Previous Ukrainian representation of the 
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countryside, Russian representation of the cities changed in 1970s. By 1979, 53 
percent of the Ukrainians lived in the cities.
645
 While this meant that the cities were 
becoming more Ukrainian demographically, more and more Ukrainians who 
migrated to the cities became acculturated or Russified since the societal pressure in 
the cities was forcing them to adopt the Russian language.
646
  
Russification could not penetrate Western Ukraine as much as it did Eastern 
Ukraine. While urbanized Eastern Ukrainians were opting for the Russian language, 
their western co-nationals urbanized without abandoning Ukrainian language.
647
 
Still, this was natural since Western Ukrainians met with Russians only with the 
industrial influx of post-WWII period, while their eastern counterparts lived with 
the Russians side by side for centuries.
648
 Although it is true that there were many 
Ukrainians who were either acculturated or Russified in the cities, urbanization did 
not bring complete assimilation but contrarily facilitated cultural awareness. While 
one important factor in the strengthening of Ukrainian national consciousness in the 
Soviet Ukraine was the annexation of Western Ukraine,
649
 the Soviet policies were 
also vital since these helped the creation of “a highly educated, bilingual, nationally 
conscious, and largely urban population whose very existence ensured the survival 
of Ukrainians and their evolution into a distinct and viable nationality.”650 Since 
Ukrainians who came to the cities realized that it was the Russians who held the 
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privileged positions, Soviet urbanization policy designed to assimilate Ukrainians 
into Soviet Russian community, instead led to an increased ethnic awareness and 
communal consciousness on the part of a great many of the urbanized 
Ukrainians.
651
 
The Crimean Tatars received their share of Stalin’s wrath. By May 1944, 
Stalin ordered the mass deportation of the Crimean Tatars to Central Asia (Soviet 
Asia), accusing them for collaborating with the Nazis. This traumatic event was 
proceeded with the abolition of the Crimean ASSR, and demotion of the peninsula 
to an oblast of the Russian SFSR, which was settled by the Russian newcomers. 
After the death of Stalin, the Crimea was to be transferred to the Ukrainian SSR in 
1954 as a “gift” from the “elder brother” to celebrate the 300th anniversary of the 
“reunification” of Ukraine with Russia. Although this brought the migration of 
Ukrainians to the peninsula, Crimea remained predominantly Russian. 
 
 
5.2.1 Post-Stalin Period 
 
With the death of Stalin in 1953, after several years of government by a 
collective leadership, Nikita S. Khrushchev succeeded in becoming the leader of the 
Soviet Union by 1958. Post-Stalin period saw a decrease in party control, relaxation 
in Russification policy, de-centralization (especially in economy) and the start of a 
process of de-Stalinization. In search for the creation of a Soviet “normalcy,” 
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Stalin’s heirs worked for the development of an impressive industry, and 
urbanization.
652
 
The all-Soviet thaw was reflected to the Ukraine. Khrushchev era saw the 
reconsideration of nationalities policy. As Ukrainians were now considered as 
second after the Russians, a more sympathetic view of the Ukrainians was 
developed.
653
 With the establishment of economic de-centralization, “Ukrainian 
authorities gained operational control over 97 percent of the republic’s industry.” 
However, since all-Union authorities saw that regional authorities guarded regional 
interests vigorously, they contemplated that economic de-centralization nurtured 
regionalism, thus this process was to be reversed by mid-1960s.
654
  
In politics, Ukrainians began to be represented in the Communist Party of 
Ukraine with an ever increasing degree and this trend extended into 1960s.
655
 
However, these Ukrainians were Ukrainian more in name than in substance. They 
were thought to be reliable enough as they were the products of Eastern Ukrainian 
cities, where they were educated in Russian schools, lived within a Russian 
environment, and thus were more Russian than Ukrainian.
656
 On the other hand, 
Western Ukrainian representation was much lower due to both the Party’s 
mistrustfulness towards them and their distantness to the Party itself. After 20 years 
of their incorporation into the Soviet Ukraine, the lack of interest to membership in 
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CPU by the Western Ukrainians was indicative to their “resentment over Russian 
dominance and to lack of identification with the Soviet system.”657 
Khrushchev era de-Stalinization also brought about “a relaxation of cultural 
restraints on the non-Russian nationalities.”658 While calls for protecting the 
Ukrainian culture and language were voiced more openly, the limits of acceptability 
were being pushed by Ukrainian writers.
659
 This relatively benign environment of 
Khrushchev era gave way to the development of a group collectively called the 
Sixtiers (Sixties generation, shestidesiatniki), who were Ukrainian writers and 
artists coming of age during the cultural “thaw” period, who favored the restoration 
of Ukrainian language and cultural values which were heavily damaged by the 
Stalin-time Sovietization and Russification policies. The Sixtiers movement was to 
transform into political dissent with the stiffening of central control and acceleration 
of Sovietization and Russification processes during the post-Khrushchev era.
660
 As 
such, “modern Ukrainian nationalism arose out of dissatisfaction on the part of 
cultural elites with the official proletarian internationalism,” with a “rejection of the 
Russification of culture under the guise of proletarian internationalism.”661 
 
 
5.2.1.1 Ukraine of Shelest vs. Ukraine of Shcherbyts’kyi 
 
The first secretary of the CPU, Petro Shelest (1963-1972) and his successor 
Volodymyr Shcherbyts’kyi (1972-1989) represented two different positions 
                                                             
657 Thomas Henry Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R, 1917-1967 (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968), 390. 
658 Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, 654. 
659 Yekelchyk, Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation, 156. 
660 Nahaylo, The Ukrainian Resurgence, 23-24. 
661Farmer, 105. 
149 
 
influencing the developments in Soviet Ukraine. The period of Shelest was marked 
by improvements in the position of Ukrainian culture and language under a leader 
concerned with the Republic’s and its people’s interests. On the other hand, the 
period of Shcherbyts’kyi represented the suppression of all things Ukrainian under a 
leader who favored centralization, Sovietization-Russification and thus assimilation. 
The early 1960s signaled the fact that the Party was going to reassert its 
ideological control over the Republics. The Soviet nationalities policy which was 
being re-evaluated by the Brezhnev leadership was toughening with the switch from 
the policy of “flourishing” (rastsvet) of the national cultures, their “drawing 
together” (sblizhenie) and their eventual “merger” (sliianie), to the concept of 
Soviet people (sovetskii narod). This meant the elimination of national distinctions 
for the creation of “homo Sovieticus,” the Soviet men whose only loyalty was to be 
to the Soviet state and whose language was to be the Russian language.
662
  
As such, while Shelest was attempting to initiate a measure of Ukrainization, 
Kremlin was determined to “restore order” by re-centralization. Pro-Ukrainian 
reform attempts of the CPU were being blocked by the orders of Kremlin.
663
 The 
toughening of Kremlin meant that a collision between the central leadership and the 
Sixtiers was inevitable. As early as 1963, there emerged increasing accusations to 
the Sixtiers group that they were following the footsteps of the Ukrainian 
“bourgeois” nationalists.664 Kremlin was also disturbed by the publishing in 
neighboring Czechoslovakia of Ukrainian writings criticizing the Soviet system.
665
 
Furthermore, since Kremlin suspected that the Sixtiers were encouraged by the 
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Ukrainian state and Party organs, Shelest and his close associates were in the cross 
hairs.
666
  
It was true that Shelest had a part in the flourishing of the Sixtiers 
movement. The Kiev leadership supported the development of studies on the 
Ukrainian history. Ukrainian journals full of articles praising things Ukrainian were 
permitted to be published freely. The criticisms of the Sixtiers were tolerated. 
Moreover, there were plans to replace Russian with Ukrainian as the language of 
instruction in higher education.
667
 Despite the moderate approach of Shelest to 
Ukrainian dissent, and his efforts to reach a compromise with the Ukrainian 
intelligentsia to keep them within the confines of the system, Moscow launched a 
crackdown on Ukrainian national dissent in 1965.  The 1965-66 period saw mass 
arrests, imprisonments and exiles of patriotic Ukrainian intellectuals. As of this 
period, the opposition writings seek publication through illegal channels of 
communication such as samvydav (underground secret self-publishing and 
distribution).
668
 The 1965 crackdown proved counter-productive and further 
radicalized the Ukrainian dissent, precipitating the surfacing of open protest and 
dissent.
669
 
What were the Ukrainian dissidents doing to disturb the Kremlin to this 
extent? During the 1960s political criticism of the dissenters in the samvydav 
became annoying for Kremlin. Around sixty intellectuals were arrested for their 
writings in the samvydav. Kiev was hosting numerous gatherings, the meeting point 
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of which was around the monument of Shevchenko who became the symbol of the 
Ukrainian patriots, protesting the assimilationist policies of the government. The 
increasing protests and gatherings against the arrests were also alarming the 
authorities.
670
  
As a reaction to the government prominent literary critic Ivan Dziuba wrote 
a protest letter to Shelest where he criticized the repressive Soviet assimilationist 
policies, enclosing his later-famed work “Internationalism or Russification?” he 
wrote in 1965 where he criticized the present state of the Soviet nationalities policy 
drawing a parallel between today and the assimilationist policies of the tsarist 
period. He criticized the gradual loss of territorial sovereignty, the de-nationalizing 
effect of the mass resettlements, lack of national education, the dominance of 
Russian language in the cities, and the second-rate position given to the Ukrainian 
culture.
671
 This work which was to become the manifestation of the Ukrainian 
dissent caused Dziuba’s expulsion from the Ukrainian Writers’ Union and then 
arrest.
672
  
There were also organized clandestine nationalist organizations some of 
which appeared exclusively in Western Ukraine were favoring Ukraine’s secession 
from the Soviet Union. To name some, the United Party for the Liberation of the 
Ukraine (formed in late 1950s in Ivano-Frankivsk, brought down in 1958), The 
Ukrainian Workers’ and Peasants’ Union (formed in  ’viv, members arrested in 
1960), Ukrainian National Front (formed in Ivano-Frankivs’k in mid-1960s) were 
all propagating secession. The only East Ukrainian organization worth to mention 
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was the Creative Youth of Dnepropetrovsk which became known in late 1969 for 
drafting a letter protesting the Russification in major East Ukrainian cities.
673
 
A study on the demographic breakdown of Ukrainian dissidence activity 
during 1960s-1970s was demonstrative. The study focused on cultural-intellectual 
unorganized opposition since the period saw no organized separatist organization in 
Eastern Ukraine to consider in such an analysis. The analysis of the data about the 
number of arrests for dissident activities in western and eastern Ukraine indicated 
that “over the last twenty years, arrests in the West Ukraine for activities associated 
with nationalism have outnumbered those in the East Ukraine by about two to 
one.”674 While “in 1956-66, two-thirds [71,4 %] of the nationalist dissident activity 
took place in the West Ukraine, there was a shift of activity by 1969-72, with more 
than half [55,5%] the activity in this period in  ast Ukraine.”675 It was seen that 
nationalist activity shifted its center from  ’viv (a decrease from 46,4% to 25%) to 
Kiev (an increase from 21,4% to 41,7%), and since this study assumed Kiev within 
the category of East Ukrainian oblasts, one can notice that when Kiev is taken out 
of this category Eastern Ukraine becomes scene to only 13,8 percent of the dissident 
activity. When thoroughly analyzed,  it further became evident that although there 
was a shift of activity toward the east, the birth places of those who have 
participated and been arrested for such activity helped us to infer that it was the 
Western Ukrainians who spread their activity to Eastern Ukraine, but not the 
Eastern Ukrainians who became the new nationalist dissenters,
676
 since more than 
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half of the nationalist dissenters were born in Western Ukraine with an overall 
population several times less than Eastern Ukraine.
677
  
During this period Shelest’s “autonomist” stance and seeming toleration of 
the Ukrainian dissidents led to an increasing conflict with Kremlin. In 1972 
Brezhnev, who decided that Shelest must go, replaced him with one of his 
associates from among the later-to-be-called “Dnepropetrovsk mafia,” 
Shcherbyts’kyi.678 Shelest was accused of local nationalism and his book Ukraina 
Nasha Radians’ka (Ukraine Our Soviet Country) was used as a pretext for this 
accusation.
679
 Brezhnev’s new choice, Shcherbyts’kyi, served Kremlin just as it was 
expected from him. Again, Sovietization-Russification was in full force. Russian 
language education became compulsory even in the kindergartens.
680
 Along with 
such state-sponsored Russification, the share of Ukrainian-language journals and 
books dropped from 46 to 19 percent and 49 to 24 percent respectively.
681
 
Ukrainian historical scholarship was especially hard hit by the Soviet authorities. 
Ukrainian historians were accused of distorting the history, and serial historical 
publications were suppressed.
682
 While Shcherbyts’kyi period saw the opening of 
ever increasing number of Russian-language schools, this pace reached to such an 
extent that by the late 1980s major southern and eastern Ukrainian cities such as 
Kharkov, Donetsk, and Odessa had no Ukrainian-language school.
683
  
The early period of his rule was marked with a renewed and wider 
crackdown on Ukrainian intelligentsia which aimed to “terminate and, if possible, 
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to reverse those social processes which had brought about the revival of cultural and 
public life in Ukraine during the 1960s.”684 With the 1972-73 crackdown not only 
leading figures of the intelligentsia were arrested, imprisoned, or exiled but many 
member of the CPU who were associated with Shelest or were suspected for 
Ukrainophilism were purged, the highest leadership of the Republic was cleaned of 
ethnic Ukrainians, and nonconformist academicians were dismissed.
685
 To escape 
persecution many intellectuals accepted to renounce their views, but this fierce state 
offensive further radicalized the Ukrainian dissent.
686
 Many reasoned that working 
legally within the official structure as during pre-1970s was not possible any 
more.
687
 
In this period, as a result of the steady Russian in-migration, Russian 
population of Ukraine increased by 28,7 percent (two million) from 1959 to 1970, 
and by 9,7 percent from 1970 to 1979. Of this Russian in-migration 75 percent was 
concentrated in southern and south-eastern Ukraine, bringing about greater 
Russification in Eastern Ukrainian regions. Furthermore, Russification in eastern 
Ukraine was reinforced as a result of inter-marriages. By 1970 close to one of every 
two Ukrainian married Russians in this region. Looking at the overall picture of 
Ukraine, unilingual Ukrainian speakers declined from 56 percent in 1970 to merely 
37.3 percent by 1979. While a slim majority (51,6 %) of Western Ukrainians 
remained unilingual Ukrainian speakers, all other parts of Ukraine were inhabited 
mainly by either adapted (52%) or acculturated Ukrainians. Acculturated and 
Russified Ukrainians were virtually non-existent (less than 1%) in Western and 
Central-Western Ukraine, whereas half of the all Russified Ukrainians resided in 
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Crimea and Donbass.
688
 Concentration of Russified Ukrainians in these regions was 
crucial since such increasing linguistic assimilation in a region showed that these 
regions were prone to further steps of national assimilation process.  
By the end of 1970s, government initiated a more intensive Russification 
policy, Russifying almost all education system from kindergarten to elementary and 
secondary schools and higher education institutions.
689
 Shcherbyts’kyi used 
exclusively Russian in public hearings and referred to the population of the 
Republic with the geographical expression “people of Ukraine” (narod Ukrainy) for 
“de-emphasizing the ethnic factor.”690 Furthermore, all state and business 
correspondences in Ukraine were switched to Russian.
691
 
The post-WWII Soviet period saw the Eastern and Southern Ukrainians 
adopting Russian ways and language, becoming increasingly bilinguals or 
unilingual-Russian speakers. On the other hand, Western and Central-Western 
Ukrainians seemed to retain Ukrainian as their primary language of communication 
by “maintaining an internal cohesion and developing ways to make (itself) 
[themselves] immune to the corroding influence of Russification.”692 These 
differences among different parts of the Republic were preserved as a result of the 
Soviet policy of residence permits (passport and propiska) which hindered inter-
regional migration and thus “helped conserve cultural differences between 
Ukrainians … living in different historical regions during the Soviet period.”693  
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Although the Ukrainian dissent was spreading, it could not grip the masses. 
While Kiev and  ’viv emerged as the main centers of Ukrainian dissent, nationalist 
dissident activity was virtually non-existent in the heavily industrialized Donbass 
area.
694
 Masses seemed contented with being “simultaneously a Ukrainian and a 
Soviet citizen,” so during 1970s and 1980s a hierarchy of multiple loyalties 
dominated the minds of the Ukrainian masses.
695
 As for the Eastern Ukraine, the 
cause of dissent activity was mainly economic hardships. It was in the shape of 
workers’ protests and strikes that mostly concentrated in the Donbass area, but had 
not much in common with the nationalist dissent movement that prevailed in 
western and central Ukrainian regions. The workers’ unrest was to become a factor 
in the developments only with the Gorbachev period.
696
 
In 1975 an important international development was to influence to events in 
the Ukraine. That year the Soviet leadership who signed the Helsinki Final Act 
accepted the monitoring of their compliance to basic human rights. Ukrainian 
dissidents (including the Sixtiers, Stalinist-period political prisoners, and devotees 
of the banned Ukrainian churches) were among the many who took this as an 
opportunity for open activity, forming the Ukrainian Helsinki Group (UHG) which 
became the first platform to unite the Ukrainian dissidents under an organization. 
The UHG assumed the task of informing the signatory countries and world public 
about the Soviet violations in Ukraine.
697
 The establishment of the UHG marked a 
new stage since as of then Ukrainian dissent shifted from “cultural and largely 
apolitical patriotic protest activity to political opposition.”698 By 1980 the leading 
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members of the UHG were imprisoned, some were forced to immigrate West, and 
some died in the forced labor camps, making the UHG totally paralyzed. Still, the 
Group reemerged during the Gorbachev period.
699
  
 
 
5.2.1.2 Glasnost’ and the Road to Independence 
 
In 1985, Gorbachev came to power and became the person to initiate wide-
ranging reforms, the policies of perestroika (reconstruction) and glasnost 
(openness), which would bring about the transformation of the Soviet society and 
eventual breakup of the Soviet Union. Glasnost’ encouraged the people to freely 
criticize the Soviet system without the fear of repression. Demands about official 
status to local languages, native-language education in all levels, rehabilitation of 
national histories were pursued with demands for autonomy and finally for 
independence. These outspoken criticisms and demands were followed by the 
Revolutions of 1989 in the central-eastern European states whereby communist 
governments in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, 
Romania and Albania were overthrown. On the other hand, Soviet republics began 
demanding their right to secession from the Soviet Union. This process culminated 
in the breakup of the Soviet Union and declaration of the independence of Ukraine. 
The events in Ukraine during this period followed the trails of all-Union 
developments. When Gorbachev came to power, Ukrainian dissident movement 
was suppressed, and despite their dissatisfaction especially with the economic 
conditions the general public seemed contented with the Soviet system. As such, 
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although there were national mobilization and unrest, “an independent Ukrainian 
state emerged in 1991 not as a result of mass national mobilization or popular 
rebellion against Communist rule … but as a byproduct of the Soviet collapse.”700 
In April 1986, one year after Kremlin was seated by Gorbachev, Ukraine 
was shocked by the nuclear accident in Chernobyl, 8 miles northwest of Kiev. The 
efforts of the Soviet authorities first to withhold information, and then to minimize 
the scale and effect of the catastrophe alienated the Ukrainian public from the 
Soviet rule. The Chernobyl event “became a symbol of the regime’s “criminally 
negligent manner,”701 and as said by a Ukrainian political activist this event helped 
them realize that they were merely “a colony.”702 
Despite the resistance of the conservative Shcherbyts’kyi,703 Glasnost’ 
provided an environment whereby long-forbidden topics such as Stalinist crimes, 
famine of 1933, assimilation, Russification, and the ban on Ukrainian churches 
began to be discussed not only among the intelligentsia but also among the 
public.
704
 As a result of the protests, by 1989 Ukrainian became the official 
language of the Republic. UHG was reestablished as the Ukrainian Helsinki Union 
(UHU). Nevertheless, the foremost pressure group of this early Glasnost’ period 
was the Ukrainian Writers’ Union, however soon other civic organizations such as 
the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society, Green World, the Memorial 
Society, and most importantly the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Perestroika 
(Rukh – The Movement) joined the struggle for Ukrainian rights.705 
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The banned Ukrainian Greek Catholic and Autocephalous Orthodox 
Churches took advantage of the Glasnost’ period to come up from the underground 
and both succeeded in achieving recognition in 1989. Not to lose its adherents to 
these Churches, the Ukrainian exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church was 
renamed as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate). As such there 
emerged a “three-way struggle” for the allegiance of the faithful of Ukraine. While 
the Greek Catholic Church attracted the majority of the adherents in the Western 
Ukraine (it was already serving Western Ukrainians as a catacomb church before its 
legalization), the Autocephalous Orthodox Church prevailed in the Right Bank and 
Central Ukraine, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church became dominant in southern 
and eastern Ukraine.
706
  With the establishment in 1992 of the Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church (Kiev Patriarchate), there emerged a four-way struggle. The most recent 
data on church affiliations of Ukrainians, is provided by a survey done by the 
Razumkov Center, “a top research institute in Kiev,”707 in 2006, whereby it is found 
that 38.9 percent of the believers in Ukraine were adherents of Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church – Kiev Patriachate, 29.4 percent of Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow 
Patriachate, 14.7 percent of Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, and 2.8 percent of 
Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.
708
 While UOC-KP dominates Central 
regions and Volhynia, UOC-MP’s hearthland is southern and eastern regions, 
UGCC and UAOC are dominant in western Ukraine. 
Thousands who participated in the public rallies organized in Kiev and  ’viv 
cheered for the restoration of Ukrainian national symbols such as the trident, the 
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blue-and-yellow flag, and the anthem “Ukraine Has Not Died Yet.”  Public 
discontent with the Communist Party grew steadily that in the 1989 elections to the 
Congress of People’s Deputies, the Party faced important loses especially in 
Western Ukraine. Hundreds of thousands were defecting from the CPU. When the 
day for the elections to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet came in March 1990, Rukh’s 
membership exceeded 300.000 and under Rukh’s leadership Green World, 
Ukrainian Language Society, democratic communists, and several other opposition 
groups joined forces to participate into the elections as the “Democratic Bloc.” 
Winning hundred seats with the elections, they were influential in the declaration of 
Ukrainian sovereignty in July 1990. In the meantime, the “National Communists,” 
among them Leonid Kravchuk
709
 who became the chairman of the Ukrainian 
Supreme Soviet (Rada), began to identify with the Ukrainian opposition, and gave 
their support to the idea of sovereignty. Following the Rada’s decision to remove 
the article about the Communist Party’s guidance out of the Constitution the period 
of multiparty politics set in. While the UHU transformed into the nationalist 
Ukrainian Republican Party, Green World became the Green Party, democratic 
communists created the Party of Democratic Revival, and moderate nationalist 
intellectuals formed the Democratic Party of Ukraine. The Rukh was divided among 
these parties and since it became increasingly nationalistic, while its membership 
boosted in Western Ukraine and Galicia, its support base in the southern and eastern 
Ukraine declined.
710
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Following the unsuccessful coup to overthrow Gorbachev and revert the 
process of disintegration, Ukraine declared independence on August 24, 1991. 
Kravchuk assumed the role of a nationally-minded leader opposing the signature of 
Gorbachev’s new union treaty. The fate of Ukraine was to be finally determined by 
the 1 December 1991 referendum on independence. Prior to the referendum the 
Ukrainian media embarked on a campaign of spreading the seductive claim that 
separating from Moscow, which had “exploited Ukrainian resources, would leave 
the Republic much better of economically,” highly influencing the public opinion 
since economic conditions under the Soviet rule were deteriorating.
711
 The results of 
the independence referendum were impressive since over 90 percent of the 
Ukrainians voted for independence. Whereas more than 90 percent of the western 
Ukrainians supported independence, around 80 percent of the eastern Ukrainians 
casted their votes for independence. In the predominantly Russian-populated 
Crimea, more than half of the participants favored independence of Ukraine.
712
  
With the establishment of independent Ukraine any chance for the survival 
of the Union was doomed. A week after the independence referendum, the leaders 
of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus met in Belovezhskaya Pushcha and agreed to 
dissolve the Soviet Union, replacing it with the Commonwealth of Independent 
States. As the remaining Soviet republics joined the CIS, Soviet Union was 
effectively abolished. 
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5.3 The Newly Independent Ukraine 
 
The reason behind the pro-independence votes was different for different 
regions of the Republic. While western Ukrainians voted mainly with nationalist 
feelings, most of the eastern and southern Ukrainians voted for independence as a 
result of their belief that independence would bring better economic conditions. As 
such, the primary obstacle the newly independent Ukrainian state was to face was 
about finding the right way to overcome the different attitudes and self-
identifications of the people of Ukraine to create a unified Ukrainian nation. The 
independent Ukraine was to falter in doing this.  
Although overwhelming majority of the people of Ukraine voted for 
independence in 1991, the next years proved that Ukrainians were not like minded 
in many aspects relevant to future Ukraine. Following independence, forces 
concentrated in the Crimea and the Donbass opposed to Ukrainian independent 
statehood and its Ukrainization efforts, expedited their activities, asserting the 
“Russianness” of these lands. Republican Movement of Crimea led by İuri 
Meshkov began campaigning Crimean independence from Ukraine,
713
 whereas 
among eastern Ukrainians there developed a movement calling for regional 
autonomy, state language status for Russian, dual Russian-Ukrainian citizenship 
and closer ties with the CIS.
714
  
The mounting of economic difficulties in the early years of independence 
facilitated social discontent. While the ever deteriorating economic conditions led 
the rise of radical-rightist groups in western and central Ukraine, communist and 
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pro-Russian forces became prominent in southern and eastern Ukraine. The 
discontent in eastern and southern regions gradually transformed into opposition of 
the state’s market-oriented and pro-Western course. The year 1993 saw strikes by 
the Donbass miners and Kiev transportation workers. The unimprovement of 
economic conditions further alienated the people of southern and eastern regions. 
While the Donbass saw a renewed strike by the workers who extended their 
demands to regional administrative autonomy, railway workers in southern Ukraine 
also went on strike.
 
The unrest forced the government to early elections to be held 
in 1994.
715
  
Whilst elections were drawing closer the pro-Russian Meshkov was elected 
president in the first presidential elections of the autonomous Crimean Republic in 
January 1994. Coming to power he did not delay in announcing that the Crimea will 
vote for a local independence referendum the very same day of Ukrainian 
parliamentary elections. These bad news coupled with the decision of the regional 
councils of Lugansk and Donetsk to hold local consultative referenda asking the 
voters if Ukraine was to become a federation, if Russian was to become country’s 
state language and language of administration and instruction in eastern regions. 
The results of these local referenda in the Crimea and the Donbass signaled a grim 
future for the idea of a unified Ukraine, since the majority of the voters in both 
regions gave their support to the propositions made by Meshkov government and 
regional councils of the Donbass.
716
  
The subsequent presidential elections showed that Ukrainian public opinion 
was divided between Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, who became to 
represent two opposing camps. While Kravchuk appealed to nationalist, Ukrainian-
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speaking forces concentraded in western and central Ukraine, presenting himself as 
the defender of independent Ukraine and Kuchma as a Russian puppet, Kuchma 
appealed to eastern and southern regions who preferred greater local administration, 
use of Russian in education and administration, and closer ties with Russia, 
accusing Kravchuk to be ineffective in saving the country from economic disaster. 
The results proved that Ukraine was divided into two camps, since western and 
central Ukraine backed Kravchuk who received 45 percent, and southern and 
eastern Ukraine rallied behind Kuchma who received 52 percent of the votes casted 
in Ukraine.
717
 It became apperant that central Ukrainian provinces on the Right and 
 eft Banks “reflected the influence of west and east Ukraine, respectively.”718 
This dichotomic situation in Ukraine renewed itself in every election to 
come,  ’viv in the West and the Crimea and Donbass in the South-east representing 
the extreme ends, while Kiev in the Central Ukraine was representing a moderate 
stance shifting between the two camps and emerging as the decisive factor in 
chosing who was to govern the country.  As mentioned in the introductory chapter 
of this thesis, this trend of polarization persisted to our day and it was this 
persistence of regional diversities that stimulated us to search for the historical roots 
of the fragmented nature of contemporary Ukrainian society.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This thesis lays the claim that the roots of regional differences in today’s 
Ukraine can be and should be found in the history of the people of Ukraine. The 
literature on regional cleavages in today’s Ukraine tend to look as far back as 18th 
century, in not far earlier, the times of empires, to find the different historical 
experiences of Ukrainians which led to today’s fragmentations. This thesis, 
however, argues that the differentiation of experiences must have started way back 
since the study of 18
th
 century onwards already exhibits different historical 
backgrounds for different parts of today’s Ukraine. Therefore, the historical analysis 
of this thesis goes as far as Kievan Rus’, as it represents the one and only time to 
speak for a homogeneous experience, if at all,  for the ancestors of the Ukrainian 
people. 
It was during the period of Kievan Rus’ that Orthodox Christianity was 
adopted by the three  astern Slavic people. From that time on being “Rus’” began 
to mean belonging to the Orthodox Christian faith. Kievan Rus’ was invaded by 
Mongols in mid-13
th
 century. Before the Mongolian rule, Kievan Rus’ was already 
divided into a number of principalities the prominent ones to be Galicia-Volhynia, 
Novgorod and Vladimir-Suzdal. The change Mongolian invasion brought about was 
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the duration of its hold on these lands. Mongolian (later “Tatar”) rule ended first in 
Galicia-Volhynia through occupations by Poland and Lithuania respectively while 
eastern lands of Kievan Rus’ endured another century of the Tatar rule. Thus the 
end of Kievan Rus’ led to the difference of experiences of Russians and 
Ukrainians,
719
 as Russians experienced the Tatar, i.e., the Golden Horde rule, longer 
but established their own state becoming the only ruling nationality in that state, 
Ukrainians lived under several different sovereigns, and thus they have interacted 
with different cultures, religions and languages. 
Ukrainians of Volhynia lived harmoniously under the rule of Lithuania as a 
result of indiscriminatory policies of Grand Duchy of Lithuania, thus retarding the 
development of their national consciousness. On the other hand, Ukrainians of 
Galicia endured intolerant policies of Poland. Polish policies produced an 
environment where Galician Ukrainians were exposed both to the forces of 
assimilation and national awakening, although not yet in full force since nationalism 
as a political thought was yet to be invented. 
Lithuanian period saw the split of the Rus’ church, which was a vital factor 
for the development of distinctions in the future Ukrainian society. Since the 
Orthodox-Ruthenians of Lithuania rejected following the Orthodox of Muscovy 
who declared autocephaly by rejecting the Catholic-Orthodox union projected by 
the Union of Florence (1439), the divide became permanent.  
In this period, contemporary southern and eastern Ukrainian lands, then 
called the Kipchak Steppes, were inhabited by the Tatars and nomadic Nogays both 
descendants of the Kipchak Turks, and were empty of sedentary Rus’ population 
until the Russian expansion that only began in the sixteenth century. The territories 
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which came to be named as “Southern Ukraine” today were a part of the Crimean 
Khanate which was a vassal of the Ottoman Empire. 
It is the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth rule that pins down the start point 
of differentiation of Ukrainians. The way the Commonwealth was established (in 
1569) allowed Poland to be the dominant actor in the lives of Ukrainians, thus 
reuniting the experiences of Galicia and Volhynia. The imposing Roman Catholic 
environment of the Polish rule saw quite a many Ruthenian, e.i. Ukrainian, noble 
opting for Polish-Catholic culture, and this cultural and linguistic Polonization was 
to affect the future developments. The process was felt more strongly in the densely 
populated western Ukrainian regions of the Commonwealth, as compared to the 
regions in the Dnieper River basin with a geographic remoteness to the Polish 
center and proximity to the Muscovites. One of the most prominent events of this 
time was the creation of the Uniate Church (Greek Catholic-Ukrainian Catholic 
Church) with the Union of Brest of 1596, which became the first major breaking 
point of experiences of eastern and western
720
 Ukrainians. As such, the foundations 
of today’s differences between western Ukrainians and their brethren in the south 
and east Ukraine were laid in the Commonwealth period. While many of those who 
held their Orthodox faith and resisted the assimilatory policies of the 
Commonwealth started to migrate eastward, quite a many others adopted Greek 
Catholicism. The Uniate Church which was supported by the Commonwealth 
authorities as an instrument of assimilation, contrary to expectations did not 
facilitate the Catholicization and Polonization of the Greek Catholic Ruthenians, as 
time would show that centuries later, the Uniate Church was to emerge as a bastion 
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of Ukrainian national movement in western Ukraine that would cause great trouble 
in the future eastern Poland. 
This time coincides with the weakening of the Tatars and of their hold on the 
southern and eastern lands of today’s Ukraine, which then were populated by 
Nogays and Crimean Tatars and were directly ruled by the Crimean Khanate. These 
lands gradually fell under the Commonwealth but were sparsely populated border 
areas, serving as a buffer zone between the Commonwealth, Muscovy and Crimea, 
thus under continuous intrusions by its neighbors. Ukrainians, migrating eastward to 
escape the Catholicism and harsh policies of the Commonwealth, inhabited these 
lands and came to be known as Zaporozhian Cossacks.  
Zaporozhian Cossacks, by their superior military abilities, created their own 
state first under the Commonwealth, then briefly independent, and finally entered 
under the rule of Muscovy. The Cossack period, especially the time of Hetmans 
Bohdan Khmel’nytskyi and Ivan Mazepa,721 became a crucial symbol of Ukrainian 
pride of their history and the brief period of Cossack autonomy provided the 
contemporary Ukrainians with an example they could regard as the precursor of a 
Ukrainian nation state. The Cossacks became a driving force for the conservation of 
Orthodoxy among the Ukrainians of the Commonwealth. While Greek Catholicism 
was spreading in western Ukrainian lands since Cossack movement could not 
expand those areas, Uniate Church was suppressed in the lands further east where 
Cossack control was established. As such, the Cossacks represented the 
eastern/Orthodox character of Ukrainian identity. Eventually however, their 
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preference for the Orthodox Muscovy over Catholic Commonwealth separated them 
from their brethrens to the west in their future experiences. The non-existence of 
religious barriers among the Cossacks and Russians facilitated their assimilation to 
the latter, whereas the distinctions possessed by the Greek Catholic Ukrainians both 
from the Roman Catholics and Greek Orthodox helped them further develop a self-
distinctive identity. Ironically, what signified Ukrainness then was Orthodoxy, 
while during the following centuries Greek Catholics were to emerge as the 
foremost bearers of the self-distinctive Ukrainian identity. While Catholicism 
represented a suppressive factor then, more recent history of Ukraine identifies 
Orthodoxy as such. While Cossacks regarded their western brethrens to be 
assimilated then, later time western Ukrainians came to regard their brethrens under 
the rule of Russia as too much Russified. 
Nevertheless, this difference of experiences proves one of the arguments of 
this thesis that Ukrainians started to differ from each other before the 18
th
 century. 
The Commonwealth represents as the second and the last time before the 
establishment of Soviet Ukraine when all Ukrainians lived under the same political 
entity, thus following the partitions Ukrainians further developed different self-
identifications, national consciousness and definitions of the other. 
When assessing the cultural differences within modern Ukraine, one should 
not confine such an analysis to the role of length imperial and Soviet rules, but 
should bear in mind that the more than four centuries-long Polish rule over Galicia, 
more than two centuries long direct Polish rule in the Right Bank, and even the 
century-long rule in Kiev and parts of the Left Bank, were crucial in the evolution 
of contemporary divisions. Today, the most fervent nationalist Ukrainians are the 
successors of Galicians who experienced the longest Polish rule of all. Likewise, the 
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national sentiments of the Right Bank Ukrainians are greater than those to their east 
where historical Polish influence gradually depotentiated. 
By 1795, the Commonwealth, which had such deep impacts such as the 
creation of the Uniate Church, and of a Cossack state, thus the first time an east-
west differentiation among Ukrainians, disappeared from the political map of 
Europe by what came to be known as Partitions of Poland. With the partitions 
Ukrainian inhabited lands went under the rule of Austria-Hungarian Empire and 
Tsarist Russia. After 1795, of the Ukrainian-inhabited lands Galicia, Belz and 
Bukovyna were part of Austria, Transcarpathia was a part of the Kingdom of 
Hungary, and in addition to formerly acquired lands, the entire Right Bank, 
palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav, Podolia, Volhynia, and eastern parts of Chelm became 
part of Russia. 
18
th
 to 20
th
 century, the Age of Empires, was the time most historians 
studying Ukraine date the start of the diversions among Ukrainians which shaped 
contemporary divergences. Indeed, the time witnessed important differences in the 
experiences of Ukrainians under the rule of their respective empires. Up until the 
second decade of the 19
th
 century, the Ukrainians (Ruthenians) of the Habsburg 
Empire enjoyed cultural and religious indiscrimination and liberty, whereby 
Ukrainians started to develop their national character vis-à-vis other nationalities of 
the Empire. On the other hand, Ukrainians (Little Russians) of the Russian Empire 
experienced Russification since the similarity of religion and language put them at a 
disadvantage for national self-awareness.  
There were different levels of national awareness among the Ukrainians of 
the Habsburg Empire, Galicia being the first to start on the path to national 
consciousness to be followed by Bukovina while Transcarpathia remained 
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undecided with a range of intellectuals from those favoring Ukrainophilism or 
Russophilism to those favoring the creation of a totally distinct nationality of 
Subcarpathian Rusyn. Nevertheless, Ukrainians of the Habsburg Monarchy 
established their Greek Catholic Church as a bastion of Ukrainian nationalism. 
Furthermore, the Austrian government supported the Ruthenian movement to 
counteract the Poles, and in such an environment Ukrainians (then called 
Ruthenians), as they were accepted by the Habsburgs as a distinct nation both from 
the Poles and Russians, developed their national language, peasant vernacular 
written in Cyrillic. Although by 19
th
 century, favorable conditions of the Habsburg 
Empire started to deteriorate, giving the upper hand to the Poles, with the Spring of 
Nations of 1848, Ukrainians, like the rest of the nations of Europe, started forming 
the nucleus of their national organizations. Their activities started not to remain 
exclusive to the interest of intellectuals but also the peasants, and even passed the 
boundary across to the lands inhabited by Ukrainians of Russian Empire.  
On the other side of the border, Ukrainians under the Russian Empire, 
experienced serious blows to their national consciousness. Russian influx to these 
lands produced Russified cities with Ukrainian populated countryside. Given the 
importance of cities in terms of intellectual development, Russification of the cities 
hit hard on national consciousness of Ukrainians in Russia. Moreover, Russian 
historiography regarded Ukrainians, as the “little brothers” of the Great Russians, 
who only differed in their experience of Polish rule.  mpire’s benign attitude 
towards their fellow brothers was conditional upon their conformity to the  mpire’s 
policies and doctrines. Once Ukrainians started to express themselves as distinct 
from Russians, then started purges, suppression and Russification. This took the 
form of ban of Greek Catholic Church, of Ukrainian cultural organizations and 
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newspapers, of the use of Ukrainian language and even of the distribution of literary 
works originating from the lands of Ukrainians of the Habsburg Empire.  
Coming to the First World War, the picture was that while Ukrainian lands 
under the Habsburgs were adorned with Ukrainian language schools from 
elementary to university level, a flourishing Church, Ukrainian newspapers, learned 
societies, organizations, cooperatives, political parties and parliamentary 
representatives, Ukrainians under the Russian rule had no Ukrainian schools, no 
newspapers, no legal parties and organizations, no right to publish anything in 
Ukrainian, and Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and Ukrainian language itself 
were banned. 
Nevertheless, the age of empires was the time when Ruthenians of 
Habsburgs and Little Russians of Romanovs started to identify themselves as 
distinct from other nations they lived side by side, not only on cultural and religious 
level but also on political level. By the end of the imperial age, no matter how 
different their level of national consciousness in different geographies under 
different ruling classes, they came to appreciate their unity across borders and the 
idea of an independent state of their own as “Ukrainians.” 
The First World War meant the dissolution of multinational empires of the 
previous period. Both Russian and Habsburg Empires were dissolved giving 
opportunity for self-determination to its subjects. Ukrainians were no exception. 
When the two Empires collapsed, Ukrainians of Austria-Hungary at first remained 
loyal to the Habsburgs and preferred to fight with Russia. On the other hand, for the 
Ukrainians of the Russian Empire, already confusing times of war was further 
complicated with the Bolshevik Revolution and the civil war that ensued. However, 
Ukrainians of the Russian Empire did not seek secession immediately, no matter 
173 
 
how favorable the conditions were. Still, this did not preclude them from 
establishing their governmental instruments that might either facilitate autonomy, 
self-rule under a federative system or independence, in the name of the Ukrainian 
National Republic either directed by the Central Rada, Hetmanate, or Directory.  
Nevertheless, the reluctance or hesitation on the part of the Ukrainians of 
Russia to move towards independence was due to their level of national 
consciousness and the demographic makeup of their lands. As afore mentioned, 
Ukrainians of Russia, because of their similarities with the Russians and of the 
Russification policies, were behind in terms of national consciousness vis-à-vis the 
Ukrainians of Habsburgs. This is reflected in the electoral votes of the time. The 
1917 elections made it evident that while Ukrainian nationalists garnered great 
support from the previously Polish-ruled Right Bank, the eastern Ukrainian 
provinces preferred to support the Bolsheviks and pro-Russian parties. However 
overall, Ukrainian votes would go to the party that would promote land reform 
above other political aims. Thus, votes casted for the Ukrainian parties cannot be 
attributed only to national sentiments but to economic considerations that autonomy 
would focus politicians’ interests on local development. As such, whenever the 
Ukrainian parties failed to live up to these expectations, votes would go to 
Bolsheviks, as well. It is also noteworthy that Ukrainian nationalism, although 
limited, attracted the rural people since the cities were to a great extent Russified. 
The Russification of the cities might have been the main obstacle to the 
development of the idea of independence, since socio-economic considerations 
weighted far more than ideals of nationhood for the illiterate peasants. Still, the 
Ukrainian governments of the revolutionary era set an example of Ukrainian self-
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governance sowing the seeds of independence idea among the masses which was 
previously limited to a handful of intellectuals.  
Unlike Ukrainians of Russia, Ukrainians of Austria-Hungary were ready to 
declare their independence, at the first opportunity given with the dissolution of the 
Habsburg Empire and were determined to fight for its survival against the superior 
armies until the inevitable end. The difference of their opinion of a future Ukraine 
marks not only the level of the different levels of national consciousness between 
western and eastern Ukrainians but also their views about each other then and 
today. 
The struggle of the “two Ukraines” with their respective enemies 
(Bolsheviks, Whites and anarchist peasants for Ukrainians of Russia, Polish army 
for Galicians) led them to a seemingly natural unification. However, their choices of 
alliances to fight their different enemies stood as a test for their continued unity. 
Ukrainians of Habsburgs preferred to collaborate with the Whites against Poles but 
Ukrainians of Russia would not cooperate since their previous experience with the 
Whites inhibits their sympathy. On the other hand, Ukrainians of Russia allied with 
the Poles, the archenemy of their Galician brethren, and offered them Galicia and 
western Volhynia, the motherland of Habsburg Ukrainians, in return. This inability 
of a unified action under a seeming unity ended up Ukrainian lands to be once more 
divided. Dnieper Ukraine was incorporated into the Soviet state after the eventual 
Bolshevik victory. Galicia and western Volhynia were left under Polish rule while 
Bukovina entered Romanian sovereignty and Transcarpathia chose to be a part of 
newly established Czechoslovakia. 
Interwar years witnessed the change of boundaries since the peace 
agreements of WWI failed to settle the disputes. For Ukraine these changes largely 
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meant incorporation of more Ukrainian lands to Soviet Union. Under the Soviet 
rule, Ukrainians first experienced a national revival as the newly born Soviet 
Union’s leaders were then bound by the Marxist-Leninist ideology to permit nations 
to live under their ethnic denominations, as they were under the unity of the 
“proletariat brotherhood.” However, this seemingly favorable environment of the 
Soviet nationalities policy faded away as the Stalinization sank in. With 
Stalinization the Soviet Ukrainian lands were far away from those of the first years 
that attracted Ukrainian intelligentsia living abroad to migrate. On the contrary, 
these lands became inflicted with purges, famine, and cultural and religious 
intolerance. The Soviet nationalities policy curbed the development of a Ukrainian 
national consciousness by imposing upon the society the Soviet-Russian culture. As 
a result, the eastern Ukrainian Soviet society evolved into a more Sovietized and 
Russified society as compared to the western Ukrainian society which was free 
from Soviet influence for twenty more years. 
During the inter-war years among all Ukrainians only Transcarpathians 
living under the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia enjoyed favorable political 
conditions while the rest of the western Ukrainians lived under the suppressive 
regimes of Poland and Romania. Ukrainians living in Poland and Romania were 
refused cultural, religious and political autonomy and were subjected to 
assimilation. Yet, it was the Ukrainians of Poland to unify the efforts against their 
suppressive rulers by establishing underground nationalist organization, the 
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which employed terrorist tactics 
such as assassinations against its enemies, in its fight for freedom.  
The Second World War for Ukrainians started with the occupation of Polish-
ruled Ukrainian lands by Soviet Union in line with the secret articles of Molotov-
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Ribbentrop Pact. Soviet rule could not camouflage its suppressive nature, thus 
giving rise to purges, bans, flight of intelligentsia abroad, and cultural and religious 
intolerance. Western Ukrainian dislike of Soviet rule, which started with the reach 
of the horrible treatment of East Ukrainians and the Great Famine, was consolidated 
and OUN had its new enemy in the boots of Soviet Union.  
Soviet-Nazi Pact did not endure the WWII and they became enemies. 
Western Ukrainians living under Soviet rule for a short period of time regarded 
Germans as liberators and thus collaborated with them in the hope of independence. 
When Nazis launched Operation Barbarossa, OUN members were in the ranks of 
the German Army. When German Army entered  ’viv, OUN members announced 
the Proclamation of the Ukrainian State (Akt), a proclamation unauthorized by 
Nazis. As for the position of Ukrainians toward the Akt, while it can be said that 
Ukrainians of Volhynia and Eastern Galicia regarded the proclamation of the Akt 
positively, it is highly suspicious that the central and eastern Ukrainians agreed with 
the western Ukrainians. Since German authorities did not accept this fait accompli, 
a crackdown on OUN started. Nevertheless, OUN expeditionary groups reached far 
into the East Ukrainian lands, spread the nationalist message and learned from their 
experience with Central and East Ukrainians that they did not share many of the 
ideals and perspectives. 
By 1943, when the tide of war turned against the Nazis, Ukrainians 
experienced the brutal nature of Nazi rule to such a point to come to prefer Soviet 
rule. National awakening flourished in eastern parts due to Nazi suppression and 
OUN membership widened, as no alternative was existent up until then. When the 
Ukrainian lands once more became a battlefield, OUN formed OUN-UPA, the 
military branch, to fight for an independent Ukraine against not only Nazis and 
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Soviets but also Polish and Soviet partisans. The period 1943-1945 is one of the 
major friction points in the experiences of Ukrainians since west Ukrainians regard 
OUN-UPA members as heroes of the nation and justify OUN collaboration with the 
Nazis as only available means for a good end, while east Ukrainians regard Nazis as 
greater evil, thereby see OUN-UPA as Nazi collaborators and Soviets as liberators, 
the total opposite of what west Ukrainians thought. Even more important, the OUN 
experience let two Ukraine’s get to know and form a perspective about each other. 
Although nationally conscious western Ukrainians regarded eastern Ukrainians as 
their brethren, they realized they had few in common. Eastern Ukrainians, less 
developed in terms of national consciousness, simply found their western brothers 
different and perceived them as other, not one of themselves.  
With the end of the WWII, Ukrainian lands were once more united, this time 
to last. Under the Soviet regime, all Ukrainians were subject to Sovietization. 
Transition to Soviet rule was smoother in eastern districts while western districts 
endured purges, Russification and ban on Greek Catholic Church. This is the time 
when East and West Ukraine came to be pronounced by the Soviet authorities to 
mark the differences between them; especially in terms of how integrated they were 
to the Soviet regime. 
Although Ukrainian experiences of post-WWII Soviet period differed only 
slightly, the response of western and eastern Ukrainians to the Soviet policies 
differed considerably. Russian in-migration of the period was mainly concentrated 
on eastern and southern Ukrainian oblasts bringing about greater Russification to 
these regions. Eastern and Southern Ukrainians were adopting Russian ways and 
language, becoming increasingly bilinguals or unilingual-Russian speakers. On the 
other hand, Western and Central-Western Ukrainians seemed to retain Ukrainian as 
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their primary language of communication and could cope up with the influence of 
Russification better than their eastern counterparts. These differences among 
different parts of the Republic were preserved as a result of the Soviet policy of 
residence permits which were instrumental in preserving cultural differences 
between different historical regions.  Western Ukrainian nationalist dissenters of the 
period doubled the easterners in number, and the clandestine nationalist secessionist 
organizations emerged exclusively within western Ukrainian lands. Once the Soviet 
purges and Sovietization policies reached their aims at eliminating dissent, it can be 
argued that both “Ukraines” had once again a history that they shared for the first 
time since the partitions of Poland.  
Still, when the tide of the history changed against the Soviet Union, it was 
the Western Ukrainians that took advantage of the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union as a chance for independence. On the other hand, majority of the eastern 
Ukrainians who voted for independence did so not with national sentiments but 
because they thought autonomy would alleviate their economic burdens, just like 
they did when they supported autonomists during the revolutionary WWI years. On 
the other hand, western Ukrainian lands saw the return of national symbols, Greek 
Catholic Church and the votes casted represented a desire to secede from Soviet 
Union and have a nation state. This is illustrative of how western Ukrainians 
retained their previous memories, and guarded their culture, history, religion and 
language underneath their everyday Soviet identity.  
These all demonstrate the role of each earlier epoch on the evolution of 
contemporary Ukrainian society. The Kievan Rus’ period brought about the 
Orthodoxation of the eastern Slavic nations. The already developing divergences 
among the principalities of the Kievan Rus’ were accentuated with the separate 
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experiences of the ancestors of present day Ukrainians and Russians following the 
Mongol invasions leading to their further differentiation. The Lithuanian and Polish 
rule over the Ukrainians created a more European worldview among them when 
compared with the Russians who fell under the Mongol-Tatar influence. Centuries 
long Polish-Catholic influence further separated Ukrainians from Russians.  
The Commonwealth period signified the development of differences among 
the Ukrainians themselves. The religious factor became the most crucial catalyst in 
this development. It was this period which saw the migration of Commonwealth’s 
Ukrainians to the east in search for an escape from imposing Polish-Catholization 
and its offspring, the Uniate Church. Quite a many people of the western Ukrainian 
lands remote from Cossack influence and vulnerable to the imposition of the Uniate 
Church converted to Greek Catholicism. On the other hand, those who escaped to 
what today came to be known as “southeastern Ukraine,” became the Cossacks who 
assumed the role of protecting Orthodoxy of Ukrainians. As a legacy of this epoch 
while Greek Catholicism began dominating western Ukrainian lands and shaping 
the identity of this region’s people completely different than their brethren to the 
east, the Cossack legacy of Orthodoxy and strong association with the Russian 
culture with the lapse of time led to the development of a pro-Russian identity 
among these regions’ Ukrainians.  Although in this period Uniates represented 
assimilation and Cossacks represented the protection of Orthodox-Ukrainian 
identity, the future centuries were to shape the Uniates into nationally-conscious 
Ukrainians while the children of Cossacks were to adopt Russian ways.  
The post-Partitions period further disconnected the experiences of the 
Ukrainians living under the Habsburg and Romanovs. While the Russian imperial 
rule was suppressing all manifestations of a Ukrainian identity distinct from the 
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dominant nationality, the Ukrainians of Austria were permitted to develop their self-
distinctive identity. While Russian rule left the eastern Ukrainian lands a legacy of 
Russification, the Austrian rule left a legacy of Ukrainian national consciousness. It 
was this twin legacy that shaped the actions of Ukrainians in the First World War 
period, which demonstrated the decisiveness of the western Ukrainians in 
establishing an independent state, and reluctance of their eastern counterparts to cut 
their ties with their “elder brother.” As the inability of the “two Ukraines” in acting 
in unison led to separate experiences anew during the inter-war years, the western 
Ukrainian lands gave life to an extreme form of Ukrainian nationalism as a reaction 
to the suppressive Polish rule, whereas the Soviet-ruled lands seemed to be resigned 
to the new regime under heavy Sovietization-Russification and purges of 
“unreliable” elements. The separate regional identities were being more and more 
consolidated during this period that these divergences were not to be erased from 
the political picture of contemporary Ukraine. The Second World War became the 
scene these differences were staged. Even the post-WWII common rule under the 
Soviet Ukraine was not to head off the already well established differences. With 
the collapse of the Soviet Union it became evident that the efforts to assimilate the 
western Ukrainians, suppression of their Church, purges, and Russification efforts 
were played off by the well-entrenchedness of national consciousness among the 
western Ukrainian masses. On the other hand the independent Ukraine was -and 
still is- to have hard times in taking the southern and eastern Ukrainians, many of 
whom became unilingual Russian speakers who adopted Russian culture, into the 
frame of a Ukrainian national state.  
This analysis demonstrated that the lengthier a rule a historical region 
experienced under a non-Russian state, the more strong its inhabitants developed a 
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pro-European, nationally-conscious Ukrainian identity. As a result of this analysis 
we came to realize that the most fervent nationalists in contemporary Ukraine are 
the people of the historic Galician regions which endured the lengthiest non-
Russian rule, not being a part of  Russian state until the end of the WWII. Although 
still endowed with much more pro-nationalist sentiments as compared with the 
regions to the east which experienced longer Russian rule, the people of historic 
Volhynia, which experienced a shorter non-Russian rule than Galicia by becoming a 
part of the Russian Empire in the end of the 18
th
 century, exhibit lesser nationalist 
tendencies than the Galicians. Similarly, while the west of the traditional Habsburg-
Romanov border represent the most nationalistically minded areas, the west of the 
traditional border of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth represent a moderate 
nationalistic tendency, exhibiting the influence of lengthy Polish rule and the 
withering away of it in the face of Russian dominance. The gradual loss of 
Commonwealth authority from the Left Bank to the Right Bank corresponds to the 
support given to nationalist political parties in contemporary Ukraine since the 
tendency in pro-nationalist voting in the Right Bank is greater than the Left Bank 
and the tendency of supporting allegedly pro-Russian parties is greater in Left Bank 
than in the Right Bank. The nationalist sentiments tend to further erode in eastern 
and southern Ukrainian regions which experienced the longest period of rule by a 
Russian or its successor state. The centuries long Russification experience of 
southeastern Ukrainians is certainly a crucial factor in the evolution of 
contemporary southeastern Ukrainians into a less nationalistic, more pro-Russian 
people. 
 Since 1991 Ukraine is an independence state. Nevertheless, Ukraine is 
still under the process of building its common self, its shared history, and its joint 
182 
 
culture, since Ukrainians are yet to achieve the creation of an all-encompassing 
Ukrainian identity that embraces everyone. The regional political differences are 
still tangible given the preferences, perspectives and everyday life of the Ukrainians 
of different historical regions. This inherent divide was the very fact that stimulated 
this study and led us to search for the historical roots of the fragmented nature of 
contemporary Ukrainian society. The historical analysis of different historical 
periods performed in this thesis not only confirms the fundamental role played by 
centuries long differing historical experiences of Ukrainian generations on the 
evolution of contemporary regional distinctions, but also is a reminder that the 
essential role of pre-18
th
 century historical legacy on the political culture and 
identity of contemporary Ukrainians is not an issue to evade. 
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